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third understands the role of banking frictions on equity markets.
More specifically, the first chapter asks the question, what is the role of monetary policy fluctuations for the
macroeconomy and bond markets? To answer this question we design a novel asset-pricing framework which
incorporates a time-varying Taylor rule for monetary policy, macroeconomic factors, and risk pricing
restrictions from investor preferences. By estimating the model using U.S. term structure data, we find that
monetary policy fluctuations significantly impact inflation uncertainty and bond risk exposures, but do not
have a sizable effect on the first moments of macroeconomic variables. Monetary policy fluctuations
contribute about 20% to the variation in bond risk premia.
Models with frictions in financial contracts have been shown to create persistence effects in macroeconomic
fluctuations. These persistent risks can then generate large risk premia in asset markets. Accordingly, in the
second chapter, we test the ability that a particular friction, Costly State Verification (CSV), has to generate
empirically plausible risk exposures in equity markets, when household investors have recursive preferences
and shocks occur in the growth rate of productivity. After embedding these mechanisms into a
macroeconomic model with financial intermediation, we find that the CSV friction is negligible in realistically
augmenting the equity risk premium. While the friction slows the speed of capital investment, its contribution
to asset markets is insignificant.
The third chapter examines how firms manage debt maturity in the presence of investment opportunities. I
document empirically that debt maturity tradeoffs play an important role in determining economic
fluctuations and asset prices. I show at aggregate and firm levels that corporations lengthen their average
maturity of debt when output and investment rates are larger. To explain these findings, I construct an
economic model where firms simultaneously choose investment, short, and long-term debt. In equilibrium,
long-term debt is more costly than short-term debt and is only used when investment opportunities present
themselves in peaks of the business cycle.
Degree Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Graduate Group
Finance
First Advisor
Joao F. Gomes
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2650
Second Advisor
Amir Yaron
Keywords
Debt Maturity, Debt Valuation, Financial Frictions, Macroeconomics, Risk Premia, Term Structure
Subject Categories
Economics | Economic Theory | Finance and Financial Management
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2650
ESSAYS ON ASSET PRICING, DEBT VALUATION, AND MACROECONOMICS
Ram S. Yamarthy
A DISSERTATION
in
Finance
For the Graduate Group in Managerial Science and Applied Economics
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania
in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
2017
Supervisor of Dissertation
Joa˜o F. Gomes
Professor of Finance
Co-Supervisor of Dissertation
Amir Yaron
Professor of Finance
Graduate Group Chairperson
Catherine Schrand, Celia Z. Moh Professor, Professor of Accounting
Dissertation Committee:
Urban Jermann, Professor of Finance
Nikolai Roussanov, Associate Professor of Finance
Ivan Shaliastovich, Associate Professor of Finance, Wisconsin School of Business
I dedicate this dissertation to my mom and dad, Lakshmi and Krishna. You have inspired
my pursuit of knowledge and taught me the value of hard work. Without your love and
support, this would not have been possible. Thank You.
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
First and foremost, I would like to thank my main advisers, Joa˜o Gomes and Amir Yaron.
Their kind and influential support helped train me and develop me into a better researcher.
I am forever indebted to them. I am also thankful to Ivan Shaliastovich, who has continually
furthered my thinking and provided valuable insights. In particular, my work with him has
served as a major learning experience. I am also appreciative of the other members of
my dissertation committee, Urban Jermann and Nikolai Roussanov, who provided great
feedback for my research. In addition to a number of faculty members and staff, I am also
thankful to my sister, the rest of my family, and close friends of mine. You all played a
crucial role in helping me pursue this work.
iii
ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON ASSET PRICING, DEBT VALUATION, AND MACROECONOMICS
Ram S. Yamarthy
Joa˜o Gomes
Amir Yaron
My dissertation consists of three chapters which examine topics at the intersection of fi-
nancial markets and macroeconomics. Two of the sections relate to the valuation of U.S.
Treasury and corporate debt while the third understands the role of banking frictions on
equity markets.
More specifically, the first chapter asks the question, what is the role of monetary policy
fluctuations for the macroeconomy and bond markets? To answer this question we design
a novel asset-pricing framework which incorporates a time-varying Taylor rule for mone-
tary policy, macroeconomic factors, and risk pricing restrictions from investor preferences.
By estimating the model using U.S. term structure data, we find that monetary policy
fluctuations significantly impact inflation uncertainty and bond risk exposures, but do not
have a sizable effect on the first moments of macroeconomic variables. Monetary policy
fluctuations contribute about 20% to the variation in bond risk premia.
Models with frictions in financial contracts have been shown to create persistence effects in
macroeconomic fluctuations. These persistent risks can then generate large risk premia in
asset markets. Accordingly, in the second chapter, we test the ability that a particular fric-
tion, Costly State Verification (CSV), has to generate empirically plausible risk exposures
in equity markets, when household investors have recursive preferences and shocks occur in
the growth rate of productivity. After embedding these mechanisms into a macroeconomic
model with financial intermediation, we find that the CSV friction is negligible in realis-
tically augmenting the equity risk premium. While the friction slows the speed of capital
iv
investment, its contribution to asset markets is insignificant.
The third chapter examines how firms manage debt maturity in the presence of investment
opportunities. I document empirically that debt maturity tradeoffs play an important role
in determining economic fluctuations and asset prices. I show at aggregate and firm levels
that corporations lengthen their average maturity of debt when output and investment
rates are larger. To explain these findings, I construct an economic model where firms
simultaneously choose investment, short, and long-term debt. In equilibrium, long-term
debt is more costly than short-term debt and is only used when investment opportunities
present themselves in peaks of the business cycle.
v
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Chapter 1: Monetary Policy Risks in the Bond Markets
(joint work with Ivan Shaliastovich)
1.1. Introduction
There is a significant evidence that monetary policy fluctuates over time. In certain periods
the monetary authority reacts more strongly to fundamental concerns about real economic
growth and inflation, thus affecting the dynamics and the risk exposures of the bond mar-
kets. Yet, there is no conclusive evidence on how these policy fluctuations impact the
economy and asset prices. To assess the role of a time-varying monetary policy, we de-
velop an economically motivated asset-pricing model which incorporates the link between
the monetary policy fluctuations, aggregate macroeconomic variables, and nominal bond
yields. We estimate the model using macroeconomic, forecast, and term structure data,
and quantify the conditional implications of the monetary policy fluctuations above and
beyond standard macro-finance risk channels. We find that while monetary policy fluctua-
tions are not significantly related to the first moments of the macroeconomic variables, the
inflation uncertainty and bond price exposures to economic risks significantly increase in
aggressive relative to passive regimes. Consequently, through their direct impact on bond
risk exposures and indirect effect on the quantity of inflation risk, fluctuations in monetary
policy have a sizeable contribution to the time-variation in the levels of yields and bond
risk premia.
Our asset-pricing framework features a novel recursive-utility based representation of the
stochastic discount factor (SDF), the exogenous dynamics of the macroeconomic factors,
and the time-varying Taylor rule for the interest rates. Specifically, the stochastic discount
factor incorporates pricing conditions of the recursive-utility investor, but does not force
an inter-temporal restriction between the short rate and the fundamental macroeconomic
processes. This representation is an alternative to the decompositions in Bansal et al. (2013)
and Campbell et al. (2012), and identifies long-run cash-flow, long-run interest rate news,
and the uncertainty news as the key sources of risk for the investor. Our representation
of the SDF is particularly convenient for our analysis. Similar to the reduced-form, no-
arbitrage models of the term structure, our representation allows us to exogenously and
flexibly model the dynamics of the short rates and the macroeconomic state variables.1 On
the other hand, our stochastic discount factor is economically motivated, and the sources
and the market prices of risks are disciplined to be consistent with recent economic term-
structure models.
1See Singleton (2006) for the review of the no-arbitrage term structure models.
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To model the short rate, we assume a forward looking, time-varying Taylor rule in which
the sensitivities of the short rate to expected real growth and expected inflation can vary
across the monetary policy regimes. We further consider an exogenous specification of the
dynamics of the real growth and inflation, which features persistent fluctuations in the
conditional means and volatilities of the economic states. As in Bansal and Shaliastovich
(2013) and Piazzesi and Schneider (2005), we allow for inflation non-neutrality, so that
expected inflation can have a negative impact on future real growth. This economic channel
plays an important role to explain a positive bond risk premium and a positive slope of the
nominal term structure. Following Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013), we also incorporate
exogenous fluctuations in inflation volatility which drive the quantity of macroeconomic
risks and bond risk premia. Novel in our paper, we allow the conditional expectations of
future consumption and inflation as well as the inflation volatility to directly depend on
the monetary policy regime. In this sense, we introduce a link between the time-varying
monetary policy, the exposures of bond prices to economic risks, and the movements in the
levels and volatilities of the underlying economic factors.
To estimate the model and assess the role of the monetary policy fluctuations, we utilize
quarterly data on realized consumption and inflation, the survey expectations on real growth
and inflation, and the data on bond yields for short to long maturities. The model-implied
observation equations are nonlinear in the states, and all economic factors are latent. Similar
to Schorfheide et al. (2013) and Song (2014), we rely on Bayesian MCMC methods to draw
model parameters, and use particle filter to filter out latent states and evaluate the likelihood
function.
We find that the estimation produces plausible parameter values and delivers a good fit to
the observed macroeconomic and yield data. The expected consumption, expected inflation,
and inflation volatility are very persistent, and expected inflation has a strong and negative
feedback to future expected consumption. We further find substantial fluctuations in the
monetary policy across the regimes. Interestingly, monetary policy fluctuations do not have
a sizeable effect on the first moments of the macroeconomic variables: the expectations of
future real growth and inflation are not significantly different across the regimes. On the
other hand, inflation uncertainty significantly increases by about a quarter, and interest
rates respond stronger to expected real growth and inflation risks in aggressive relative
to passive regimes. Indeed, the median short rate loadings on expected real growth and
expected inflation are equal to 0.7 and 1.7, respectively, in aggressive regimes, which are
significantly larger than the estimated loadings of 0.5 and 0.9 in passive regimes.
These differences in inflation volatility and bond sensitivities have important implications
for the dynamics of bond yields. We document that the loadings of bond yields and bond
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risk premia are magnified in aggressive relative to passive regimes. This results in elevated
means and volatilities of bond yields and bond risk premia in aggressive regimes. Intro-
ducing time-variation in monetary policy increases variability of bond risk premia by about
20%. The time-varying bond exposures to expected inflation risk and the time-varying
quantity of inflation risk due to monetary policy fluctuations both contribute about equally
to a rise in bond risk premia. Interestingly, the variations in inflation and real growth sen-
sitivities of interest rates have opposite effects on the bond risk premia. We further show
that the bond risk premia can go negative when the inflation premium is relatively small. In
the data, the model-implied bond risk premia turn negative post 2005 when the conditional
inflation volatility is below the average, and the economy is in a passive regime.
Related Literature. There are several contributions of our approach to the existing lit-
erature. First, we rely on a novel representation of the stochastic discount factor which
allows us to incorporate a flexible dynamics of a time-varying Taylor rule and macroeco-
nomic factors, and yet impose economic pricing restrictions from the recursive preferences.
Second, we consider the interaction between monetary policy fluctuations and movements
in stochastic volatility, expected growth, and expected inflation. Finally, we estimate the
model using the macroeconomic and asset price data, and perform a quantitative assess-
ment of the importance of monetary policy fluctuations for the levels and volatilities of
bond yields and bond risk premia.
Our paper is related to a large and growing macro-finance literature which studies the role
of monetary policy for macroeconomic fundamentals and asset prices. In the context of gen-
eral equilibrium models, Song (2014) considers a long-run risks type model to investigate a
role of monetary policy and macroeconomic regimes for the dynamics of bond and equity
prices, and specifically for the comovement between bond and equity returns. This work
does not consider the link between monetary policy and macroeconomic uncertainties, which
we find to be important for the movements in the bond risk premia. Campbell, Pflueger
and Viceira (2014) use a New Keynesian habit formation model to study the variation in
stock and bond correlation and movements in the bond risk premia across monetary policy
regimes. The model is calibrated to target interest rate rules across data subsamples. In
our work, persistent changes in monetary policy regimes which affect the dynamics of the
macroeconomy and bond yields are taken into account when evaluating the Euler equation,
and represent a priced source of risks for the investor. Within a DSGE framework, time-
variation of the monetary policy is also considered in Andreasen (2012), Chib et al. (2010),
and Palomino (2012), while constant coefficient Taylor rule are featured in general equilib-
rium models such as Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) and Gallmeyer et al. (2006). Kung
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(2015) embeds a constant coefficient Taylor rule in a production-based asset pricing model,
and considers the monetary policy impact on the term structure of interest rates. Relative
to this literature, our paper entertains an alternative and more flexible representation of
the stochastic discount factor and macroeconomic factors, and further incorporates a link
between inflation uncertainty and the monetary policy fluctuations.
In terms of the reduced-form term structure literature, Ang et al. (2011) highlight the im-
portance of a time-varying monetary policy for the shape of the nominal term structure
and the levels of the bond risk premia. They document substantial fluctuations in Fed’s
response to inflation, while the variations in policy stance to output gap shocks are much
smaller. They do not entertain movements in macroeconomic volatilities. In our framework,
we find that monetary policy coefficients to persistent growth and inflation risks are both
quite volatile, and contribute to the fluctuations in the risk premia, alongside with move-
ments in fundamental uncertainties. Bikbov and Chernov (2013) incorporate time-variation
in monetary policy and stochastic volatilities of the fundamental shocks, and argue that in-
terest rate data play an important role to identify movements in the underlying regimes.
We follow their insight and use bond price data jointly with the macro and survey observa-
tions to identify the model parameters and states. Different from their paper, we take an
economically-motivated, long-run risks pricing approach to the term structure, and allow
for the link between monetary policy and economic uncertainty. Bekaert and Moreno (2010)
and Ang et al. (2005) study the role of the monetary policy for the term structure using
constant-coefficient Taylor rules and reduced-form specifications of the pricing kernel.
Our paper focuses on both the time-varying macroeconomic volatilities and regime shifts due
to monetary policy as the main drivers of the bond risk premia. Hasseltoft (2012) and Bansal
and Shaliastovich (2013) document the importance of the fluctuations in macroeconomic
uncertainty for the time-variation in bond risk premia. In an alternative approach, Bekaert
et al. (2009), Bekaert and Grenadier (2001) and Wachter (2006) use time-varying habits-
formation models to study fluctuations in the bond risk premia. There is a large literature
which incorporates discrete regimes changes into the term structure model specification.
Bansal and Zhou (2002) implement regime shifting coefficients in the short rate of a one
factor Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model. Beyond matching bond yield facts, they show that the
regimes are related to business cycle movements. Dai et al. (2007) show that incorporating
regime shift factors impact the dynamics of yields and increases time-variation in expected
excess bond returns. Ang et al. (2008) use a regime-shift term structure model to study
the implications for real rates and the inflation premium embedded in the cross-section of
nominal bonds.
In terms of the earlier literature, Hamilton (1989) was the first to perform a Markov-
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switching, regime shift model using purely macroeconomic data in a traditional VAR set-
ting, finding that state parameters correspond to peaks and troughs in the business cycle.
The seminal work of Sims and Zha (2006) extended the Markov-switching to a Bayesian
framework with a structural VAR setup. The large conclusion of this work was that mone-
tary policy shifts have been brief if at all existent. In fact the model that fits the best is one
where there is stochastic volatility in the disturbances of fundamental variables. Related
to that, Primiceri (2005) shows that while monetary policy significantly varies over time, it
appears to have little effect on the real economy. Consistent with these works, we find little
effect of monetary policy for the levels of real growth and inflation. However, we find a
significant effect on the macroeconomic uncertainty, and the conditional dynamics of bond
prices and bond risk premia.
Our paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the economic model. In the
following two sections, we provide an overview of our estimation method and discuss our
results. The last section concludes.
1.2. Economic Model
1.2.1. Stochastic Discount Factor
We derive a convenient representation of the stochastic discount factor, similar to Bansal
et al. (2013), which incorporates pricing conditions of the recursive-utility investor, but
which does not force an inter-temporal restriction between the short rate and the funda-
mental macroeconomic processes. This approach allows us to specify a flexible link between
short rates and macroeconomic factors, which can be identified directly in the data. At the
same time, we maintain economic restrictions on the fundamental risk sources and their
market prices of risks, useful for pricing long-term bonds.
As shown in Epstein and Zin (1989), under the recursive utility the log real stochastic
discount factor (SDF) is given by,
mrt+1 = θ log δ −
θ
ψ
4ct+1 + (θ − 1)rc,t+1, (1.1)
where where ∆ct+1 is the real consumption growth, and rc,t+1 is the return to the aggregate
wealth portfolio. Parameter γ is a measure of a local risk aversion of the agent, ψ is the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and δ ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor. For
notational simplicity, parameter θ is defined as θ = 1−γ
1− 1
ψ
.
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To obtain nominal SDF, we subtract inflation rate pit+1 from the real SDF:
mt+1 = m
r
t+1 − pit+1
= θ log δ − θ
ψ
4ct+1 + (θ − 1)rc,t+1 − pit+1.
(1.2)
The nominal SDF is driven the consumption growth, inflation rate, and the unobserved
return on the wealth portfolio.
Next we incorporate the budget constraint and the Euler equation for the short rates
to characterize the expectations of the SDF, Etmt+1, and the innovation into the SDF,
Nm,t+1 = mt+1 −Etmt+1, in terms of the observed dynamics of the macroeconomic factors
and the short rate.
The standard first-order condition implies that for any nominal return rt+1, the Euler
equation should hold:
Et [exp(mt+1 + rt+1)] = 1. (1.3)
Using this condition for the one-period short-term nominal interest rate, rt+1 = it, we
obtain that:
Etmt+1 = −it − Vt. (1.4)
The last component Vt is the entropy of the SDF:
Vt = logEt(exp(Nm,t+1)). (1.5)
Up to the third-order terms, Vt is driven by the variance of the SDF; indeed, in a con-
ditionally Gaussian model, Vt is exactly equal to half of the conditional variance of the
stochastic discount factor. This is why we refer to this component as capturing uncertainty
or volatility risks.
Now let us relate the SDF innovation Nm,t+1 to the fundamental economic shocks, consistent
with the recursive utility specification in (1.2). Consider the news into the current and future
expected stochastic discount factor, (Et+1 − Et)
∑
j=0 κ
j
1mt+j+1. Based on the recursive
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utility formulation in (1.2), it is equal to,
(Et+1 − Et)
∑
j=0
κj1mt+j+1 = −
θ
ψ
(Et+1 − Et)
∑
j=0
κj1∆ct+j+1
+ (θ − 1)(Et+1 − Et)
∑
j=0
κj1rc,t+j+1 − (Et+1 − Et)
∑
j=0
κj1pit+j+1.
(1.6)
Note that the return to the consumption claim rc,t+1 satisfies the budget constraint:
rc,t+1 = log
Wt+1
Wt − Ct ≈ κ0 + wct+1 −
1
κ1
wct +4ct+1, (1.7)
where wc is the log wealth-consumption ratio and the parameter κ1 ∈ (0, 1) corresponds to
the log-linearization coefficient in the investor’s budget constraint. Iterating this equation
forward, we obtain that the cash-flow news, defined as the current and future expected
shocks to consumption, should be equal to the current and future expected shocks to con-
sumption return:
NCF,t+1 = (Et+1 − Et)
∑
j=0
κj1∆ct+j+1 = (Et+1 − Et)
∑
j=0
κj1rc,t+j+1. (1.8)
With that, the right-hand side of (1.6) simplifies to,
(Et+1 − Et)
∑
j=0
κj1mt+j+1 = −
θ
ψ
NCF,t+1 + (θ − 1)NCF,t+1 −Npi,t+1
= −γNCF,t+1 −Npi,t+1,
(1.9)
where the long-run inflation news are defined as,
Npi,t+1 = (Et+1 − Et)
∑
j=0
κj1pit+j+1. (1.10)
The news into the current and future expected stochastic discount factor, which is on the
left-hand side of equation (1.9), incorporates current SDF shock Nm,t+1 and shocks to future
expectations of the SDF, which we can characterize using the representation in (1.4):
(Et+1 − Et)
∑
j=0
κj1mt+j+1 = Nm,t+1 − (Et+1 − Et)
∑
j=0
κj1(it+j + Vt+j)
= Nm,t+1 −Ni,t+1 −NV,t+1,
(1.11)
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where the interest rate and volatility news are defined as follows:
Ni,t+1 = (Et+1 − Et)
∑
j=0
κj1it+j , NV,t+1 = (Et+1 − Et)
∑
j=0
κj1Vt+j . (1.12)
Hence, we can represent the SDF shock as,
Nm,t+1 = −γNCF,t+1 + (Ni,t+1 −Npi,t+1) +NV,t+1, (1.13)
and the total SDF is given by:
mt+1 = −it − Vt − γNCF,t+1 + (Ni,t+1 −Npi,t+1) +NV,t+1. (1.14)
That is, under the recursive utility framework, the agent effectively is concerned about the
long-run real growth news NCF,t+1, long-run risk free rate news (inflation-adjusted short
rate news Ni,t+1 −Npi,t+1), and long-run uncertainty news NV,t+1. The market price of the
cash-flow risks is equal to the risk-aversion coefficient γ, while the market prices of both the
interest rate and volatility shocks are negative 1: the marginal utility increases one-to-one
with a rise in uncertainty or interest rates.
It is important to emphasize that the SDF representation above is common to all the
recursive-utility based models. Indeed, to derive it we only used the Euler condition and the
budget constraint, and did not make any assumptions about the dynamics of the underlying
economy. In general equilibrium environments, the macroeconomic model assumptions
are going to determine the decomposition of these underlying cash-flow, interest rate, and
volatility risks into primitive economic shocks.
In our empirical approach, we rely on the SDF representation (1.14), instead of a more
primitive specification in (1.2). This allows us to model short-term interest rates exoge-
nously together with consumption and inflation processes, and yet maintain the pricing
implications of the recursive utility SDF. Notably, the uncertainty term is still endogenous
in our framework, as the volatility term Vt and the innovations NV,t+1 should be consistent
with the entropy of the SDF in (1.5).
1.2.2. Economic Dynamics
In this section we specify the exogenous dynamics of consumption, inflation, and the short
rates. This, together with the specification of the SDF and the Euler condition, allows us
to solve for the prices of long-term nominal bonds.
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We first specify a Markov chain to represent the time-variation in monetary policy regimes
st. We assume N states with a transition matrix, T , given by:
T =

pi11 pi12 . . . pi1N
pi21 pi22 . . . pi2N
...
...
...
...
piN1 piN2 . . . piNN
 =

...
...
...
...
T1 T2 . . . TN
...
...
...
...

where each piji indicates the probability of moving from state i to state j. Each column, Ti,
is the vector of probabilities of moving from state i to all other states next period.
We next specify the exogenous dynamics of the macroeconomic state variables. Our asset-
pricing framework underscores the importance of long-run, persistent movements in con-
sumption, inflation, and fundamental volatility. To capture these risks, we directly specify
exogenous processes for consumption and inflation, which feature persistent fluctuations
in their expectations and volatilities. In this sense, our approach is different from “New
Keynesian” based models which feature alternative empirical specifications for output gap
and a Phillips curve, such as those in Bikbov and Chernov (2013), Campbell et al. (2013),
and Bekaert and Moreno (2010).
Specifically, similar to Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013), we specify an exogenous dynamics
for consumption and inflation, which incorporates persistent movements in the conditional
expectations and volatilities. The realized consumption and inflation are given by,
4ct+1 = µc(st) + xc,t + σ∗c c,t+1
pit+1 = µpi(st) + xpi,t + σ
∗
pipi,t+1.
(1.15)
Notably, we allow the components of the conditional means to depend on the monetary
regime st, which allows us to identify the variation in expectations of future consumption
and inflation related to monetary policy. Fundamentals are also driven by ”non-policy”
shocks such as movements in persistent expected components, xi,t, as well as i,t+1 which
represent i.i.d. Gaussian short-run shocks.
The dynamics of the expected consumption and expected inflation states Xt = [xct, xpit]
′
follows a VAR(1) process:[
xc,t+1
xpi,t+1
]
=
[
Πcc Πcpi
Πpic Πpipi
][
xc,t
xpi,t
]
+ Σtt+1. (1.16)
This representation allows us to capture persistence of expected consumption and infla-
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tion risks, as measured by the values of Πcc and Πpipi. Further, this specification can also
incorporate “inflation non-neutrality,” that is, a negative response of future expected con-
sumption to high expected inflation (Πcpi < 0). As shown in Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013)
and Piazzesi and Schneider (2005), inflation non-neutrality is important to account for the
bond market data. For simplicity, the persistence matrix Π is constant. The model can be
extended to accommodate regime-dependent persistence coefficients.
In general, the volatilities of expected real growth and inflation states are given by:2
Σt =
(
σc,0 0
0 σpi,t
)
=
√δc(st) + σ˜2c,t 0
0
√
δpi(st) + σ˜2pi,t

Each conditional variance depends on the monetary policy regime and is also driven by an
orthogonal component σ˜i,t. This component captures movements in macroeconomic volatili-
ties which are independent from the monetary policy. Their dynamics is specified as follows:
σ˜2ct = σ˜
2
c,0 + ϕcσ˜
2
c,t−1 + ωcησct,
σ˜2pit = σ˜
2
pi,0 + ϕpiσ˜
2
pi,t−1 + ωpiησpit.
(1.17)
For simplicity, the exogenous volatilities are driven by Gaussian shocks. The specification
can be extended to square root processes, as in Tauchen (2005), or positive Gamma shocks.
Notably, in our specification macroeconomic volatilities can be systematically different
across the monetary policy regimes. This captures the link between the fluctuations in
monetary policy and aggregate economic uncertainty. Many of the existing specifications
which incorporate fluctuations in monetary policy and volatilities do not entertain comove-
ments between the two (see e.g., Song (2014) and Bikbov and Chernov (2013)).
Finally, we specify the dynamics of the short rate. It follows a modified Taylor rule, in
which the monetary authority reacts to expected growth and expected inflation, and the
stance of the monetary policy can vary across the regimes. Specifically,
it = i0 + αc(st) (xct + µc(st)) + αpi(st) (xpi,t + µpi(st))
= [i0 + αc(st)µc(st) + αpi(st)µpi(st)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡α0(st)
+αc(st)xct + αpi(st)xpi,t. (1.18)
The loadings {αc(st), αpi(st)} are the key regime-dependent parameters of monetary policy.
The interpretation of this Taylor rule is that the short rate loads stochastically on both
2In empirical implementation, we focus on the time-variation in inflation volatility, and set consumption
volatility to be constant.
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expected growth and inflation. The justification for a “forward-looking” Taylor rule has
been empirically founded and shown in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2003). For parsimony,
we abstract from other sources of variation in the interest rate rule, such as monetary policy
shocks, dependence on lag rates, etc. While they can be easily introduced in our framework,
we opt for a simpler specification to focus on the time-variation in the growth and inflation
loadings of the Taylor rule and their relation to the macroeconomy and bond markets.
1.2.3. Model Solution
In Appendix we show that the long-run cash-flow, inflation, interest rate, and volatility news
can be expressed in terms of the underlying macroeconomic, interest rate, and regime-shift
shocks. Specifically, the cash flow, inflation news and interest rates news are given by,
NCF,t+1 = FCF,0(st+1, st) + FCF,(st+1, st)
′Σtt+1 + σ∗c c,t+1, (1.19)
Npi,t+1 = Fpi,0(st+1, st) + Fpi,(st+1, st)
′Σtt+1 + σ∗pipi,t+1, (1.20)
NI,t+1 = FI,0(st+1, st) + FI,X(st+1, st)
′Xt + FI,(. . . )′Σtt+1, (1.21)
where the functions F depend on the policy regimes and model parameters. Notably, the
sensitivities of the long-term news to primitive economic shocks in general depend on current
and future monetary policy regimes.
We can also show that the uncertainty term Vt is in general given by,
Vt(st, Xt, σ˜
2
c,t, σ˜
2
pi,t) = V0(st) + V1(st)
′Xt + V2c(st)σ˜2c,t + V2pi(st)σ˜
2
pi,t, (1.22)
so that the volatility news are given by,
NV,t+1 = Fv,0(st+1, st) + Fv,X(st+1, st)
′Xt + Fv,σc(st+1, st)′σ˜2ct + Fv,σpi(st+1, st)
′σ˜2pit
+ Fv,(. . . )Σtt+1 + Fv,ηc(. . . )ωcησc,t+1 + Fv,ηpi(. . . )ωpiησpi,t+1.
(1.23)
The coefficients are determined as part of the model solution, and are given in the Appendix.
Combining all the components together, we can represent the SDF in terms of the underlying
macroeconomic, interest rate, and regime shift shocks:
mt+1 = −it − Vt − γNCF,t+1 +NR,t+1 +NV,t+1
= S0 + S
′
1,XXt + S1,σcσ˜
2
ct + S1,σpiσ˜
2
pit + S
′
2,Σtt+1 + S2,ηcωcηc,t+1 + S2,ηpiωpiηpi,t+1
− γσ∗c c,t+1 − σ∗pipi,t+1.
(1.24)
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The SDF loadings and the market prices of risks depend on the primitive parameters of
the model. In this sense, the pricing restrictions of the recursive utility provide economic
discipline on the dynamics of our pricing kernel. Notably, because short rate loadings are
time-varying, the SDF coefficients generally depend on monetary policy regimes. In a model
with constant Taylor rule coefficients, the volatility of the SDF and the asset risk premia
fluctuate only because the volatilities of expected growth and expected inflation are time-
varying. In the model with time-varying monetary policy, the SDF volatility varies also due
to movements in the Taylor rule coefficients.
1.2.4. Nominal Term Structure
In our model, log bond prices, pnt , and the bond yields y
n
t = − 1npnt are (approximately)
linear in the underlying expected growth, expected inflation, and volatility states, and the
loadings vary across the regimes:
ynt = −
1
n
pnt = An(st) + Bn
′
X (st)Xt + Bnσc(st)σ˜2ct + Bnσpi(st)σ2pit. (1.25)
For n = 1 we uncover the underlying Taylor rule parameters:
A1(st) = α0(st),
B1X(st)′ = α(st)′,
B1σc(i) = 0,
B1σpi(i) = 0.
We can further define one-period excess returns on n−maturity bond,
rxt→t+1,n = nyt,n − (n− 1)yt+1,n−1 − yt,1. (1.26)
The expected excess return on bonds is approximately equal to,
Et(rxt→t+1,n) +
1
2
V art(rxt+1,n) ≈ −Covt(mt+1, rxt+1,n)
= Cons(st) + rσc(st)σ˜
2
ct + rσpi(st)σ˜
2
pit.
(1.27)
The risk premia in our economy are time varying because there are exogenous fluctua-
tions in stochastic volatilities, and because bond exposures fluctuate across monetary policy
regimes. The second, monetary policy channel is absent in standard macroeconomic models
of the term structure which entertain constant bond exposures and rely on time-variation
in macroeconomic volatilities to generate movements in the risk premia (see e.g., Bansal
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and Shaliastovich (2013), Hasseltoft (2012)). In the next section we assess the importance
of the monetary policy risks to explain the term structure dynamics, above and beyond
traditional economic channels.
1.3. Model Estimation
1.3.1. Data Description
We use macroeconomic data on consumption and inflation, survey data on expected real
growth and expected inflation, and asset-price data on bond yields to estimate the model.
For our consumption measure we use log real growth rates of expenditures on non-durable
goods and services from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The inflation measure
corresponds to the log growth in the GDP deflator. The empirical measures of the ex-
pectations are constructed from the cross-section of individual forecasts from the Survey
of Professional Forecasts at the Philadelphia Fed. Specifically, the expected real growth
corresponds to the cross-sectional average, after removing outliers, of four-quarters-ahead
individual expectations of real GDP. Similarly, the expected inflation is given by the average
of four-quarters-ahead expectations of inflation. The real growth and inflation expectation
measures are adjusted to be mean zero, and are rescaled to predict next-quarter consump-
tion and inflation, respectively, with a loading of one. The construction of these measures
follows Bansal and Shaliastovich (2009). Finally, we use nominal zero-coupon bond yields
of maturities one through five years, taken from the CRSP Fama-Bliss data files. We also
utilize the nominal three-month rate from the Federal Reserve to proxy for the short rate.
Based on the length of the survey data, our sample is quarterly, from 1969 through 2014.
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for our variables. In our sample, the average short
rate is 5.2%. The term structure is upward sloping, so that the five-year rate reaches 6.4%.
Bond volatilities decrease with maturity from 3.3% at short horizons to about 3% at five
years. The yields are very persistent. As shown in the bottom panel of the Table, real
growth and inflation expectations are very persistent as well. The AR(1) coefficients for
the real growth and inflation forecasts are 0.87 and 0.98, respectively, and are much larger
than the those for the realized consumption growth and inflation. Figure 1 shows the time
series of the realized and expected consumption growth and inflation rate. As shown on
the Figure, the expected states from the surveys capture low frequency movements in the
realized macroeconomic variables.
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1.3.2. Estimation Method
In our empirical analysis of the model, we focus on the stochastic volatility channel of
the expected inflation, and set the volatility of the expected real growth to be constant.3
To identify the volatility level parameters, we set the monetary policy component of the
inflation volatility in state one to be zero; to identify the regimes, we impose that the
short rate sensitivity to expected inflation is highest in regime 2. Finally, we set the log-
linearization parameter κ1 to a typical value of .99 in the literature.
To estimate the model and write down the likelihood of the data, we represent the evolution
of the observable macroeconomic, survey, and bond yield variables in a convenient state-
space form:
(Measurement) y1:Nyt+1 = A1:Ny(st+1) + B1:NyX (st+1)Xt+1 + B1:Nyσpi (st+1)σ˜2pi,t+1 + Σu,yut+1,y,
4ct+1 = µc(st) + e′1Xt + σ∗c c,t+1,
pit+1 = µpi(st) + e
′
2Xt + σ
∗
pipi,t+1,
xSPFcons,t+1 = µc(st+1)− E [µc(st+1)] + xc,t+1 + σu,xcut+1,xc,
xSPFinfl,t+1 = µpi(st+1)− E [µpi(st+1)] + xpi,t+1 + σu,xpiut+1,xpi,
(Transition) Xt+1 = ΠXt + Σt(σ˜pit, st)t+1,
σ˜2pit = σ˜
2
pi,0 + ϕpiσ˜
2
pi,t−1 + ωpiησpi,t,
st ∼ Markov Chain (Ps),
where Ny is the number of bond yields in the data. In the estimation we allow for
Gaussian measurement errors on the observed yields and survey expectations, captured by
ut+1,y and ut+1,xc:xpi. For parsimony and to stabilize the chains, we fix the volatilities of
the measurement errors to be equal to 20% of the unconditional volatilities of the factors.
As we describe in the subsequent section, the ex-post measurement errors in the sample are
much smaller than that.
The set of parameters, to be jointly estimated with the states, is denoted by Θ, is given by:
Θ = {Π, δαpi, σ˜2c0, σ˜2pi0, ϕpi, ωpi, σ∗c , σ∗pi, i0, γ, µ1:Nc , µ1:Npi , α1:Nc , α1:Npi ,Ps}.
The estimation problem is quite challenging due to the fact that the observation equations
3Identification of real volatility is challenging in bond market data alone. In a related framework, Song
(2014) incorporate equity market data, which are informative about movements in real uncertainty, to help
estimate real volatility.
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are nonlinear in the state variables, and the underlying expectation, volatility, and regime
state variables are latent. Because of these considerations, we cannot use the typical Carter
and Kohn (1994) methodology which utilizes smoothed Kalman filter moments to draw
states. Instead, to estimate parameters and latent state variables we rely on a Bayesian
MCMC procedure using particle filter methodology to evaluate the likelihood function. As
in Andrieu et al. (2010) and Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007), we embed
the particle filter based likelihood into a Random Walk Metropolis Hasting algorithm and
sample parameters in this way. Schorfheide et al. (2013) and Song (2014) entertain similar
approaches to estimate versions of the long-run risks model.
1.4. Estimation Results
1.4.1. Parameter and State Estimates
Table 2 shows the moments of the prior and posterior distributions of the parameters. We
chose fairly loose priors which cover a wide range of economically plausible parameters to
maximize learning from the data. For example, a two-standard deviation band for the
persistence of the expected inflation and expected consumption ranges from 0.5 to 1.0. The
prior means for the scale parameters are set to typical values in the literature, and the prior
standard deviations are quite large as well. Importantly, we are careful not to hardwire
the fluctuations in monetary policy and their impact on macroeconomy and bond prices
through the prior selection. That is, in our prior we assume that the monetary policy
coefficients are the same across the regimes, and are equal to 1 for expected inflation and
0.5 for expected growth. Likewise, our prior distribution for the role of monetary policy on
inflation volatility is symmetric and is centered at zero, and there is no difference in the
conditional means of consumption and inflation across the regimes. Hence, we do not force
any impact through the prior, and let the data determine the size and the direction of the
monetary policy effects.
The table further shows the posterior parameter estimates in the data. The posterior median
for the risk aversion coefficient is 13.6, which is smaller than the values entertained in Bansal
and Shaliastovich (2013) and Piazzesi and Schneider (2005). The expected consumption,
expected inflation, and inflation volatility are very persistent: the median AR(1) coefficients
are above 0.95. The expected inflation has a negative and non-neutral effect on future real
growth: Πcpi is negative, consistent with findings in Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013) and
Piazzesi and Schneider (2005).
We further find that there are substantial fluctuations in the monetary policy in the data.
The monetary policy regimes are quite persistent, with the probability of remaining in a
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passive regime of 0.955, and in the aggressive regime of 0.958. There is a significant difference
in monetary policy across the regimes. Indeed, the median short rate loadings are equal
to .75 and 1.68 on the expected growth and expected inflation, respectively, in aggressive
regimes, which are larger than .54 and .94 in passive regimes. These differences are very
significant statistically. Overall, our estimates for these regime coefficients corroborate the
prior evidence for Taylor rule coefficients on inflation being above one; see e.g. Cochrane
(2011), Gallmeyer et al. (2006), and Backus, Chernov and Zin (2013).
In terms of the impact of monetary policy on the macroeconomy, we find that the expected
consumption and expected inflation are somewhat lower in aggressive regimes. This is
consistent with the evidence in Bikbov and Chernov (2013) who show that future output
and inflation tend to decrease following a monetary policy shock. However, in our estimation
the difference in expectations is not statistically significant across the regimes, mirroring
the findings in Primiceri (2005) that monetary policy appears to have little effect on the
levels of economic dynamics. On the other hand, we find that inflation volatility is quite
different across the regimes. The value of δpi is positive and significant statistically and
economically: total inflation volatility rises by about a quarter in aggressive regimes.
Our filtered series for the latent expected growth, expected inflation, inflation volatility,
and monetary policy regimes are provided in Figures 2-4. The estimated expectations are
quite close to the data counterparts, and are generally in the 90% confidence set. Some of
the noticeable deviations between the model and the data include post-2007 period, when
model inflation expectations are systematically below the data. Notably, this is a period of
a zero lower bound and unconventional monetary policy, which are outside a simple Taylor
rule specification considered in this model.4
The exogenous component of inflation volatility is plotted in Figure 3. It is apparent that
non-policy related volatility spikes up in the early to mid 1980’s and gradually decreases
over time. The inflation volatility is quite low in the recent period, which reflects low
variability in inflation expectations in the data.
Finally, we provide model-implied estimates of the monetary regime in Figure 4. The figure
suggests that a shift to an aggressive regime occurred in the late-70’s / early-80’s period,
in accordance with the Volcker period. In mid 90’s, there was a shift to a passive regime,
consistent with the anecdotal evidence regarding the Greenspan loosening. These findings
are consistent with the empirical evidence for the monetary policy regimes in Bikbov and
Chernov (2013). In the crisis period our estimates suggest a passive regime, consistent with
4Branger et al. (2015) discuss the impact of a zero lower bound on the inference of economic states and
model-implied yields in a related framework.
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the observed evidence of lower levels and volatilities of the bond yields and risk premia in
this period.
1.4.2. Model Implications for Bond Prices
Figure 5 shows the time series of model-implied yields. The model matches the yields quite
well in the sample: the average pricing errors range from 0.08% for 1-year yields to about
0.03% for 3-year yields, and a good fit is apparent from the Figure. As shown in Figure
6, the model generates an unconditional upward sloping term structure and a downward
sloping volatility term structure. These patterns are consistent with the data.
We next consider the conditional dynamics of bond prices implied by the model. In Figure
7 we report standardized bond loadings on the expected growth, expected inflation and
inflation volatility. The Figure shows that bond yields increase at times of high expected
real growth. This captures a standard inter-temporal trade-off effect: at times of high
expected real growth agents do not want to save, so bond prices fall and yields increase.
Because we are looking at the nominal bonds which pay nominal dollars, their prices fall at
times of higher anticipated inflation, so bond yields also increase with expected inflation.
Finally, while short rates do not respond to inflation volatility, long term yields increase at
times of high volatility of inflation. This reflects a positive risk premium component which
is embedded in long term yields, and which increases at time of high inflation volatility.
Interestingly, all the bond loadings are uniformly larger in aggressive relative to passive
regimes. Hence, a higher sensitivity of short-term bonds to expected consumption and
expected inflation risks in aggressive regime, embedded in the Taylor rule, persists across
all the bond maturities. As bonds are riskier in aggressive regimes, the average levels and
volatilities of bond yields are higher in aggressive relative to passive regimes, as shown in
Figure 6.
1.4.3. Model Implications for Bond Premia
In the benchmark model, the market price of the expected growth risk is positive, while the
market prices of risks are negative for expected inflation and volatility risks. Indeed, high
marginal utility states are those associated with low expected real growth, high expected
inflation, or high inflation volatility. As bond yield loadings are all positive to these risks,
it implies that the bond exposure to expected real growth contributes negatively to bond
risk premia, while bond exposures to inflation risks contribute positively to the bond risk
premia. Table 3 shows the average bond risk premium in the model, and its decomposition
into the underlying economic sources of risk. Quantitatively, the expected inflation risk
premium is quite large, so the average bond risk premia are positive.
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One of the key model parameters which determines the magnitude of the inflation premium,
and thus the level of the risk premia and slope of the nominal term structure, is the inflation
non-neutrality coefficient Πcpi. When this parameter is negative, as in the benchmark model,
high expected inflation is bad news for future real growth. The inflation non-neutrality im-
plies that investors are significantly concerned about expected inflation news. Long-term
bonds which are quite sensitive to expected inflation are thus quite risky, and require a
positive inflation premium. In the middle panel of Table 3 we show the risk premia impli-
cations when the inflation non-neutrality parameter is set to zero. In this case, expected
inflation risk premium is virtually zero, the bond risk premia are negative, and the entire
term structure is downward sloping.
We plot the in-sample risk premia in Figure 8. Consistent with the above discussion,
the bond risk premia are positive on average, and the term-structure of bond risk premia
is upward-sloping, so that long-term bonds are riskier and have higher expected excess
returns than short-term bonds. The risk premia fluctuate over the sample, and can even
go negative, as in in the post 2000 sample when the volatility of expected inflation is quite
below its average, and the economy is in a passive regime.
We next quantify the contribution of the monetary policy risks to the levels of the bond
risk premia. Specifically, we set all the regime-dependent coefficients to be equal to their
unconditional means, based on the median set of parameters. This includes the regime-
shifting Taylor rule coefficients, the policy component of expected inflation volatility, as well
as drift components in the fundamental consumption and inflation processes. As displayed
in the last panel, we find that risk premia decrease, with larger absolute differences at the
long end of the curve. However, the impact of the time-variation in monetary policy to the
levels of the risk premia is quite modest, about 10-15 basis points.
On the other hand, we find that monetary policy fluctuations contribute significantly to
the time-variation in bond risk compensation. Similar to the regime dependent structures
in Bansal and Zhou (2002) and Dai et al. (2007), the time-variation in monetary policy
coefficients creates nonlinearities in yields via regime dependent bond loadings that affect the
fluctuations in the risk premia. We can think of this as a time-varying risk exposure channel,
which is different from a time-varying quantity of risk generated through the conditional
volatility present in the inflation expectations. Both of these channels help generate risk
premia variability.
To examine the quantitative impact of monetary policy on risk premia fluctuations, in Table
4 we present the volatilities of risk premia under different model specifications, in sample
and population. First, we consider a case where all the regime-shifting parameters are set to
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the constant unconditional averages, and only the non-policy portion of inflation volatility
is present. Next we consider the case where we add the time-varying short rate sensitivity
related to inflation, αpi. Subsequently, in the third line, we allow for time-variation in the
policy portion of inflation volatility, δpi. The fourth line represents the case with variation
in the growth-related Taylor rule coefficient, while the baseline configuration additionally
allows for regime-dependent movements in expected growth and inflation. We find that only
allowing for exogenous inflation volatility generates about 80% of the risk premia variation
in population, and about 70% to 75% of the variation in sample. Incorporating movements
in the inflation-related Taylor rule coefficient increases the variance of the risk premia by
about 15% of the total risk premia variance. Interestingly, movements in the policy portion
of inflation volatility then contribute an additional 15%. Allowing for the movements in
the short rate sensitivity to growth brings down the risk premia variability back to value in
the benchmark model, and incorporating movements in expected consumption and inflation
does not materially alter the volatility of the risk premia. In total this suggests that the
effects of monetary policy on risk premia variability is substantial – about 20% of baseline
in total.
The impact of monetary policy on bond risk premia is quite substantial in the sample as
well, as shown in in Figure 9. Here the solid line is the case with only exogenous inflation
volatility, while the dashed and circled lines represent cases with movements in inflation-
related policy variables and the baseline parameters. The central takeaway is that adding
monetary policy fluctuations increases the volatility of the risk premia. Relative to the
model with constant monetary policy, the benchmark bond risk premia rise in the 1980s,
and fall below zero, at a greater degree in the recent period.
In our model, the risk premia volatility is higher when the short rate sensitivity to growth
is constant. To help interpret this result, consider the bond risk premia decomposition:
rpnt = Cons(st) + rσc(st)σ˜
2
c0 + rσpi(st)σ˜
2
pit.
The first component captures the risk premia due to the inflation volatility and regime shifts
risks. The second component captures the risk premia due to the expected consumption
risks. This is constant within the regime because the amount of expected consumption risks,
the real growth volatility, is assumed to be constant. Finally, the last component contains
the compensation for the expected inflation risks. It is driven by the monetary policy
fluctuations, and the movements in exogenous inflation volatility. As we showed in Table
3, the risk premium portion coming from the expected real growth risks is negative while
that from expected inflation risk is positive: rσc < 0, rσpi > 0. Further, both coefficients
become larger, in absolute value, in aggressive regimes, as bond riskiness increases. Hence,
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in the benchmark model movements in expected growth risk premia offset the movements in
expected inflation risk premia. When short-rate sensitivity to real growth is constant, the
expected real growth component of the bond premia is also constant, and thus the volatility
of the risk premia increases.
The above decomposition also shows that bond risk premia can turn negative at times
when expected inflation compensation is relatively low. This is more likely to happen in
passive regimes, at times of low inflation volatility, and for long-maturity bonds, as shown
in Figure 10. This is why the in-sample bond risk premia turn negative post 2000 when
inflation volatility is low, and the economy is in the passive regime.
1.5. Conclusion
We estimate a novel, structurally motivated asset-pricing framework to assess the role of
monetary policy fluctuations for the macroeconomy and bond markets. We find substantial
fluctuations in the monetary policy in the data. Interestingly, monetary policy fluctuations
do not seem to have a sizeable effect for the first moments of the macroeconomic vari-
ables: the expectations of real growth and inflation are not significantly different across the
regimes. On the other hand, inflation uncertainty significantly increases, and interest rates
respond stronger to economic risks in aggressive relative to passive regimes. The monetary
policy fluctuations help increase persistent variations in the bond risk premia, and the pol-
icy fluctuations in regard to real growth and inflation concerns have offsetting effects on the
level and volatility of the bond premia.
Our empirical findings for the impact of monetary policy on the expectations and volatilities
of the macroeconomic variables have important implications for the conduct of monetary
policy and the understanding of the transmission of the monetary policy risks. We leave
the study of the economic mechanisms which can explain our evidence for future research.
Further, in our paper we focus on a “conventional” monetary policy represented by chang-
ing coefficients in the Taylor rule. Other policy issues, such as a zero lower bound and
unconventional policy channels, can play an important role to explain the recent evidence,
and are also left for future research.
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1.6. Appendix: Analytical Model Solution
In this section we present the details of the model solution.
1.6.1. Long-Run Cash Flow and Inflation News
Recall that the cash flow news is solved through
NCF,t+1 = (Et+1 − Et)
∑
j=0
κj1∆ct+j+1
= (Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=0
κj1µc(st+j) + (Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=0
κj1e
′
1Xt+j + σ
∗
c c,t+1.
(1.28)
We start by calculating the first portion of the news related to µc(. . . ). Note that,
(Et+1 − Et)µc(st+1) = µc(k)−
N∑
j=1
pijiµc(j) = µc(k)− T ′iµc =
(
e′k − T ′i
)
µc,
(Et+1 − Et)µc(st+2) = T ′kµc −
∑
j˜
pij˜i
∑
j
pijj˜µc(j) = T
′
kµc − T ′iT ′µc,
. . .
(Et+1 − Et)µc(st+j) =
[
T ′k(T
′)j−2 − T ′i (T ′)j−1
]
µc for j > 1.
(1.29)
Summing over j, we obtain that,
(Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=1
κj1µc(st+j) =
{
κ1
(
e′k − T ′i
)
+ κ21
(
T ′k − T ′iT ′
) (
I − κ1T ′
)−1}
µc. (1.30)
On the other hand, the revisions in the expectations of the continuous factors are given by,
(Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=0
κj1e
′
1Xt+j = κ1e
′
1 (I − κ1Π)−1 Σtt+1. (1.31)
Hence, the long-run cash flow news is given by,
NCF,t+1 =
{
κ1
(
e′k − T ′i
)
+ κ21
(
T ′k − T ′iT ′
) (
I − κ1T ′
)−1}
µc
+ κ1e
′
1 (I − κ1Π)−1 Σtt+1 + σ∗c c,t+1
= FCF,0(st+1, st) + FCF,(. . . )
′Σtt+1 + σ∗c c,t+1.
(1.32)
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In an analogous way we can show that the long-run inflation news is:
Npi,t+1 =
{
κ1
(
e′k − T ′i
)
+ κ21
(
T ′k − T ′iT ′
) (
I − κ1T ′
)−1}
µpi
+ κ1e
′
2 (I − κ1Π)−1 Σtt+1 + σ∗pipi,t+1
= Fpi,0(st+1, st) + Fpi,(. . . )
′Σtt+1 + σ∗pipi,t+1.
(1.33)
1.6.2. Long-Run Nominal Interest Rate News
The interest rate news is specified by:
NI,t+1 = (Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=1
κj1
[
α0(st+j) + α(st+j)
′xt+j
]
. (1.34)
Similar to the cash flow news, the first part is equal to,
(Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=1
κj1α0(st+j) =
{
κ1
(
e′k − T ′i
)
+ κ21
(
T ′k − T ′iT ′
) (
I − κ1T ′
)−1}
α0. (1.35)
To compute the second component, note that:
(Et+1 − Et)α(st+1)′xt+1 = α′kxt+1 −
N∑
j=1
pijiα(j)
′ (ΠXt)
= α′k (ΠXt + Σtt+1)− T ′iα (ΠXt) =
(
α′k − T ′iα
)
ΠXt + α
′
kΣtt+1,
(1.36)
where α indicates the stacked matrix of α(j)′ of all states. For the t+ 2 state,
(Et+1 − Et)α(st+2)′xt+2 = T ′kαΠXt+1 −
∑
j
piji
∑
j˜
pij˜jα(j˜)
′ (Π2Xt)
= T ′kαΠXt+1 − T ′iT ′αΠ2Xt
=
(
T ′kαΠ− T ′iT ′αΠ
)
ΠXt + T
′
kαΠΣtt+1.
(1.37)
More generally for j ≥ 2,
(Et+1 − Et)α(st+j)′xt+j =
[
T ′k − T ′iT ′
] [(
T ′
)j−1
αΠj
]
Xt + T
′
k(T
′)j−2αΠj−1Σtt+1.(1.38)
Denote the infinite sums, {S10,I , S20,I} which can be solved through the Ricatti equations,
S10,I =
∞∑
j=2
(T ′)j−1αΠjκj1 = κ
2
1T
′αΠ2 + κ1T ′S10,IΠ, (1.39)
S20,I = (T
′)−1S10,I(Π)
−1. (1.40)
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After summing across j we obtain that,
NI,t+1 =
{
κ1
(
e′k − T ′i
)
+ κ21
(
T ′k − T ′iT ′
) (
I − κ1T ′
)−1}
α0
+
{
κ1
[
α′kΠ− T ′iαΠ
]
+
[
T ′k − T ′iT ′
]
S10,I
}
Xt +
{
κ1α
′
k + T
′
kS
2
0,I
}
Σtt+1
= FI,0(st+1, st) + FI,X(st+1, st)
′Xt + FI,(. . . )′Σtt+1.
(1.41)
1.6.3. Long-Run Volatility News
We guess and verify that the uncertainty term Vt satisfies,
Vt(st, Xt, σ˜
2
c,t, σ˜
2
pi,t) = V0(st) + V1(st)
′Xt + V2c(st)σ˜2c,t + V2pi(st)σ˜
2
pi,t, (1.42)
where {V0, V1, V2c, V2pi} are the volatility loadings that are determined endogenously.
The long-run volatility news is given by,
NV,t+1 = (Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=0
κj1Vt+j . (1.43)
Similar to cash-flow and interest rate news, we can solve for the components of the volatility
news as follows. The first term is given by,
(Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=1
κj1V0(st+j) =
{
κ1
(
e′k − T ′i
)
+ κ21
(
T ′k − T ′iT ′
) (
I − κ1T ′
)−1}
V0,(1.44)
where V0 denotes the stacked matrix of V0(j)
′. The second portion of the volatility news is
given by:
(Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=1
κj1V1(st+j)
′Xt+j =
{
κ1
[
V ′1,kΠ− T ′iV1Π
]
+
[
T ′k − T ′iT ′
]
S10,V
}
Xt
+
{
κ1V
′
1,k + T
′
kS
2
0,V
}
Σtt+1,
(1.45)
where the volatility loadings {S10,V , S20,V } are given by,
S10,V = κ
2
1T
′V1Π2 + κ1T ′S10,V Π, (1.46)
S20,V = (T
′)−1S10,V (Π)
−1. (1.47)
The final two portions of the volatility news can be derived in an analogous way. They are
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equal to,
(Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=1
κj1V2c(st+j)σ˜
2
c,t+j =
{
κ1
[
V2c(k)ϕc − T ′iV2cϕc
]
+
[
T ′k − T ′iT ′
]
S10,v2c
}
σ˜2c,t
+
{
κ1V2c(k) + T
′
kS
2
0,v2c
}
ωcησc,t+1,
(Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=1
κj1V2pi(st+j)σ˜
2
pi,t+j =
{
κ1
[
V2pi(k)ϕpi − T ′iV2piϕpi
]
+
[
T ′k − T ′iT ′
]
S10,v2pi
}
σ˜2pi,t
+
{
κ1V2pi(k) + T
′
kS
2
0,v2pi
}
ωpiησpi,t+1.
(1.48)
For i = c, pi the vector terms satisfy:
S10,v2i = κ
2
1T
′V1ϕ2i + κ1T
′S10,v2iϕi, (1.49)
S20,v2i = (T
′)−1S10,v2i(ϕi)
−1. (1.50)
Hence, the volatility news is given by,
NV,t+1 = Fv,0(st+1, st) + Fv,X(st+1, st)
′Xt + Fv,σc(st+1, st)′σ˜2ct + Fv,σpi(st+1, st)
′σ˜2pit (1.51)
+ Fv,(. . . )Σtt+1 + Fv,ηc(. . . )ωcησc,t+1 + Fv,ηpi(. . . )ωpiησpi,t+1, (1.52)
where the loadings satisfy:
Fv0 =
{
κ1
(
e′k − T ′i
)
+ κ21
(
T ′k − T ′iT ′
) (
I − κ1T ′
)−1}
V0,
F ′v,X =
{
κ1
[
V ′1,kΠ− T ′iV1Π
]
+
[
T ′k − T ′iT ′
]
S10,V
}
,
Fv,σc =
{
κ1
[
V2c(k)ϕc − T ′iV2cϕc
]
+
[
T ′k − T ′iT ′
]
S10,v2c
}
Fv,σpi =
{
κ1
[
V2pi(k)ϕpi − T ′iV2piϕpi
]
+
[
T ′k − T ′iT ′
]
S10,v2pi
}
,
F ′v, =
{
κ1V
′
1k + T
′
kS
2
0v
}
,
Fv,ηc =
{
κ1V2c(k) + T
′
kS
2
0,v2c
}
,
Fv,ηpi =
{
κ1V2pi(k) + T
′
kS
2
0,v2pi
}
.
(1.53)
Now we solve for coefficients on the volatility factor. From the definition of the uncertainty
component Vt it follow that,
Vt = logEt exp (Nm,t+1) . (1.54)
The SDF shock be related to the primitive macroeconomic and regimes shocks,
Nm,t+1 = −γNCF,t+1 +NI,t+1 −Npi,t+1 +NV,t+1
= M0 +M
′
1,XXt +M1,σcσ˜
2
ct +M1,σpiσ˜
2
pit +M
′
2,Σtt+1 +M2,ηcωcηc,t+1 +M2,ηpiωpiηpi,t+1
− γσ∗c c,t+1 − σ∗pipi,t+1,
(1.55)
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where each loading in general depends on current and future monetary policy regime:
M0(st, st+1) = −γFCF,0 + FI,0 − Fpi,0 + Fv,0,
M1,X(st, st+1)
′ = F ′I,X + F
′
v,X ,
M1,σc(st, st+1) = Fv,σc,
M1,σpi(st, st+1) = Fv,σpi,
M2,(st, st+1)
′ = −γF ′CF, + F ′I, − F ′pi, + F ′v,,
M2,ηc(st, st+1) = Fv,ηc,
M2,ηpi(st, st+1) = Fv,ηpi.
(1.56)
Conditioning on next-period regime, one can show that,
Vt = logEt exp (Nm,t+1)
= logEt exp
(
M˜0 + M˜
′
1,XXt + M˜1,σcσ˜
2
ct + M˜1,σpiσ˜
2
pit
)
,
(1.57)
where
M˜0 = M0 +
1
2
[(
M12,
)2
δαcαc(st) +
(
M22,
)2
δαpiαpi(st) +M
2
2,ηcω
2
c +M
2
2,ηpiω
2
pi
]
+
1
2
γ2 (σ∗c )
2
+
1
2
(σ∗pi)
2
,
M˜ ′1 = M
′
1,
M˜1,σc = M1,σc +
1
2
δσc
(
M12,
)2
,
M˜1,σpi = M1,σpi +
1
2
δσpi
(
M22,
)2
.
(1.58)
To integrate out next-period regimes, similar to Bansal and Zhou (2002) and Song (2014),
we use the approximation, exp(y) ≈ 1 + y, which holds for small enough y. It follows that,
Vt = T
′
iM˜0(i) +
(
T ′iM˜1,X(i)
)
Xt + T
′
iM˜1,σc(i)σ˜
2
ct + T
′
iM˜1,σpi(i)σ˜
2
pit, (1.59)
where M˜0(i) is the stacked vector of M˜0(i, :), and M˜1,X(i) is the stacked matrix of M˜1,X(i, k)
′.
To guarantee an internally-consistent solution to the model, we equate the volatility speci-
fication in (1.42) to the equation above. This implies that:
V0(i) = T
′
iM˜0(i),
V1X(i) = T
′
iM˜1,X(i),
V2c(i) = T
′
iM˜1,σc(i),
V2pi(i) = T
′
iM˜1,σpi(i).
(1.60)
for all i. This system is exactly identified, and allows us to endogenously relate volatility
news to the primitive shocks and model parameters.
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1.6.4. Nominal Bond Prices
The solution to the stochastic discount factor satisfies,
mt+1 = −it − Vt − γNCF,t+1 +NR,t+1 +NV,t+1
= S0 + S
′
1,XXt + S1,σcσ˜
2
ct + S1,σpiσ˜
2
pit + S
′
2,Σtt+1 + S2,ηcωcηc,t+1 + S2,ηpiωpiηpi,t+1
− γσ∗c c,t+1 − σ∗pipi,t+1,
(1.61)
where each of the coefficients are given by,
S0(st, st+1) = M0 − α0 − V0,
S1,X(st, st+1)
′ = M ′1,X − α′ − V ′1 ,
S1,σc(st, st+1) = M1,σc − V2c,
S1,σpi(st, st+1) = M1,σpi − V2pi,
S2,(st, st+1)
′ = M ′2,,
S2,ηc(st, st+1) = M2,ηpi,
S2,ηpi(st, st+1) = M2,ηpi.
(1.62)
In the model, log bond prices, pnt , are linear in states, and the bond loadings vary with the
monetary policy regime:
pnt = A˜n(st) + B˜n
′
X (st)Xt + B˜nσc(st)σ˜2ct + B˜nσpi(st)σ˜2pit, (1.63)
where for the short term bond n = 1 the loadings satisfy
A˜n(st) = −α0(st),
B˜nX(i)′ = −α(st)′,
B˜nσc(st) = 0,
B˜nσpi(st) = 0.
(1.64)
Using similar approach as before to solve for the bond prices, we obtain that the bond
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loadings for longer maturities satisfy,
A˜n(i) = 1
2
(
γ2 (σ∗c )
2
+ (σ∗pi)
2
)
,
+
∑
k
piki
{
S˜0 +
1
2
[(
S˜12,
)2
δαcαc(st) +
(
S˜22,
)2
δαpiαpi(st) + S˜
2
2,ηcω
2
c + S˜
2
2,ηpiω
2
pi
]}
,
B˜n′X (i) =
∑
k
pikiS˜
′
1,X ,
B˜n′σc(i) =
∑
k
piki
{
S˜1,σc +
1
2
δσc
(
S˜12,
)2}
,
B˜n′σpi(i) =
∑
k
piki
{
S˜1,σc +
1
2
δσc
(
S˜12,
)2}
.
(1.65)
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Bond Yields:
3M 1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5Y
Mean (%) 5.19 5.66 5.90 6.09 6.26 6.39
Std. Dev. (%) 3.27 3.33 3.28 3.18 3.09 2.99
AR(1) .942 .954 .961 .965 .967 .969
Macro and Survey Data:
4c pi xc xpi
Mean (%) 1.81 3.64 0.00 0.00
Std. Dev. (%) 1.74 2.41 .957 2.13
AR(1) .513 .892 .865 .983
The table shows summary statistics for bond yields, consumption growth, inflation, and
expectations of real growth and inflation constructed from the Survey of Professional Fore-
casters. Quarterly observations from 1968Q3 to 2013Q4.
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Table 2: Prior and Posterior Distributions
Prior Posterior
Distr. Mean Std. Dev. 5% 50% 95%
Transition Parameters:
Πcc N
T .9 .2 .956 .976 .991
Πpic N
T 0 - - 0 -
Πcpi N
T 0 .2 -.040 -.027 -.015
Πpipi N
T .9 .2 .950 .966 .977
Non-Policy Volatility Parameters:
σ˜2c0
1−ϕc × 10
5 IG .01 .02 .011 .018 .041
σ˜2pi0
1−ϕpi × 10
5 IG .02 .01 .009 .016 .024
ϕpi N
T 0.95 0.1 .962 .977 .992
ωpi × 106 IG 0.15 0.2 .182 .184 .189
σ∗c × 10 IG .05 .02 .030 .038 .051
σ∗pi × 10 IG .05 .02 .025 .033 .045
Regime-Shifting Coefficients:
µc(s1) N .0045 .001 .0024 .0042 .0074
µc(s2) N .0045 .001 .0009 .0033 .0068
µpi(s1) N .0091 .001 .0085 .0102 .0121
µpi(s2) N .0091 .001 .0065 .0081 .0101
δpi(s1)× 105 − 0.00 - - 0.00 -
δpi(s2)× 105 N 0.00 0.1 .005 .006 .007
αc(s1) N 0.5 1 .287 .535 .652
αc(s2) N 0.5 1 .541 .748 .918
αpi(s1) N 1 1 .892 .936 .949
αpi(s2) N 1 1 1.56 1.68 1.88
pi11 N
T .9 .2 .941 .955 .970
pi22 N
T .9 .2 .942 .958 .986
Other Parameters:
κ1 − .995 - - .995 -
γ G 10 5 12.92 13.58 14.25
i0 N 0.00 .01 -.004 -.0008 -.0003
The table summarizes the prior and posterior distributions for the model parameters. G
refers to Gamma distribution, N to Normal distribution, NT is truncated (at zero and/or
one) Normal distribution, and IG is Inverse-Gamma. Dashed line indicates that the pa-
rameter value is fixed.
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Table 3: Risk Premia Levels
Baseline Parameters:
n = 6M 1Y 3Y 5Y
Exp Growth Shocks (%) -.205 -.601 -2.02 -3.19
Exp Inflation Shocks (%) .324 .920 2.74 3.91
Other Shocks (%) 0.00 0.03 .430 1.09
Total (%) .119 .348 1.16 1.81
Inflation Neutrality:
n = 6M 1Y 3Y 5Y
Exp Growth Shocks (%) -.205 -.601 -2.02 -3.19
Exp Inflation Shocks (%) .009 .022 .026 -.009
Other Shocks (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total (%) -.196 -.579 -1.99 -3.20
Constant Monetary Policy:
n = 6M 1Y 3Y 5Y
Exp Growth Shocks (%) -.205 -.601 -2.02 -3.19
Exp Inflation Shocks (%) .310 .884 2.66 3.81
Other Shocks (%) 0.00 0.03 .429 1.09
Total (%) .105 .311 1.07 1.71
The table shows the decomposition of the average bond risk premia into the risk contribu-
tions due to expected growth shocks, expected inflation shocks, and the remaining shocks
(inflation volatility and the regime shifts). The Baseline case refers to the benchmark
estimation of the model. For the Constant Monetary Policy case the regime-dependent
coefficients are fixed at their unconditional averages. For the Inflation Neutrality case the
feedback between expected consumption and expected inflation is set to zero. All statistics
are in annual terms and in percentages, and are computed at the median parameter draw.
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Table 4: Risk Premia Volatilities
In-Sample:
% of Baseline n = 6M 1Y 3Y 5Y
Movements in σ˜pit 68.8 69.7 72.7 74.5
Movements in {σ˜pit, αpit} 95.1 94.8 93.7 92.9
Movements in {σ˜pit, δpit , αpit} 109.5 109.2 108.4 107.7
Movements in {σ˜pit, δpit , αpit, αct} 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Baseline (%) .231 .649 1.87 2.62
Population:
% of Baseline n = 6M 1Y 3Y 5Y
Movements in σ˜pit 79.9 80.8 83.4 85.0
Movements in {σ˜pit, αpit} 94.9 94.6 93.8 93.3
Movements in {σ˜pit, δpit , αpit} 110.6 110.2 108.8 107.8
Movements in {σ˜pit, δpit , αpit, αct} 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Baseline (%) .178 .503 1.47 2.06
This table shows the in-sample and population risk premia volatilities in the restricted
models which incorporate time-varying exogenous inflation volatility (σ˜pi), monetary portion
of inflation volatility (δpi), Taylor rule coefficients on inflation and consumption (αpi, αc).
The baseline model additionally includes movements in the consumption and inflation drifts
(µc, µpi). The bottom line represents the annualized volatility, in percentage terms. The
top lines represent volatilities as a percentage of the baseline value.
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Figure 1: Realizations and Survey Expectations of Macroeconomic States
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The top panel of the figure shows the realized (dashed line) and expected (solid line) con-
sumption growth. The bottom panel shows the realized and expected inflation. Real
growth and inflation expectations are constructed from the Survey of Professional Fore-
casters. Quarterly observations from 1968Q3 to 2013Q4. The variables are demeaned, and
are reported at the annual basis in percentage terms.
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Figure 2: Estimated Macroeconomic States
Real Growth:
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The top panel of the figure shows the expected real growth in the survey data (dashed line),
and the estimated posterior median from the model (solid line). The bottom panel shows
the expected inflation in the survey data and in the model. Grey region represents posterior
(5%, 95%) credible sets. Data expectations are constructed from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters. Quarterly observations from 1968Q3 to 2013Q4. The variables are reported at
the annual basis in percentage terms.
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Figure 3: Estimated Inflation Volatility
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The figure shows the estimated posterior median of the exogenous component of inflation
volatility. Grey region represents posterior (5%, 95%) credible sets. Quarterly observations
from 1968Q3 to 2013Q4. The variables are reported at the annual basis in percentage terms.
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Figure 4: Estimated Monetary Policy Regime
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The figure shows the estimated posterior median of the monetary policy regime. Grey
region represents posterior (5%, 95%) credible sets. Quarterly observations from 1968Q3 to
2013Q4.
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Figure 5: Estimated and Observed Yields
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The figure shows the nominal bond yields in the data (red line), and the estimated posterior
median from the model. Grey region represents posterior (5%, 95%) credible sets. Quarterly
observations from 1968Q3 to 2013Q4.
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Figure 6: Unconditional Levels and Volatilities of Yields
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The figure shows model-implied unconditional levels and volatilities of bond yields across
monetary policy regimes.
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Figure 7: Bond Loadings
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The figure shows the model-implied bond loadings on the expected real growth, expected
inflation and inflation volatility, and the unconditional bond yields in aggressive and passive
regimes. Bond loadings are standardized to capture a one standard deviation movement in
each factor, and are computed at the median parameter draw.
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Figure 8: Model-Implied Risk Premia
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The figure shows the estimated bond risk premia in the sample. We display the one-quarter
risk premia for one-, three-, and five-year to maturity bonds. All model-implied values are
computed at median parameter values and states.
39
Figure 9: Risk Premia Decompositions
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This figure displays the in-sample time series of the five year bond risk premia in the
restricted model which incorporates only time-varying exogenous inflation volatility (σ˜pi);
and the model which also adds monetary portion of inflation volatility (δpi) and Taylor
rule coefficients on inflation δpi. The baseline model additionally includes movements in the
Taylor rule coefficients to real growth, and monetary-policy components of the consumption
and inflation drifts (µc, µpi). The economic states correspond to the benchmark estimate of
the model.
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Figure 10: Conditional Risk Premia in the Model
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The figure shows the model-implied risk premia for one- and five-year bonds with respect
to standardized movements of inflation volatility. The solid lines are the risk premia that
result in passive regimes while the dashed ones result in aggressive regimes.
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Chapter 2: The Asset Pricing Implications of Contracting
Frictions
(joint work with Joa˜o Gomes and Amir Yaron)
2.1. Introduction
The success of Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences in endowment-based economies has led
to an offspring in research that asks whether recursive preferences can generate plausible
macroeconomic and financial dynamics in production-based frameworks. In a parallel line
of work, financial frictions have been shown to create an amplification mechanism that
increases the quantity of risk associated with total factor productivity shocks. In this paper
we ask what quantitative role do contracting frictions play in amplifying the risk exposures of
financial assets. Furthermore, how do agency frictions compare to other popular mechanisms
in the literature, such as recursive preferences and adjustment costs to capital?
We examine these questions through the tractable framework of Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997). There are four agents in the model – (1) households who make consumption and
savings decisions under Epstein-Zin preferences, (2) intermediaries who borrow household
savings and lend them out, (3) risk-neutral entrepreneurs who borrow from intermediaries
and invest into a capital generating technology, and (4) final goods producers who rent
capital and labor, set marginal prices, and close the economy. There is moral hazard between
the intermediaries and entrepreneurs, regarding the productivity of the capital-generating
technology, which leads to a Costly State Verification (CSV) contract that allows for a role
of monitoring costs. While the contract is decided in a static fashion, it is a function of the
aggregate state and hence plays a dynamic role.
Households own capital in this economy and we calculate asset returns from their perspec-
tive. More precisely, this is the rate of return from purchasing a unit of capital today,
collecting dividends, and reselling the undepreciated portion to the market tomorrow. Un-
der a baseline calibration that has neglibile bankruptcy costs and implements quadratic
costs of capital adjustment we are able to capture many key macro-financial moments.
These include the volatility of output growth, the relative volatility of consumption growth,
the correlation of consumption and investment growth, and the level of the risk free rate.
Additionally we receive an equity risk premium of about three percent (3%) and a Sharpe
ratio of .4, values that get close to empirical estimates. Finally, we are also able to re-
ceive a reasonable leverage ratio for the entrepreneurs, of about thirty percent (30%), and
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countercyclical credit risk premia.
Having fitted the data reasonably well with a model that only implements direct adjustments
costs to capital, we find that bankruptcy frictions have a minor effect on the aggregate
market return. Increasing monitoring costs from zero to twenty percent raises the levered
excess return on market capital by only eighty basis points. While the contracting friction
acts as an implicit adjustment cost, distorting the price of capital away from one and
decreasing investment volatility, it is a weak one. Instead, a standard convex adjustment
cost to capital accounts for 250 basis points. Equivalently stated, the overall volatility of
the cost of capital is less sensitive to a movement in the agency friction than it is to a change
in the physical capital adjustment.
Another weakness of the contracting friction is that it drives a procyclicality of the credit
spread. As the monitoring cost increases, entrepreneur leverage in the model becomes more
procyclical, due to the fact that lending becomes highly restricted when aggregate states
are adverse. This increased leverage in good states of the world results in a procyclical
default rate. The compensation for the entrepreneur’s default risk must pay off in the very
states where default risk and leverage are high. Hence the credit spreads are procyclical in
a model with costly state verification. These results are parallel to those in Gomes et al.
(2003), keeping in mind that our model includes mechanisms (recursive preferences, shocks
to growth rates) that are traditionally known to get closer to asset pricing data.
The original intuition of this class of models is that costly state verification increases the
autocorrelation of economic aggregates. This is what the literature determines to be the
“persistence effects” of financing frictions and is the result of hump-shaped impulse response
functions. We show that financial frictions do not have such an effect in our model. In the
baseline model, one with no physical adjustment costs, and one featuring a lower separation
between risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, we show that the
autocorrelation of both output and consumption are largely in-sensitive to financial frictions.
Put in another way, when we calibrate a financial frictions model to handle asset pricing data
as well as movements in macroeconomic aggregates, the persistence effects of contracting
frictions are not present. This stands in direct contrast to the key results in Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997).
Another major result is regarding the role of Epstein-Zin preferences. We examine values
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution while fixing risk aversion. We find that there
is a clear, monotonically decreasing risk premium when we shift IES from two to below one.
As our model setup is dependent on shocks to growth rates of productivity as opposed to
levels of productivity the IES plays a strong role in influencing the persistence of investment
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flows. As a result, the procycality of dividend payments are diminished when IES decreases.
This result is very similar to those in Croce (2014) and Favilukis and Lin (2013).
Related Literature. Our work is focused on measuring the asset market impact of con-
tracting frictions from intermediation, in a production economy setting. In order to make
a quantitative statement however, we need to properly calibrate our model to match key
features of the financial and macroeconomic time series. This is not an easy task. As
discussed in Jermann (1998) and much of the production-based asset pricing literature,
households can smooth consumption by managing investment. Consumption growth be-
comes less volatile across the business cycle and assets decay in their level of risk premia.
To get around this smoothness of consumption, one can input adjustment costs to capital
to help slow the rate of investment and increase consumption volatility. This is also the
spirit behind planning on investment in advance (Christiano et al. (2001)) and rigidities in
wage adjustment (Favilukis and Lin (2015)). In our setup we will also input adjustment
costs to capital and compare it to an indirect investment friction: the intermediation link
between entrepreneurs and households.
Starting from the Long Run Risks literature (Bansal and Yaron (2004), Bansal and Shalias-
tovich (2013)), the use of Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences has helped explain asset pricing
dynamics, by increasing risk exposures on asset valuations. From a production economy
standpoint, Tallarini Jr. (2000) and Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010) have shown the
benefits of utilizing recursive preferences to better match macro-financial data. In our
model, we will show that positive sizeable equity premia are only generated when we have
a large EIS parameter, close to two.
Using productivity shocks that are more long-lived naturally amplifies the quantities of risk
that assets bear. This is the motivation behind using persistent shocks to the growth rates
of total factor productivity. As shown in Croce (2014), these shocks are not only advanta-
geous in terms of matching asset pricing properties in a model-based setting but are also
empirically justified when we examine growth rates of Cobb Douglas residuals in the data.
Further, Favilukis and Lin (2013) discuss the desirable implications that shocks to growth
rates have with respect to capturing autocorrelation and heteroskedasticy of investment
rates in a neoclassical model. If we would like to micro-found these production-based long
run risks, one could examine the properties of an endogenous growth model, as in Kung
and Schmid (2015). In this model, per-period investment into a patent sector generates
endogenous, upwards movement in a persistent productivity process. The collective patent
formation gives rise to desirable asset pricing results.
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Our model focuses on the quantitative implications arising from financial frictions, which
were first motivated as mechanisms to generate endogenous magnification in aggregate
fluctuations. In particular, we can think of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke et al.
(1999), and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) as primary examples of models in which firms’
financing constraints create distortions in capital markets. In Kiyotaki and Moore, firms
are forced to pledge collateral for borrowing, which creates distortions across borrowers
of different types. In Carlstrom and Fuerst, hereafter CF, firms (entrepreneurs) can only
borrow on the basis of their ex-ante net worth, which factors into a costly state verification
agreement with intermediaries. As our model builds upon CF we also will use the net
worth channel to create magnified cyclical variations. And as business cycle variations
are magnified in quantities, we expect assets with positive exposures (betas) to be subject
to higher risk premia. We will show in our paper that when we calibrate our model to
more saliently capture macroeconomic and financial time series data (through different
household preferences, shocks, and adjustment costs), many of these traits that amplify
financial frictions are no longer robust. At a business cycle frequency, it is more so the case
that direct, physical costs to adjustment are more advantageous relative to the financial
friction.
If we interpret the net worth channel as an active financial constraint for entrepreneurs, this
paper also connects to the literature that discusses the relationship between firm financing
constraints and asset pricing. Gomes et al. (2006) quantitatively examines whether financial
constraints are significantly priced in asset returns, through the Euler condition of a firm
that dynamically chooses capital each period. Similarly, Whited and Wu (2006) construct a
model-based financial constraints index that predicts returns significantly, relative to other
predictive factors in the literature. Livdan et al. (2009) takes a similar approach but uses
model-based Lagrange multipliers on firm constraints in order to predict returns.
Our article can best be thought of as a combination of Gomes et al. (2003), hereafter GYZ,
and Croce (2014). While GYZ studies the asset pricing implications of the Carlstrom and
Fuerst model, it does not allow for recursive preferences and also does not employ shocks
to growth rates of productivity as in Croce and Favilukis and Lin. We find that both of
these mechanisms are crucial to better capture macro-financial dynamics. Under the scope
of a much more plausible environment,1 we then make statements regarding the financial
friction.
The roadmap for our paper is as follows. In the next section we document the general
1In Gomes et al. (2003), the average annual equity premium in a model with agency costs was .02% on
an annual basis. In our model, an analogous environment generates about 3.30%, a much more realistic
amount relative to the data.
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equilibrium model that we will use to study the role of financial frictions in asset prices.
In the following section we document the quantitative details of the model calibration,
including parameter choice and the data used. In the fourth section, we document the main
results regarding the role of contracting frictions. In the fifth and final section, we conclude.
2.2. Model
The model consists of four agents: (1) Households that exhibit recursive preferences (2)
Intermediaries whose role wil largely be to propagate a costly state verification contract
(3) Entrepreneurs who are capital-producing and make investment decisions under the
previously stated friction (4) and Final Goods Producers that convert capital goods into
consumption goods for the household and entrepreneur. We will describe each agent’s role
individually. For more details, Appendices 2.6 and 2.7 discuss the timing of the model and
derivations of first order conditions.
2.2.1. Households
Identical households are infinitely lived with Epstein-Zin (EZ) preferences over consumption
and labor at wage wt. They also own and rent capital, kt+1, to the final goods producer at
rate rt. The decision problem can be written in the following manner:
Ut = Max{ct,lt,kt+1}
(
(1− β) (V (ct, lt))
1−γ
θ + β
(
Et
[
U1−γt+1
]) 1
θ
) θ
1−γ
s.t. ct + qtkt+1 + qtΦa (kt, kt+1) kt = wtlt + rtkt + qt(1− δ)kt
where V (ct, lt) represents the intratemporal utility from consumption and labor choice.
The price of capital is qt and δ is its depreciation rate. The EZ parameters are standard
with γ representing risk aversion, ψ representing IES, and θ ≡ 1−γ
1− 1
ψ
. Additionally, there
are adjustment costs that directly enter the household’s problem, as provided by Φa × k.
Because the previous expression is in terms of capital units, it is multiplied by the price of
capital to maintain consumption units.
In this model the household lends to an intermediary that provides an instantaneous, in-
traperiod return of one. Hence the household’s problem does not need to take into account
the “zero profit” intermediary. Similarly, the final goods producer has constant returns to
scale and will provide zero profits to the households. Therefore the above budget constraint
does not to take into account these two elements.
We can solve this problem for first order and envelope conditions. We receive an equation
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governing the trade-off of labor and consumption and the usual Euler equation:
wtVc(ct, lt) = −Vl(ct, lt)
Et
[
Mt+1R
k
t+1
]
= 1
s.t. Mt+1 = β
U
1
ψ
−γ
t+1(
Et
[
U1−γt+1
])1− 1
θ
(
Vt+1
Vt
)− 1
ψ
(
Vc,t+1
Vc,t
)
Rkt+1 =
rt+1 + qt+1(1− δ)− qt+1
(
Φa,t+1 +
∂Φa,t+1
∂kt+1
kt+1
)
qt
(
1 +
∂Φa,t
∂kt+1
kt
)
where Φa,t are adjustment costs at time t, evaluated at (kt, kt+1).
We will interpret the bottom quantity as the return on capital in the model. Put in other
words, it is the return from purchasing a unit at time t, selling back the depreciated unit
at time t+ 1 and collecting the appropriate dividend from the final goods producer. With
adjustment costs, additional terms reflect the opportunity cost of investment. Note that
when adjustment costs are set to zero, the expression boils down to:
Rk,noadjt+1 =
rt+1 + (1− δ)qt+1
qt
and the dividend becomes the rental rate on capital, r.
2.2.2. Contract between Intermediary and Entrepreneurs
Intermediaries take household savings and lend to entrepreneurs at rate rlt. In turn en-
trepreneurs invest these funds along with their own net worth, a total investment of it,
into a linear technology of capital production that is subject to idiosyncratic productivity
shocks. Let the TFP shocks be represented by ωt, which are IID random variables such that
E(ωt) = 1. Additionally, ω takes on a CDF Φ(·) and PDF φ(·) over non-negative support.
This will suggest that the capital generated will be ωtit. In consumption units it will be
qtωtit.
To finance his investment the entrepreneur needs to borrow an external debt from interme-
diaries, over his current net worth, represented by it − nt. This will be at an endogenously
determined interest rate. As ω is an ex-ante unknown object to the bank, the bank will
contract on the future realization of these shocks. In particular it will be the case that
47
when the realization of ω is too low, the enterpreneur will not be able to repay the loan.2
Accordingly, he will give up all of his realized investment, ωtit. Hence, default only occurs
when:
ωtit < ω¯tit ≡ (1 + rlt)(it − nt)
where ω¯t is determined prior to the realization of the investment shock.
As we will discuss, the payoffs and participation constraint are linear. This will allow us to
formulate an optimal debt contract in the form of Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig
(1985), where banks pay a fractional fee, µ, to audit or monitor entrepreneurs when default
occurs. Based on the previous cutoff value, the bank’s expected income of a loan of size
it − nt will be given by:
qtitg(w¯t) ≡ qt
[∫ ω¯t
0
ωtitd(Φ(ωt))− Φ(ω¯t)µit + (1− Φ(ω¯t))(1 + rlt)(it − nt)
]
= qtit
[∫ ω¯t
0
ωtd(Φ(ωt))− Φ(ω¯t)µ+ (1− Φ(ω¯t))ω¯t
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
g(ω¯t)
Similarly, the enterpreneur’s expected income with the given loan size will be:
qtitf(w¯t) ≡ qt
[∫ ∞
ω¯t
(ωtit − (1 + rlt)(it − nt))d(Φ(ωt))
]
= qtit
[∫ ∞
ω¯t
(ωt − ω¯t)d(Φ(ωt))
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(ω¯t)
We maximize the expected income of the entrepreneur given that the lender is (at-least)
returned his original loan amount. This results in the following contracting problem:
Max
{ω¯t,rlt,it}
qtitf(ω¯t)
s.t. qtitg(ω¯t) ≥ it − nt
Notice that given it and nt there is a one to one mapping from ω¯t to r
l
t – this comes from
the definition of ω¯t. Hence we will simply solve for it and ω¯t. It can be shown that these
2More specifically, we use a debt contract in which partial disclosure is optimal. When the entrepreneur
defaults it will be incentive compatible to disclose the severity of the shock. Likewise, the lender’s par-
ticipation constraint will hold under non-disclosure, which will only occur when the entrepreneur does not
default.
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values will satisfy the first order conditions:
qtf(ω¯t) =
f ′(ω¯t)
g′(ω¯t)
(qtg(ω¯t)− 1)
it =
nt
1− qtg(ω¯t)
s.t. f ′(ω¯t) = −(1− Φ(ω¯t))
g′(ω¯t) = 1− Φ(ω¯t)− µφ(ω¯t)
To solve for the contract terms, notice first ω¯t = ω¯(qt) to satisfy the first equation. For the
given level of ω¯t, qt, and nt, we can then solve for it = i(qt, nt) from the second equation
and also pin down rlt. For additional details see Appendix 2.7.
From this contract it is clear that the intermediary’s participation constraint is binding; in
other words, he will make zero profits. Hence the household does not receive any additional
funds through deposits. In terms of timing, the contract will determine what it is before
the entrepreneur makes his consumption / saving decisions.
2.2.3. Entrepreneur
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs that make consumption and capital decisions each
period, following the determination of contract conditions and realization of technology
shocks. For entrepreneurs that default on loan terms, they choose zero amounts of con-
sumption and next period capital, while solvent entrepreneurs optimize. Due to the linear
structure of the budget constraint, the risk neutral preferences of the entrepreneur, and
the fact that entrepreneurs will receive the continuum of IID technology shocks we can ag-
gregate the dynamic decision problem to solve for the entrepreneurs’ average policies. For
additional details see Appendix 2.6.
We maximize average lifetime discounted consumption. The entrepreneur’s decision prob-
lem is the following:
Max
{cet ,ket+1}
E
∞∑
t=0
(βγe)tcet
s.t. cet + qtk
e
t+1 = qtitf(ω¯t)
nt = w
e
t + rtk
e
t + qt(1− δ)ket
The first constraint represents the entrepreneur’s budget balance, where cet is his consump-
tion choice and ket+1 is his capital choice. For an investment of it (which is predetermined
by the point in time of this decision) the aggregate entrepreneur receives qtitf(ω¯t) as a re-
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turn in the same period, which represents the aggregation of each individual entrepreneur’s
contract proceeds. – The second constraint represents the components of net worth: wages
wet , rent on capital (at same rate as household) rtk
e
t , and the current value of undepreciated
capital, qt(1 − δ)ket . These are all observable at the time of the entrepreneur solving the
problem.
Using the definition of f(ω¯t) from above we can solve the previous problem and derive the
following Euler equation:
Et
βγe

(
qt+1f(ω¯t+1)
1−qt+1g(ω¯t+1)
)
(qt+1(1− δ) + rt+1)
qt

 = 1
In this equation, there is an additional wedge that serves as additional compensation for
taking on investment. This is given by:
qt+1f(ω¯t+1)
1− qt+1g(ω¯t+1)
The principal reason for this wedge is that it captures further risk that the entrepreneur
bears. While he gets the standard gross capital return, he also needs to be compensated for
the additional risk that comes with investment – additional leverage and hence more default
risk, all else equal. One can think of this wedge as the compensation for credit risk.3In the
empirical evaluation of the model, we will treat it similar to a credit spread.
2.2.4. Final Goods Producer
The final goods firm exhibit constant returns to scale (CRS) with labor-augmenting shocks
inside the production function. This will be given by:
Yt = F (Kt, ZtLt, ZtL
e
t )
where Kt denotes aggregate capital, Lt aggregate household labor, and L
e
t aggregate en-
trepreneur labor. Zt represents a (symmetric) technology shock.
The share of entrepreneurs in the economy is η, while that of households is 1 − η, which
suggest Kt = (1− η)kt + ηket . For labor market clearing, Lt = (1− η)lt and Let = ηlet = η,
where the last statement follows from labor not entering the entrepreneur’s utility. Due to
3One can also think of this wedge as the additional compensation for financial constraintedness. In a
firm problem where leverage or equity is bounded, the dynamic Lagrange multiplier provides a wedge for
additional return compensation. This is the focus in Livdan et al. (2009).
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the CRS, zero-profit nature of the final goods producers we will have:
rt = FK(Kt, ZtLt, ZtL
e
t )
wt = FL(Kt, ZtLt, ZtL
e
t )
wet = FLe(Kt, ZtLt, ZtL
e
t )
at the equilibrium quantities.
2.2.5. Market Clearing
Beyond the labor markets clearing we will require that supply and demand match in the
capital markets and goods markets. That is to say:
(Capital Markets) Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + ηit(1− µΦ(ω¯t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Investment across all entrepreneurs
(Goods Markets) Yt = F (Kt, ZtLt, ZtL
e
t ) = (1− η)ct + ηcet + ηit
Notice the correction for the surplus loss in the capital markets clearing. As investment
is chosen before productivity shocks are realized, there are deadweight losses to be bourne
from the monitoring costs that are triggered, for Φ(ω¯t) worth of defaults.
Since all variables are aggregate quantities for a measure one, we scale households and
entrepreneurs by η and 1− η for market clearing. Going forward we will denote aggregate
consumption and investment as:
It = ηit (1− µΦ (ω¯t))
Ct = ηc
e
t + (1− η)ct
In measurement of aggregate quantities we compute growth rates of these variables.
2.2.6. Measurement of Quantities and Returns
We will be interested in examining log growth rates of macroeconomic variable X given by
log
(
Xt+1
Xt
)
where Xt ∈ {Yt, Ct, It}. The risk free rate we will be targeting will be given by:
exp
(
rft+1
)
=
1
Et [Mt+1]
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We will focus on one capital return in the model – that of the household, denoted here by
rk:
exp
(
rkt+1
)
=
rt+1 + qt+1(1− δ)− qt+1
(
Φa,t+1 +
∂Φa,t+1
∂kt+1
kt+1
)
qt
(
1 +
∂Φa,t
∂kt+1
kt
)
exp
(
ret+1
)
=
(
qt+1f(ω¯t+1)
1−qt+1g(ω¯t+1)
)
(qt+1(1− δ) + rt+1)
qt
The last value specified, re, denotes a return-type object from the entrepreneur’s perspective
of owning and collecting on capital proceeds. For completeness, we also report this in the
final tables but will not utilize this measure in our calibration procedure.
It is well founded in the data that excess returns in equities are levered and some volatility
in the excess returns is due to idiosyncratic noise. To take our model’s equity excess return
to the data we finally define a levered, excess equity return given by:
Rlevex,t+1 = 2×
(
rkt+1 − rft+1
)
+ σlevlev,t+1
The leverage parameter here, two, comes from literature. It can be originally traced back
to work by Rauh and Sufi (2011) as well as Garca-Feijo and Jorgensen (2010).
To understand the credit spread dynamics in the model we will use the difference between
the returns of the entrepreneur and household, re−rk. While the household has adjustment
costs, it will be the case that much of the variation in this difference will be governed by
the additional default premium – the wedge that was discussed earlier.
2.3. Baseline Calibration and Data
In this section we specify the processes governing productivity shocks, household utility,
and adjustment costs. We will also go over the baseline calibration which corresponds to a
model with solely convex costs of adjustment to capital and roughly zero costs of bankruptcy
(equivalently stated, a low value of µ). The goal in later parts of the paper will be to make
adjustments to this baseline and observe marginal behavior of the model.
2.3.1. Productivity Shocks
As demonstrated in Croce (2014), the use of productivity shocks to growth rates of total
factor productivity generates dynamics that are both empirically plausible as well as quan-
titatively advantageous for general equilibrium models. Explained in Favilukis and Lin
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(2013), these modifications generate persistent investment flows that will result in a larger
procyclicality of dividend flows and hence larger risk premia. In models where shocks are
to the level of TFP, we are not able to generate such features.
We model log growth rates in productivity as having a small, persistent component:
4zt+1 = gz + xt + ϕzz,t+1
xt = ρxxt−1 + ϕxx,t+1
The setup of TFP shocks here allows us to interpret movements in z,t+1 as “short run
risks” and those in xt as “long run risks.” We follow from the literature and impose the
ratio of ϕxϕz to be 10% while the persistence of xt will be ρx = .96 which is consistent with
the estimate in Croce. Similarly we will choose gz to be roughly .5%, which allows us to
match average growth rates of the US economy in steady state. All that is left to calibrate
is ϕz which we do so to approximately match the volatility of US GDP.
In addition to the productivity shocks of the TFP, we also need to calibrate the shocks
related to the entrepreneur’s capital investment technology. We assume that ω follows a
log-normal distribution with zero mean. That is to say that:
logωt ∼ N
(−.5σ2ω, σ2ω)
Because of the log-normal distribution, we can compute as a function of the normal distri-
bution, the share of surplus going to entrepreneurs and banks in closed form.4
2.3.2. Intratemporal Utility and Adjustment Costs
Given the generality of the model we will need to take a stand on the forms of household’s
intratemporal utility function, Vt. For the purposes of this exposition we will shut down
the household’s labor supply and make it inelastic. That is to say:
V (ct, lt) = ct
and hence lt is equal to one at all states. Including labor in the model will more than likely
make the quantitative performance weaker. This is due to the fact that households will have
another hedging instrument to smooth over consumption flows, which will reduce volatility
of the SDF and decrease excess equity returns. In principle we could add other modeling
4We have tested an alternative form of entrepreneur shocks. When implementing a uniform shock dis-
tribution centered around a unitary mean, results do not materially change (investment volatility increases
while asset pricing conclusions are unchanged).
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devices, such as a time to plan assumption for labor (Christiano et al. (2001)) or rigidity
in wages (Favilukis and Lin (2015)), but we keep the model simple in order to focus on the
effects of contracting frictions.
Additionally we will set the final goods production function to be Cobb-Douglas with labor-
augmenting TFP shocks, which is to say:
Yt = K
αk
t (ZtLt)
αl (ZtL
e
t )
αe
Zt = exp (zt)
where αk + αl + αe = 1 and the transmission of zt is as given in the previous subsection.
Finally we set the household adjustment costs to take a convex, quadratic form given by:
Φt = Φ (kt, kt+1) =
φk
2
(
kt+1 − (1− δ)kt
kt
− δ
)2
The use of this form of adjustment costs is certainly different than the irreversibility form
used in Jermann (1998). As a result, investment by each individual is not limited to be be
positive in equilibrium. Furthermore, it might be the case that our results are not directly
at a parallel of Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2011) and Croce (2014). Nonetheless we find
that the qualitative attributes of our model are very reasonable. For example, increasing
φk decreases investment volatility and increases the market return.
2.3.3. Baseline Calibration
In Table 5 we list the baseline calibration model where bankruptcy costs are set at very
low levels. This is given through µ = .5%. Regarding other parameters of the model, we
set the capital share of the final goods producer (αk) to be .30 while setting the household
labor share to be .6999 and the remainder to the entrepreneur share. This calibration
follows directly from Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Gomes, Yaron and Zhang (2003).
Also similar to literature are the depreciation rate of capital (δ = .02) and the share of
entrepreneurs in the economy (η = .10). We also fix the household’s risk aversion to a
reasonable level (γ = 15) throughout our experiments. This value is in between those
calibrated in Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013). We also fix the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution at 2.5 in the baseline. This level of IES is necessary
to merit reasonable consumption and dividend dynamics. We will show this more explicitly
in our counterfactuals.
There are a few parameters that we have left to more carefully calibrate; the first one
being the subjective time discount factor of the household, β. Naturally we would expect
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β to influence the level of the risk free rate negatively. Different from the mechanism in
Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2011) however we do not get a sole identification of the
time discount rate through the risk free rate; rather the volatility of investment is also
highly dependent on β, negatively. As β increases, the penchant to smooth consumption
decreases which increases the volatility share of consumption. For a fixed output volatility
and correlation of consumption and investment growth, this means that the volatility of
investment will drop. Altogether, this strong tradeoff makes it difficult to hit both moments
simultaneously and hence we choose a β that gets the risk free rate at a reasonable expected
level; in our calibration this amounts to an annual risk free rate of 72 basis points.
As the baseline model is selected to operate with purely adjustment costs we modify the
value of φ, which is the value of the multiplier on the household’s quadratic adjustment
costs. What we find is that this parameter has a strong bearing on whether consumption
and investment growth correlate in a positive manner. In particular, as φ increases so too
does the value of ρ (4c,4i). We set φ = 10 to receive a correlation of about .67 which is
very close to the annual data counterpart.
The amount of volatility on the entrepreneur’s shock has a direct impact on the equilibrium
leverage that is taken by entrepreneurs. We set σw to correspond to the roughly thirty
percent market leverage that is found in the Compustat universe of firms. Finally we have
left one parameter to set which is the volatility parameter on the idiosyncratic noise in the
levered excess equity return. We set this quarterly number to 3.25% to match the monthly
leverage volatility found in Croce (2014). This helps us match the Sharpe ratio of the excess,
levered equity return.
2.3.4. Data
The macroeconomic data we use as a calibration comparison come largely from the Na-
tional Income Product Accounts (NIPA). Annual consumption from 1929 through 2008 is
constructed as the sum of real, per capita, nondurables and services consumption. Similarly
investment is taken to be the sum of real, per-capita, private residential and non-residential
fixed investment.5 To construct a comparable output series in the context of the model we
sum the constructed consumption and investment series.
The annual return series for the realized excess equity returns is given through the excess
market return on Ken French’s website. We also take the nominal one month risk free rate
on his website and subtract inflation constructed from the GDP deflator index to receive a
measure for the real risk free rate. Credit spread data is received by taking the difference
5We do not subtract software processing equipment as the time series for this does not go back to 1929.
Even if we are to extrapolate the series going backwards, investment statistics do not drastically change.
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between BAA and AAA corporate bond indices from Moody’s.
2.4. Results
2.4.1. The Fit of the Baseline Model
Based on the parameters discussed in the previous section we examine the model’s implied
behavior through a long sample simulation of 50,000 quarters (the model is calibrated at a
quarterly frequency). Following the simulation, we time aggregate the data by four quarters
to receive annual data. All reported statistics are hence in annual units. Table 6 provides
the baseline fit of the model alongside standard error bounds. Quantities that are bolded
indicate those that are used to calibrate the model (this is explained in detail in the previous
section). We find that we are able to do a reasonable job in matching the relative volatility
of consumption (.64 in the data versus .84 in the model), the volatility of output (3.36 in
the data versus. 3.74 in the model), and the correlation of consumption and investment
growth (.68 in the data versus .718 in the model). As discussed earlier we choose β to hit
the expected level of the risk free rate and as a result the model warrants an equivalent risk
free rate of 72 basis points.
While we reasonably succeed on our desired calibration metrics, we perform differentially
with respect to other ones. In particular, the relative volatility of investment is too low in
the model. This boils down to facing a tradeoff in matching the macroeconomic moment
(investment volatility) versus targeting the asset pricing moment (market equity returns).
As the asset pricing moment is more relevant for our study, we compromise on the other
metric. As a result, we are able to capture the excess equity return reasonably well with
an equity premium of about three percent (2.51 %) and a Sharpe ratio that is well within
error bounds (.356). To better understand the mechanism through which we capture the
equity premium, we provide a more granular image of the returns in Table 8. In the column
titled µ = .5% we outline the results of the baseline model. As the unlevered market return
is only about 1.25% with a rather high Sharpe ratio of .87, leverage provides a much more
reasonable final result. It is interesting to note that the “return-like” entrepreneur object,
re, provides just under 4.3% of excess returns. Finally, the model is able to deliver the pro-
cyclicality of the market excess return and the countercylicality of the model-based credit
spread. We will discuss this last result in length shortly.
2.4.2. Behavior of the Model
To provide a basic understanding of the model mechanism, we examine impulse response
functions with respect to a long-run shock, a one-standard deviation shock to x, in Figure
11. As the model is non-linear and history-dependent, we compute a number of model
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simulations and take the average deviation from steady state values to compute the impulse
response function. In the top-right panel, we see that a shock to the long-run component of
TFP growth results in a positive and persistent response to output growth. As the shock
to TFP growth is persistent via the autocorrelation of x, this has long-lasting effects for
output growth. This is compounded by the fact that the amount of capital increases in
the economy. In the bottom left panel, we see that investment immediately shoots up,
albeit less persistently. This happens in conjunction with an upwards movement in the
price of capital, q, which is hence procyclical as well. As output growth does not respond
following the impact of the shock, and investment does in a positive way, consumption
growth decreases at time 0. While this seems odd in conjunction with a positive TFP
shock, we see that consumption growth immediately rebounds to a positive level in period
one and after.
2.4.3. Adjustment versus Bankruptcy Costs
We start by examining the model results with respect to a perturbation of the household’s
adjustment costs, as given in Table 7. Broadly speaking, as we slow down the movement
of capital, this should lead to a lower volatility in investment, dividends that are more
procyclical, and larger equity premia. When adjustment costs are shut down (first column)
, the relative share of investment volatility is much higher and levered returns collapse to
.30% on an annual basis. The second column is our baseline model, and already represents
a roughly eight-fold increase in premia, to 2.51%. In the final column we shift adjustment
costs to a, perhaps, unreasonable level. This brings the equity premium even higher, to
about 4.5%. The adjustment cost mechanism works similar to how we would expect it to.
Next, we explore the effects of bankruptcy costs. In Table 8 we incrementally shift the
monitoring costs from the baseline, one half of a percentage point, upwards to ten and
twenty percent. We find that there is a very marginal effect on this dimension, amounting
to only about eighty basis points on the final levered market return. This underscores the
fact that the financing friction acts as a micro-founded adjustment cost to investment. The
relative volatility of investment decreases roughly 25% in total as we shift the monitoring
costs to the highest level. If we compare this tradeoff to those related to direct adjustment
costs to capital, we find that, at least as a modeling device, physical adjustment costs are
much more quantitatively appealing.
We discuss the impact of the bankruptcy costs on the behavior of the model, in Figure 12.
We look at the change in the price of capital, output growth, and investment growth under
different model configurations wtih respect to agency costs (given by µ = .005, .10, .20). In
the previous paragraph, we discussed the fact that the financing friction is an adjustment
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cost to investment. In this sense, increasing the value of µ adds to the volatility of q and
this is prominently displayed in the first graph. We see that the responses of q increase
monotonically at time 0, as we adjust µ upwards. As expected losses given default are
higher to the intermediary, when monitoring costs increase, it will be the case that the
amount of lending by banks will be less sensitive to the cycle. Put equivalently, the total
amount of investment from the entrepreneurs will be less sensitive to business cycle shocks,
or simply less volatile. This message is conveyed in the bottom left most panel. We see
that indeed as monitoring costs increase, investment growth reacts less sensitively. This is
an illustration of the fact that the monitoring friction acts as an adjustment cost.
2.4.4. Monitoring Costs, Leverage, and the Cyclicality of Returns
In Table 9 we examine how returns covary with the business cycle. In the first row we display
the correlation between consumption growth and the leveraged excess market return. The
second row is the same, except using output growth. Similar to data, our baseline calibration
(µ = .5%), delivers a procyclical, realized market return. This is largely due to the fact
that when the economy is in a boom period, the price of capital (q) goes up, which means
that the resale value on a unit of capital is procyclical. Additionally the rental rate on
capital is procyclical in the model. Together these facts generate a correlation of roughly
25 - 30%. One can also see that increasing monitoring costs does not significantly change
these results.
When we compute the same statistics regarding the effective credit spread in the model,
re − rk, we find that the baseline calibration delivers a countercyclical default premium,
with a correlation of roughly -92%. As discussed earlier, we interpret this as a credit spread
due to the fact that the difference is driven by the additional default risk being priced into
the entrepreneur’s return.6 Put differently,
re − rk ≈ qt+1f(ω¯t+1)
1− qt+1g(ω¯t+1)
The intuition for this result is the following. From the model simulations we can see that
leverage is countercyclical in the baseline model. This is given in the fifth and sixth lines.
This implies that not only does equilibrium lending increase in bad times, but also too does
default, as shocks are IID and increasing leverage is correlated with increasing default. As
leverage is used to generate more capital, and broadly own more capital, the return has to
be sufficient to warrant the default risk that is taken on by entrepreneurs. In particular,
there must be higher return in bad times to compensate for the excess default, in those very
6If we compute a variance decomposition of re − rk, we can show that much of the variation is driven by
the wedge in the entrepreneur’s return.
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times. This then provides the intuition behind the baseline result.
Using this very same intuition we can gain more insight as to why agency costs push the
model towards delivering counterfactual results. As the monitoring costs increase, not only
does the average amount of leverage decrease, but also leverage becomes procyclical. This
is due to the fact that lending becomes highly restricted when aggregate states are low, or
correspondingly when the price of capital is low. As a result of more equilibrium leverage
in good times, and hence more default, then entrepreneurs must be compensated with
additional returns to capital in good times. Put equivalently, the price of default risk is
higher in good times. In line with this thought process, the table shows that increasing the
monitoring cost raises the procyclicality of leverage and hence the credit spread. Moreover,
even when we incorporate the agency cost friction into a setting with recursive preferences
and adjustment costs, we are not able to overturn the results of Gomes et al. (2003). As
a graphical confirmation of this logic, in Figure 13 we display the response of the credit
spread with respect to changes in µ. For a negligible amount of bankruptcy costs, the
impulse is negative. When we increase the costs to higher levels, the movement becomes
more pronounced in the positive direction, in accordance with higher rates of procyclicality.
2.4.5. Persistence of Output Growth
As discussed in Carlstrom and Fuerst, the inclusion of financial frictions creates a hump-
shaped response to the level of output, and hence an endogenous persistence to the growth
rate of output. We test whether we can make similar conclusions in our model, given that
we calibrate to a wider array of macroeconomic and financial data using different modeling
devices.
As displayed in the top right corner of Figure 12, we see that output growth is barely
modified by the inclusion of monitoring costs. In particular we find that the shocks are
indistinguishable across calibrations, but more relevantly, the autocorrelation is roughly
equivalent. This can be deduced from the responses of output being on top one another.
These sort of effects can be more precisely seen if we directly compute autocorrelations of
macro aggregates, as in Table 11. In the top panel, we provide the first-order autocor-
relation, of annualized data generated from the baseline model. The bottom two panels
examine similar statistics shutting off various model elements, including adjustment costs
to capital, as well as a lower Epstein-Zin friction. What we find is that, starkly, the auto-
correlation of output growth is relatively unchanged in all three cases, when we increase the
bankruptcy friction. In line with previous literature, the investment growth autocorrelation
certainly increases as well, likely due to the contracting friction dampening the volatility of
investment.
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What explains the result with respect to output growth? While the new model frictions
we incorporate (adjustment costs and recursive preferences) slightly change the levels of
output growth autocorrelation, they do not affect the in-sensitivity of autocorrelation to
the monitoring costs. This suggests that the use of shocks to growth rates of productivity,
as opposed to levels of TFP as in previous literature, plays a substantial role in mitigating
the persistence effects of financial frictions. It can be explained in the following way. Output
growth is fundamentally a function of capital growth and TFP growth. As we embed TFP
growth with a persistent component, by definition, this gives rise to the results we see.
2.4.6. The Role of Recursive Preferences
In Table 10 we examine the behavior of the model when shifting the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution from ψ = 2.5 to values below 1. The first column represents the baseline
version of the model. What we find is that the unlevered excess return on household capital
decreases to -1.2%. A large amount of the shift downwards is due to the increase in the
risk free rate. As ψ decreases agents are much more less willing to trade off consumption
between periods. This will decrease the need for the hedging asset and the risk free rate
increases in equilibrium as a result. Moreover, as ψ moves towards 1γ , the model returns to
one with time-separable preferences, and wipes away any existing risk premia.
2.4.7. A Comparison to He and Krishnamurthy
He and Krishnamurthy (2013), hereafter HK, discuss the importance of intermediation for
asset markets. In a set up with households, intermediaries, and riskless and risky asset
markets, they are able to show that intermediation constraintedness and countercyclical
leverage are key drivers for reaching large levels of risk premia. As our model provides a
differing opinion on the quantitative relevance of intermediation, it is natural to ask how
can we reconcile our differences.
There are key modeling contrasts between our setup and HK. One difference is that divi-
dends with respect to the risky asset are calibrated to be an exogenous cash flow, as opposed
to the endogenous dividends in our model. As discussed earlier, endogenous dividends pose
a significant challenge in terms of matching both macro quantities and financial prices in
the data. A more substantial element in HK is that the intermediary is the marginal agent
in pricing risky assets. This means that asset prices are determined through the covariation
of the specialist’s pricing kernel and the risky asset return. In our work, the household is
still the marginal agent as we use the recursive preference based Euler equation to evaluate
equity returns. If the focus is on understanding the effect of financial frictions on broader
asset markets, then it might be more appropriate to utilize our setup. This is due to the rea-
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son that equity markets are operated to a great extent with household capital (via mutual
and pension funds, money market accounts), and resultingly household preferences seem
to be a central concern. Additionally, our analysis with respect to macroeconomic quan-
tities requires individuals that are critical participants. It would be tough to argue that
the high wealth clients that use proprietary trading firms to access risky assets in He and
Krishnamurthy (2013), can be interpreted as representative of the larger macroeconomy.
HK also argues that the existence of an occasionally binding equity constraint is crucial
to drive risk premia upwards. When the wealth of banks drop too low, intermediaries
become equity capital constrained, and exceedingly leveraged. In order to compensate
investors for the bank’s risky positions, the required excess return on the risky asset increases
dramatically. Similarly in our model, capital-producing firms face constraints on their
investment. However, the net worth constraint dictates how much debt, as opposed to
equity, the entrepreneurs can take on. More generally however, we argue that the optimal
calibration that captures key features of the data, is one that has a negligible amount of
agency costs. Put otherwise, the most realistic economy is one in which investment is not
constrained by financial frictions.
2.5. Conclusion
We revisit the quantitative role of financial frictions and discuss its impact on financial
markets. In particular, the use of Epstein and Zin preferences and shocks to growth rates
of productivity make a large impact on how we plausibly interpret the effects of costly
state verification. After fitting a model jointly to business cycle and financial data, without
monitoring costs associated with the entrepreneur’s contract, we then activate the friction
and examine its effects. For a very mild increase in equity risk premia, our setup sugests
counterfactual results that are associated with the intermediation contract: a large decrease
in investment volatility and a procylicality of credit spreads. In total, we are able to
suggest that volatility of the price of capital due to physical adjustment costs, as opposed
to contracting frictions, allows for more quantitatively satisfying results.
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2.6. Appendix: Model Timing and Related Issues
2.6.1. Model Timing (from start of t to end of t)
(I) Aggregate shock is realized, Zt.
(II) Households / entrepreneurs supply previously chosen capital (kt, k
e
t ) and labor (lt, l
e
t )
to Final Goods Producer. Output (Yt) is created and rental payments (capital and
labor income at now determined prices) are given to households and entrepreneurs.
The budget constraint of the household will read:
ct + qt (kt+1 − (1− δ)kt + Φa,tkt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Goes to Intermediary Intraperiod
= wtlt + rtkt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Realized Income
(III) The intermediary collects the non-consumption portion of realized income and uses
it to lend to the entrepeneur. Each entrepreneur’s loan will be it−nt and the amount
of loan will equate:
qt (kt+1 − (1− δ)kt + Φa,tkt) = (it − nt) = qtitg (ω¯t)
At this point, the entrepreneur’s net worth will be given by:
nt = w
e
t + (rt + qt(1− δ)) ket
Note here that ket represents an average capital for the entire set of entrepreneurs,
taking into account those that default last period. This allows us to not keep track of
each individual entrepreneur.
(IV) Entrepreneurs enter into a contract with intermediaries and decide terms such that
they solve:
Max
{ω¯t,rlt,it}
qtitf(ω¯t)
s.t. qtitg(ω¯t) ≥ it − nt
This pins down the lending rate, cutoff threshold, and investment level. All en-
trepreneurs (total measure one) now invest the level it.
(V) The idiosyncratic shock is realized and if ωjt > ω¯t then the jth individual will do the
following: (a) pay back loan to the bank at qtω¯it, (b) choose a consumption level,
ce,jt and (c) choose next period capital, k
e,j
t+1.
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However, if wjt < ω¯t, then the jth entrepeneur will set c
e,j
t = 0 and k
e,j
t+1 = 0. In this
case also, the bank will pay a monitoring cost µ which will count as a loss in capital
goods.
(VI) The bank will take both loans that are paid back fully (in solvent entrepreneurs’ case)
and also claim remaining assets minus monitoring costs (in non-solvent cases) and
pay back the household at a short term borrowing rate of 1. This will reenter the
household’s budget constraint as:
qt (kt+1 − (1− δ)kt + Φa,tkt) = qtitg (ω¯t)
(VII) The entrepreneurs that are living (realized shocks greater than ω¯t) now choose a
consumption level. Instead of keeping track of individual consumption and capital
plans, we solve for the average consumption and capital levels accounting for income
that would go to the entire measure of entrepreneurs. This can be seen from the
budget constraint:
cet + qtk
e
t+1 = qtitf(ω¯t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total income across measure
Hence {cet , ket+1} are average quantities across η entrepeneurs, some of which have
defaulted on their loans.
2.6.2. Average Entrepreneur’s Decision Problem
Entrepreneur j’s problem, regardless of default, is given by:
Max
{ce,jt ,ke,jt+1}
E
∞∑
t=0
(βγe)tce,jt
s.t. ce,jt + qtk
e,j
t+1 = qtit max{0, ωjt − ω¯t}
Investment is not entrepreneur dependent as it is decided before the shock is realized. We
know at each t, Φ(ω¯t) will default, with consumption and next period capital equal to zero,
so average policies will be given by:
cet =
∫
ωjt>ω¯t
ce,jt dΦ
(
ωjt
)
ket+1 =
∫
ωjt>ω¯t
ke,jt+1dΦ
(
ωjt
)
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and the overall income (RHS of the budget constraint) will be given by:
qtit
∫
ωjt>ω¯t
(ωt − ω¯t) dΦ
(
ωjt
)
= qtitf (ω¯t)
using the definition from earlier. To get the average utility we can utilize the risk neutrality
to receive the time t utility to be:
(βγe)tΦ (ω¯t) (0) + (βγ
e)t
∫
ωjt>ω¯t
ce,jt dΦ
(
ωjt
)
= (βγe)t cet
2.6.3. Accounting for Market Clearing
Note that the market clearing is given by:
(Capital Markets) Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + ηit(1− µΦ(ω¯t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Investment across all entrepreneurs
(Goods Markets) Yt = F (Kt, ZtLt, ZtL
e
t ) = (1− η)ct + ηcet + ηit
The reason we take into account the actual distribution, via Φ, in the first equation is
because investment is made at the per-entrepeneur level, before default is realized. In the
second equation, cet is accounted for as an average, taking into account the entire distribution
of possibilities. Because it is an average for the unit measure of entrepreneurs, we also
multiply it by η.
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2.7. Appendix: Analytical Derivations
2.7.1. Household Problem
The decision problem of the Epstein-Zin household can be written as:
Ut = Max{ct,lt,kt+1,st+1}
(
(1− β) (V (ct, lt))
1−γ
θ + β
(
Et
[
U1−γt+1
]) 1
θ
) θ
1−γ
s.t. ct + qtkt+1 + qtΦa (kt, kt+1) kt = wtlt + rtkt + qt(1− δ)kt
where V (ct, lt) represents the intratemporal utility from consumption and labor choice. The
price of capital is qt and δ is its depreciation rate. The EZ parameters are standard with
γ representing risk aversion, ψ representing IES, and θ ≡ 1−γ
1− 1
ψ
. We proceed to solve the
household problem with the following Lagrangian:
L = Ut + λt
(
wtlt + rtkt + qt(1− δ)kt − ct − qtkt+1 − qtΦa
(
kt, kt+1
)
kt
)
∂L
∂ct
:
θ
1− γ
(
U
1−γ
θ
t
) θ
1−γ−1
(1− β)(1− 1
ψ
) (Vt)
− 1
ψ Vc.t − λt = 0
∂L
∂lt
:
θ
1− γ
(
U
1−γ
θ
t
) θ
1−γ−1
(1− β)(1− 1
ψ
) (Vt)
− 1
ψ Vl.t + λtwt = 0
∂L
∂kt+1
:
θ
1− γ
(
U
1−γ
θ
t
) θ
1−γ−1
β
(
1
θ
)(
Et
[
U
1−γ
t+1
]) 1
θ
−1
Et
[
(1− γ)U−γt+1
∂Ut+1
∂kt+1
]
− λt
(
qt
[
1 +
∂Φa,t
∂kt+1
kt
])
= 0
Envelope :
∂Ut
∂kt
=
∂L
∂kt
= λt
(
rt + qt(1− δ)− qt
[
Φa,t +
∂Φa,t
∂kt
kt
])
If we bring λ terms to the right hand side of the first two equations, and divide the first
equation by the second we will receive the following relationship governing consumption-
labor tradeoffs:
wtVc(ct, lt) = −Vl(ct, lt)
To receive the Euler condition, we start by dividing the third FOC by the first one and
receive:
qt
(
1 +
∂Φa,t
∂kt+1
kt
)
= Et
 β
1− β
U−γt+1(
Et
[
U1−γt+1
]) 1
θ
−1
V
1
ψ
t
Vct
∂Ut+1
∂kt+1

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If we substiute the Envelope condition into ∂Ut+1kt+1 we receive:
Et
[
Mt+1R
k
t+1
]
= 1
s.t. Mt+1 = β
U
1
ψ
−γ
t+1(
Et
[
U1−γt+1
])1− 1
θ
(
Vt+1
Vt
)− 1
ψ
(
Vc,t+1
Vc,t
)
Rkt+1 =
rt+1 + qt+1(1− δ)− qt+1
(
Φa,t+1 +
∂Φa,t+1
∂kt+1
kt+1
)
qt
(
1 +
∂Φa,t
∂kt+1
kt
)
which matches the result from the main text.
2.7.2. Intermediary Contract
The contract between intermediaries and entrpreneurs is a static, one period agreement, that
maximizes the entrepreneur’s portion of the surplus while ensuring that the participation
constraint of the intermediary holds.
Max
{ω¯t,it}
qtitf(ω¯t)
s.t. qtitg(ω¯t) ≥ it − nt
where nt and qt are assumed to be known at the time of the contract.
As the lender is assumed to be risk neutral we know that his participation constraint will
bind, which will result in:
it =
nt
1− qtg(ω¯t) = i (ω¯t)
Notice that solving for i is interchangeable with ωt as this is a one-to-one mapping (based
on properties of f). Hence the maximization problem has ωt as a sole control variable. The
first order condition of the original maximand is:
∂
∂ω¯t
(qtitf(ω¯t)) = qtitf
′ (ω¯t) + qtf (ω¯t) i′ (ω¯t) = 0
⇐⇒ = itf ′ (ω¯t) + f(ω¯t)it qtg
′(ω¯t)
1− qtg(ω¯t) = 0
Canceling it and rearranging terms we receive the condition provided in the main text.
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2.7.3. Entrepreneur Problem
The Lagrangian of the entrepreneur’s problem can be written as:
Le =
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
pi
(
st
)
(βγe)t
[
cet + µt
(
qtitft − cet − qtket+1 − qtΦea,tket
)]
where the entrepreneur’s choice variables are simply
{
cet , k
e
t+1
}
as investment, it is prede-
termined due to the ex-ante contract. µt denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the budget
constraint. The first order conditions will be:
∂Le
∂cet
: pi
(
st
)
(βγe)t [1− µt] = 0
⇐⇒ µt = 1
∂Le
∂ket+1
: pi
(
st
)
(βγe)t
[
µt
(
−qt
(
1 +
∂Φea,t
∂ket+1
ket
))]
+
∑
st+1
pi(st+1) (βγe)t+1
[
µt+1
(
qt+1f(ω¯t+1)
∂it+1
∂ket+1
− qt+1
(
Φea,t+1 +
∂Φea,t+1
∂ket+1k
e
t+1
))]
= 0
s.t.
∂it+1
∂kt+1
=
∂nt+1/∂kt+1
1− qt+1gt+1 =
rt+1 + (1− δ)qt+1
1− qt+1gt+1
In the second condition, we treat ω¯ as a price which explains why there are no partials
of f(ω¯)′ or g(ω¯)′ with respect to ke′ . Also we use the definition of net worth as earlier
introduced in the text:
nt = w
e
t + rtk
e
t + qt(1− δ)ket
If we rewrite the latter first order condition and plug in µ, we will receive the result from
the text:
Et
βγe

(
qt+1f(ω¯t+1)
1−qt+1g(ω¯t+1)
)
(qt+1(1− δ) + rt+1)− qt+1
(
∂Φea,t+1
∂ket+1
ket+1 + Φ
e
a,t+1
)
qt
(
1 +
∂Φea,t
∂ket+1
ket
)

 = 1
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2.8. Appendix: Data Sources
2.8.1. Consumption
We construct real, per capita consumption (Ct) by summing real measures of nondurables
and services consumption. Nominal consumption data for these items come from National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) table 1.1.5. To get corresponding price deflators for
real quantities, we use those in table 1.1.9. Per-capita measures utilize population data in
NIPA table 2.1.
2.8.2. Investment
To measure investment (It) we use fixed investment, from NIPA table 1.1.5. We adjust this
by its price deflator in table 1.1.9 and the population series from earlier.
2.8.3. Output
Output for model moments is provided by the sum of the constructed consumption and
investment. As there is no government or trade in the model these are the only series of
quantitative relevance for us.
2.8.4. Inflation and Financial Market Data
The annual, nominal data on risk free rates and market returns come from Ken French’s
website. We compute the market excess return as the annualized difference between the
two. To calculate the real risk free rate, we adjust the risk free rate by the growth rate of
the GDP deflator index from NIPA table 1.1.4.
To obtain statistics regarding credit spreads, we use Moody’s data series on seasoned BBB
and AAA corporate yields from the St. Louis FRED.
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Table 5: Calibration Parameters for Baseline Model
Parameter Value Selection Criteria
β .991 Approximately match E
(
rf
)
ζ 1 Labor Supply Shut Down
δ .02
αk .3000
αl .6999
αe .0001
η .1
σω .75 Set to receive leverage ratio of roughly 30%
γe –
µ .5% Key parameter to control amount of bankruptcy costs
γ 15
ψ 2.5
gz .45% Approximately match E (4y)
ϕz 2% Approximately match σ (4y)
ρx .96 Croce(2014)
ϕx .1× ϕz Capture appropriate LRR portion of volatility
φ 10
σlev .0325 Croce (2014)
This table provides the baseline calibration for the model, at a quarterly frequency. All
parameters with z and x subscripts refer to parameters that calibrate the growth rate
process for TFP. The wedge in the discount rates of the entrepreneur and household is
given through γe while that of the household is β. The level of monitoring costs for the
intermediary is provided through µ.
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Table 6: Baseline Model Fit
Statistic Data (Annual, 1929 - 2008) Baseline Model
Macro (Annual):
σ(4c)/σ(4y) .641 (.578, .664) .840
σ(4i)/σ(4y) 4.46 (3.19, 5.19) 2.07
σ(4y)(%) 3.36 (1.90, 4.35) 3.74
ρ(4c,4i) .678 (.436, .889) .718
Financial (Annual):
E(rf )(%) .722 (-.690, 2.16) .72
σ(rf )(%) 3.78 (2.02, 4.78) .93
E(Rlevex,t+1)(%) 5.04 (3.07, 7.03) 2.51
σ(Rlevex,t+1)(%) 20.3 (16.4, 23.6) 7.05
Sharpe(Rlevex,t+1) .248 (.137, .390) .356
ρ(4c,Rlevex ) .224 (.008, .333) .294
ρ(4y,Rlevex ) .209 (-.099, .360) .358
ρ(4c, re − rk) -.503 (-.637, -.244) -.922
ρ(4y, re − rk) -.539 (-.685, -.345) -.969
This table provides the results of the baseline calibration. The in-sample moment estimates
are constructed from annual data (1929 – 2008). Numbers in parentheses provide a boot-
strapped standard error distribution at the (5%, 95%) levels. Details for data construction
are provided in the Appendix. The baseline calibration results are generated through a
long sample simulation (population) of 50000 quarters. After a burn-in of 5000 quarters,
we annualize all moments, in log terms and report figures above. All statistics refer to
quantities that are defined in the main portion of the text.
70
Table 7: Role of Household Adjustment Costs
Statistic φ = 0 φ = 10 φ = 20
Macro (Annual):
σ(4c)/σ(4y) .680 .840 923
σ(4i)/σ(4y) 2.69 2.07 1.91
σ(4y)(%) 3.83 3.74 3.70
ρ(4c,4i) .52 .72 .68
Financial (Annual):
E(rf )(%) .43 .72 .72
σ(rf )(%) .90 .93 .96
E(rk − rf )(%) .15 1.25 2.26
σ(rk − rf )(%) .30 1.44 2.21
Sharpe(rk − rf ) .492 .870 1.02
E(re − rf )(%) 4.45 4.31 4.46
σ(re − rf )(%) 1.08 1.01 1.01
Sharpe(re − rf ) 4.10 4.28 4.43
E(Rlevex,t+1)(%) .30 2.51 4.52
σ(Rlevex,t+1)(%) 6.53 7.05 7.77
Sharpe(Rlevex,t+1) .046 .356 .582
This table provides the results of perturbing the level of adjustment costs, that enter the
household’s budget constraint. The results are generated through a long sample simulation
(population) of 50000 quarters. After a burn-in of 5000 quarters, we annualize all moments,
in log terms and report figures above. All statistics refer to quantities that are defined in
the main portion of the text.
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Table 8: Role of Bankruptcy Costs
Statistic µ = .5% µ = 10% µ = 20%
Macro (Annual):
σ(4c)/σ(4y) .840 .861 .881
σ(4i)/σ(4y) 2.07 1.65 1.60
σ(4y)(%) 3.74 3.71 3.70
ρ(4c,4i) .72 .78 .78
Financial (Annual):
E(rf )(%) .72 .49 .42
σ(rf )(%) .93 .93 .94
E(rk − rf )(%) 1.25 1.56 1.64
σ(rk − rf )(%) 1.44 1.75 1.83
Sharpe(rk − rf ) .870 .892 .896
E(re − rf )(%) 4.31 14.8 26.1
σ(re − rf )(%) 1.01 2.94 3.63
Sharpe(re − rf ) 4.28 5.04 7.17
E(Rlevex,t+1)(%) 2.51 3.12 3.29
σ(Rlevex,t+1)(%) 7.05 7.31 7.39
Sharpe(Rlevex,t+1) .356 .427 .445
This table provides the results of perturbing the level of monitoring costs, where we fix
the adjustment cost parameter, φ = 10. The results are generated through a long sample
simulation (population) of 50000 quarters. After a burn-in of 5000 quarters, we annualize
all moments, in log terms and report figures above. All statistics refer to quantities that
are defined in the main portion of the text.
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Table 9: The Cyclicality of Returns – Current Model
Statistic Data (Annual, 1929 - 2008) µ = .5% µ = 10% µ = 20%
ρ(4c,Rlevex ) .224 (.008, .333) .243 .279 .303
ρ(4y,Rlevex ) .209 (-.099, .360) .299 .349 .362
ρ(4c, re − rk) -.503 (-.637, -.244) -.922 -.035 .199
ρ(4y, re − rk) -.539 (-.685, -.345) -.969 .162 .367
ρ(4c, log (it/nt)) – -.496 .212 .305
ρ(4y, log (it/nt)) – -.323 .430 .499
E
[
it−nt
ket
]
– .549 .147 .145
E
[
it−nt
it
]
– .335 .123 .120
This table provides the results of perturbing the level of monitoring costs, where ρ represents
contemporaneous correlation statistics. The in-sample moment estimates are constructed
from annual data (1929 – 2008). Numbers in parentheses provide a bootstrapped standard
error distribution at the (5%, 95%) levels. Details for data construction are provided in the
Appendix. Model results are generated through a long sample simulation (population) of
50000 quarters. After a burn-in of 5000 quarters, we annualize all moments, in log terms
and report figures above.
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Table 10: Role of IES
Statistic ψ = 2.5 ψ = 1.5 ψ = .8
Macro (Annual):
σ(4c)/σ(4y) .840 .843 .954
σ(4i)/σ(4y) 2.07 1.94 2.13
σ(4y)(%) 3.74 3.69 3.61
ρ(4c,4i) .72 .86 .58
Financial (Annual):
E(rf )(%) .72 2.10 3.88
σ(rf )(%) .93 1.39 2.19
E(rk − rf )(%) 1.25 .50 -.49
σ(rk − rf )(%) 1.44 1.28 1.57
Sharpe(rk − rf ) .870 .394 -.310
E(re − rf )(%) 4.31 3.44 2.75
σ(re − rf )(%) 1.01 1.44 2.25
Sharpe(re − rf ) 4.28 2.39 1.22
E(Rlevex )(%) 2.51 1.01 -.97
σ(Rlevex )(%) 7.05 6.94 7.20
Sharpe(Rlevex ) .356 .146 -.135
This table provides the results of perturbing the IES parameter that enters the household
preferences, where we also fix the household adjustment costs parameter at φ = 10. The
calibration results are generated through a long sample simulation (population) of 50000
quarters. After a burn-in of 5000 quarters, we annualize all moments, in log terms and
report figures above. All statistics refer to quantities that are defined in the main portion
of the text.
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Table 11: Persistence of Macroeconomic Variables
Statistic Data (Annual, 1929 - 2008) µ = .5% µ = 10% µ = 20%
Baseline Model:
AR1(4c) .480 (.222, .562) .515 .490 .449
AR1(4i) .435 (.200, .580) -.018 .280 .337
AR1(4y) .444 (.125, .589) .406 .408 .408
No Adjustment Costs (φ = 0):
AR1(4c) .480 (.222, .562) .795 .516 .513
AR1(4i) .435 (.200, .580) -.009 .298 .321
AR1(4y) .444 (.125, .589) .432 .437 .438
Lower Epstein-Zin Friction (ψ = .8):
AR1(4c) .480 (.222, .562) .335 .378 .355
AR1(4i) .435 (.200, .580) -.061 .203 .273
AR1(4y) .444 (.125, .589) .373 .374 .374
This table provides the first order autocorrelation statistics of macroeconomic growth vari-
ables. The in-sample moment estimates are constructed from annual data (1929 – 2008).
Numbers in parentheses provide a bootstrapped standard error distribution at the (5%,
95%) levels. Details for data construction are provided in the Appendix. Model results are
generated through a long sample simulation (population) of 50000 quarters. After a burn-in
of 5000 quarters, we annualize all moments, in log terms and report figures above.
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Figure 11: Impulse Response Functions – Baseline Calibration
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(d) 4Ct
Impulse response functions are given here with respect to a one standard deviation shock
to innovations of the long run component of TFP growth, x. Parameters are fixed at
baseline values. All units are given in quarterly values. To compute impulses, we simulate
200 economies under two sets of shocks, one of which includes an additional long run
growth impulse. We then take the average, across all economies, of the deviation of
responses for both sets of shocks.
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Figure 12: Impulse Response Functions – Shifting µ
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(d) 4Ct
Impulse response functions are given here with respect to a one standard deviation shock
to innovations of the long run component of TFP growth, x. The solid, dashed, and lines
marked with a circle represent model responses under different values of µ (.005, .10, .20).
All units are given in quarterly values. To compute impulses, we simulate 200 economies
under two sets of shocks, one of which includes an additional long run growth impulse. We
then take the average, across all economies, of the deviation of responses for both sets of
shocks.
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Figure 13: Impulse Response Functions – Financial Market Variables
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(a) Impulse Response of Rlevex,t
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(b) Impulse Response of re,t − rk,t
Impulse response functions are given here with respect to a one standard deviation shock
to innovations of the long run component of TFP growth, x. The solid, dashed, and lines
marked with a circle represent model responses under different values of µ (.005, .10, .20).
All units are given in quarterly values. To compute impulses, we simulate 200 economies
under two sets of shocks, one of which includes an additional long run growth impulse. We
then take the average, across all economies, of the deviation of responses for both sets of
shocks.
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Chapter 3: Corporate Debt Maturity and the Real Economy
3.1. Introduction
The financial crisis of the late 2000’s placed debt maturity concerns at the forefront of the
economic policy debate. As firms with relatively more short-term debt were exposed to
rollover and liquidity crises, new questions arose as to how long-term debt could affect firm
and economic stability.1 While some academic work tackle these issues, they do not provide
a link between debt maturity and investment behavior.2 My work provides a comprehensive,
quantitative framework that connects debt maturity choice, corporate bond yields, and the
endogenous assets of the firm’s balance sheet.
Empirically, I document several novel facts that discuss the positive link between business
cycles and the long-term debt share. At the aggregate level, I use US Federal Reserve
Financial Accounts data to identify the portion of total non-financial, corporate liabilities
that are considered long-term. This ratio is significantly correlated with GDP and aggregate
investment growth, with predictive power up to six quarters in the future. Using Compustat
data at the firm level as well, I show that when firms shift their long-term debt ratio to
a longer average maturity, profitability and investment rates are higher. These results are
robust to controlling for a variety of macroeconomic and financial factors.
In order to understand these phenomena, I design a dynamic, heterogeneous firm, capital
structure model in which corporations optimally issue equity and debt of short and long ma-
turities. Using external financing and cash flows from production, firms finance investment
into profit-generating capital. I compute and calibrate the model to target cross-sectional
and aggregate data related to investment, leverage, default, and credit spreads.
The model generates a pro-cyclical long-term debt ratio through an endogenously generated,
time-varying pecking order of capital market securities. The framework also implies that
stable firms, which are more capitalized and have a larger portion of long-term debt, matter
more for the real economy. Despite higher quantities of leverage and long-term debt, their
average credit spreads are lower. Altogether, endogenous investment plays a crucial role in
1It is well-documented that the over abundance of short-term liabilities on corporate balance sheets
helped cause runs in commercial paper and repurchase agreement markets during the financial crisis (see
eg. BNP Paribas, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, General Electric). In non-crisis events as well, survey
evidence suggest that CFO’s take on long-term debt to “reduce risk of having to borrow in ‘bad times’ ”
(see Graham and Harvey, 2002; Servaes and Tufano, 2006).
2My focus on the endogenous asset choice of firms separates my paper from Chen et al. (2013) and He
and Milbradt (2016), where cash flows are taken to be exogeneous. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) and
Campello et al. (2011) discuss the impact of the financial crisis event on investment, but do not discuss the
explicit role of long-term debt in a larger context.
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driving leverage and debt maturity choice, default dynamics, and credit spreads.
The conditions of Miller and Modigliani (1959) would suggest that firms are indifferent
to debt of varying maturities, under a pari passu treatment of securities. To break this
indifference, the model splits the proportion of distress costs that are held by short and long-
term debt. Each period, firms have access to debt issuance in a short-term, collateralized
debt contract which prices in relatively less default risk. Meanwhile the longer term debt
market inherits a greater burden of default risk and associated distress costs.
In a higher aggregate state of the model economy, firms optimally choose to invest more
than they generate in profits. In order to do so, they need to acquire external financing.
Due to a tax advantage of debt, and the fact that short-term debt is the least costly form
of financing, via the collateral constraint, corporations seek to first finance their need for
cash using short-term debt issuance.
For additional financing, the firm has the choice of issuing long-term debt or equity. In
positive economic environments, it is desirable for corporations to take on more long-term
debt as its effective cost is lower; this is due to a lower probability of default that results
in lower expected distress costs. Put differently, in good states of the world, yields on
long-term debt compare favorably to issuance costs in equity.
In poor aggregate states, when the marginal gains from investing are lower, the firm doesn’t
require as much external financing. However, if some firms do seek to externally finance
more than is available through short-term markets, the marginally higher credit spreads
and effective costs of longer term debt make it an unattractive option. In this case, firms
would rather obtain external financing using equity than long-term debt.
As my model involves a heterogeneous firm setup, I also provide implications for the cross
section. Sorting firms on distance to default, I find that firms that are closer to exiting
have higher credit spreads, less capital, less leverage, and less long-term debt. The italicized
statements are counter-intuitive; we would expect leverage to have a negative relationship
with firm stability. These results directly imply that in the model’s equilibrium cross-
section, capital is a much larger driver of firm default. Furthermore, these findings suggest
that economic stability is positively linked to a higher long-term debt ratio.
To underscore the importance of endogenous investment, I show that default events are
largely precipitated by a joint drop in productivity levels and capital. During a sequence of
negative productivity shocks in an economic recession, eventually-defaulting firms disinvest
in response to a decreasing marginal product of capital. However, due to the burden of
long-term debt on their balance sheet, firms eventually choose to exit. Firms do have the
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option to purchase back debt, but for defaulting firms, this option becomes limited as they
have reduced funds from production and constraints on borrowing from short-term debt
markets.
In comparison to the classical leverage and default framework of Leland and Toft (1996),
there are three major differences: (i) via investment, firms shift the level of capital resulting
in an endogenous dividend stream, (ii) the firm continually rebalances the book values
of short and long-term debt (a setup with “non-commitment”), (iii) when using external
financing, the firm chooses between additional equity issuance and debt issuance of two
different maturity types.
As documented in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012), models that feature long-term debt
with fair pricing have difficulties with numerical convergence. Due to the discrete nature
of firm default and the dependence on future policy functions, the long-term debt pricing
function fluctuates greatly, which leads to non-convergence in value as well. In order to
remedy this problem, I extend the computational method cited in the above paper, to allow
for a simultaneous choice of both capital and debt policies. The additional choice variables
complicate the problem substantially.3 I introduce zero-mean IID noise with a low amount
of variance into the dividend payments. By calculating default breakpoints perfectly as
a function of these noise variables and taking expectations over default and non-default
regions of the noise, I am able to smooth out the discrete jumps and improve convergence
of the model.
Having described the key results, I now provide a roadmap for the rest of the paper. I
conclude this section by providing a literature review. In the following section, I discuss
the procyclicality of the long-term debt share. The third section is dedicated to discussing
the model I use to study these issues, via dynamic issuance of multiple debt maturities.
Following this, I delve into the quantitative implications arising from the model, including
the key mechanisms and cross-sectional implications. In the final section I conclude.
Previous Literature. This paper relates to many strands of literature regarding corporate
credit spreads, capital structure, and the macroeconomy. I discuss my work in the context of
each area and provide differences. The overarching theme is that I connect capital structure
with multiple debt maturities, endogenous investment and output, and asset prices in a
dynamic structural model.
3In the cited paper, consumer income is taken to be an exogenous process, while in my paper the firm’s
income is chosen endogenously, as investment is a choice variable. My extension compares very similarly
to the methodology used in Gordon and Guerron-Quintana (2016). The key difference is that I also have
short-term debt (which I account for through a collateral constraint).
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As my model provides endogenous prices for short and long-term debt, this paper connects
to the literature regarding structural models of credit. Merton (1974), Leland (1994), and
Leland and Toft (1996) serve as historical benchmarks in this area. In the large majority of
this work, firms are risk neutral with cash flows expressed as exogenous Gaussian diffusion
processes. Using the known statistical distribution of firm value given the current state,
alongside optimal choice for debt and default boundaries, we can compute closed form
expressions for bond prices.4 However, as discussed in Huang and Huang (2012), the large
conclusion of this literature is that structural credit models undershoot credit risk premia
when matching default rates. This is partially due to the fact that model-based state
prices (Arrow-Debreu prices) are not volatile or countercyclical enough. In order to correct
for these problems, Bhamra et al. (2010) and Chen (2010) utilize Epstein and Zin (1989)
preferences in order to increase the risk exposures of credit securities. My paper is different
from these studies in that my dynamic model allows corporations to dynamically invest.
Furthermore, at each point in time, firms have access to issuing multiple maturities of debt,
both of which can change in book terms (“non-commitment”).
This paper connects with the vast literature of dynamic models with endogenous investment.
Many of these setups include firms that have a time-varying capital structure of equity and
debt. A non-exhaustive list of papers includes Gomes (2001), Whited and Wu (2006),
and Hennessy and Whited (2007). Hennessy and Whited (2005) were the first to discuss
debt-equity tradeoffs in a business cycle model with idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks.
Livdan et al. (2009) use a structural corporate model to discuss the relationship between
firm constrainedness and asset prices. Perhaps closest to my work, Kuehn and Schmid
(2014) develop a partial equilibrium firm model with endogenous investment, recursive
preferences-based stochastic discount factor, and long-term debt. I extend their model to
have an additional, short-term debt choice that is governed through a collateral constraint.
My paper also relates to work by Covas and Den Haan (2011) and Jermann and Quadrini
(2012) which discuss the fact that debt issuance is procyclical. In my model, I try to match
the more granular fact that the share of long-term debt is positively correlated with output
and investment. Crouzet (2015) discusses how multiple equilibria may arise in models with
multiple debt maturities and investment. The main difference between the previous paper
and my own is that within the scope of my model the short-term debt is assumed to be less
costly, via the collateral constraint. This is a key driver of the pro-cyclical long-term debt
share in my paper. Finally, a recent paper (Alfaro et al., 2016) discusses how economic
uncertainty interacts with financial frictions to cause larger shifts in short-term debt than
4The calculation of an optimal default boundary is done through a “smooth-pasting condition” that
leaves the equityholder indifferent at the boundary, between continuing to operate and dissolving. In many
papers, this is also known as “strategic default.”
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those in long-term debt. A key difference between their work and my own is that they use
collateral constraints to maintain a risk free term structure. In my model long term debt,
in particular, is risky.
In terms of work regarding maturity choice, Diamond (1991) suggests that cross-sectional
heterogeneity of long-term debt shares can be linked to firm level signals in the form of
credit ratings. More recently, Greenwood et al. (2010) try to understand the time-variation
of corporate debt maturity choice. They suggest that the time series patterns of corpo-
rate debt maturity are linked to investor-related substitution effects between government
and corporate debt. I provide evidence and construct a model that instead utilizes firm
investment as a key driver for explaining the pro-cyclical long-term debt share. He and Mil-
bradt (2016) discuss a dynamic debt rebalancing problem with short and long-term debt.
Their model features classes of equilibria, one in which firms continually shorten the overall
maturity of their debt and another in which they lengthen overall maturity. There are
many ways in which my model differs from theirs, but one key difference again is that I
allow for an endogenous choice of assets, which provides me the opportunity to discuss the
investment-related impact of debt maturity. Finally, Chen et al. (2013) discuss the impact
of multiple debt maturities in a structural credit model. They are able to show that the
additional use of long-term debt cuts credit spreads. Through my model, I will be able to
make a similar statement regarding debt prices and debt maturity, while also speaking to
the endogenous asset side of the balance sheet.
A more recent literature discusses empirical evidence regarding debt refinancing. Using
syndicate loan data from the FDIC, Mian and Santos (2011) provide evidence that credit-
worthy firms borrow at and extend existing loans to longer maturities when economic cli-
mates are positive in order to weather liquidity crises that might occur later. Similarly, Xu
(2015) suggests that speculative grade firms issue or refinance longer maturity debt in favor-
able market conditions. Both of these papers support the general economic story my model
displays. Other empirical work (see Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Campello et al., 2011)
have discussed how firms utilize alternative forms of liquidity (in particular, cash and credit
lines) in order to buffer operations in the Great Recession period. As I calibrate my model
to public market data, I focus my attention on tradeoffs between short and long-term debt
and abstract away from alternative securities. Finally, a recent paper (Choi et al., 2016)
examines the granuality or spread of debt maturity dispersion within corporations. Using
data from Mergent’s Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) they suggest that younger
and smaller firms have a debt maturity that is less diverse across corporate debt, while
mature and larger firms display the exact opposite.
The sovereign default literature also discusses maturity tradeoffs for emerging market economies.
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Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) explain how issuing long-term debt serves as a hedge
to future movements in debt prices. Broner et al. (2013) suggest that emerging economies
borrow sovereign debt at a maturity that lengthens in expansions of domestic business cy-
cles. My economic story broadly agrees with this time-varying procyclical nature of debt
maturity, in the context of US firms. On the computational front, I adopt techniques from
this literature, first introduced in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) and extended by Gor-
don and Guerron-Quintana (2016). In both of these papers, IID noise is introduced into
the (effective) dividend flow payment to help smooth out the bond price calculation. This
smoothing is very useful to handle the discrete jumps that come with the nature of default
decisions. While I don’t provide a proof for existence under the use of the IID noise (as is
done in these papers), I do use this tool to help convergence greatly.
3.2. Procyclicality of Long Term Debt Ratio
In this section, I document the fact that the share of long-term debt is positively associated
with business cycles. I present evidence at both the aggregate and firm levels.
3.2.1. Aggregate Dynamics
Using quarterly data at the U.S. Federal Reserve Financial Accounts going back to 1952,
I construct a measure of the share of long-term debt, where long-term debt includes ag-
gregated corporate, mortgage, and municipal debt on the balance sheet of non-financial
corporations.5 As discussed in Greenwood et al. (2010), this series contains a time-varying
trend and I correct for it by extracting the cyclical component of the long-term debt share.
In Figure 14, I provide a graph of this series, obtained through a Hodrick and Prescott
(1997) filter. The grey bars indicate NBER recession dates and the left hand axis indicates
changes in percentage points of the ratio. I find that the ratio decreases in recessions and
increases in expansions of the business cycle.
This is made quantitatively clear in Figure 15. I compute cross correlation functions between
cycle components of the long-term debt ratio and measures of the business cycle. All figures
on the left hand side represent correlations between output growth and various cyclical
measures of the long-term debt share, while those on the right hand side report correlations
using investment growth. From top to bottom, the cyclical components are measured using
Hodrick and Prescott, Baxter and King (1999), and Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) filters,
respectively. Across all three filters, I find that the contemparenous correlations between
economic aggregates and the long-term debt share are significantly positive. Using the HP-
filtered value, for example, it is at the order of 35% while its correlation with investment
5The same measure is discussed in Chen et al. (2013). However they do not compute explicit correlations
between the ratio, output, and investment growth.
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growth is roughly 40%. Similar results hold for the BK-filtered debt share and the CF
filter, particularly at lag zero. Altogether firms take on more long-term debt and extend
the length of their maturity structure in business cycle expansions.
I seek to further understand the procyclical features of the long-term debt share measure,
by examining predictive regressions. I project average, future output growth onto a set of
controls and the HP-filtered long-term debt share, given here by LTDRc:
1
k
k∑
i=1
∆yt+i = β0 + β
′
XXt + βLTLTDR
c
t + errort+k
The vector of controls, Xt, includes a wide array of lagged macroeconomic and financial vari-
ables known to have predictive power for business cycles, including lagged output growth,
consumption growth, inflation, price-dividend ratios, credit spreads, and U.S. Treasury bond
yields. The top panel of Table 12 reports the coefficients of the long-term ratio and its as-
sociated t-statistic after correcting for serial and autocorrelated errors using Newey and
West (1987) adjustment. The long-term ratio predicts output at a very significant rate, up
to four quarters out, even when controlling for a wide array of factors. Perhaps stemming
from the higher raw correlation presented earlier, results are even stronger when I perform
the same regression using investment growth as a dependent variable. In the bottom panel
of the same table, I show that coefficients are larger and t-statistics are close to five in
the first year. In terms of economic magnitudes, these results suggest that one percent of
additional long-term debt share is associated with roughly .60% more output growth and
3% more investment growth at the annual basis. Putting both the contemparaneous and
predictive facts together, the aggregate long-term debt ratio contains significant positive
economic news.
3.2.2. Firm-Level Dynamics
Using firm-level data I seek to confirm facts shown at the aggregate level. I construct
another measure of long-term debt, as that in Barclay and Smith (1995), with quarterly,
Compustat data. I define the long-term debt ratio as the share of debt that is greater than
one year at issuance. This measure includes any corporate bonds, mortgages and municipal
debt that firms have on their balance sheet. It also includes long-term leases and wage
contracts, but excludes long-term accounts payable. I do not provide full sample statistics
of this measure, but in summary, the average firm holds close to 70% in the form of debt
over one year. The fact that this number is so large suggests how important publically-
issued long-term debt is. As financial, public, and utility firms are regulated in their capital
structure behavior I remove these firms from the sample by way of their SIC codes. I
85
also remove firm-quarter observations if there are extreme quarterly movements in market
leverage or the long-term debt ratio (in the bottom or top 1%). This is meant to remove
the effects of capital structure shifts, due to merger and acquisition activity or divestitures.
Due to data quality issues related to completeness, I run all tests using data following the
first month of 1984.
As there is non-stationarity in many of the firm-level variables, I adjust firm quantities
by their overall size and estimate the link between capital-adjusted profits (pii/ki) and the
long-term debt share (LTDRi):
piit
kit
= β0 + β
′
XXit + βld1LTDRit + errorit
where Xit indicates a vector of firm and aggregate level controls, depending on the specifi-
cation. I provide the results of this regression in Table 13. From left to right, I test multiple
specifications where I successively add (i) firm-level controls, (ii) macroeconomic controls,
and (iii) firm fixed effects. Following the main feature in Gilchrist et al. (2014), I include
a term accounting for the historical, four-quarter volatility in profitability. I also include
contemporaneous leverage, lagged investment rate, lagged market to book (“average Q”),
and the long-term debt ratio. Macroeconomic controls are similar to the past subsection
and include quarterly growth rates of industrial production and the consumer price index,
U.S. treasury yields, and the average aggregate credit spread.
The conclusion that is consistent across all specifications is that the long-term debt ratio,
at the firm level, is significantly associated with higher levels of profitability, beyond the 1%
confidence level. In terms of economic magnitudes, a one standard deviation movement in
the long-term debt share would be associated with a roughly 6.5% increase in profitability,
from the baseline average. I can also run the same regression using contemparenous rates
of capital-adjusted investment. The results of this projection are provided in Table 14.
Again, I find that the long-term debt ratio is significant in its association with investment.
Economic magnitudes are similar here as a one standard deviation increase in the long-term
debt share is associated with a roughly 6.8% increase in the capital-adjusted investment rate.
As in our aggregate regression results, we also check the power that firm specific long-term
debt shares have in predicting profitability and investment rates. In Table 15, we display
the results of both of these regressions. In the top panel, the left hand side displays average
future profitability between one and four quarters out, while on the right hand side are
the usual controls including the long-term debt share. It is evident that the predictive
power is significant and (intuitively) declines from one quarter out to four quarters out. In
economic magnitudes, a standard deviation movement in the current-long term debt share
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correlates with 4.1% additional future profitability (at one quarter forward) and 1.5% more
average profitability (four quarters). The bottom panel reports statistics for the investment
regression, where conclusions are similar. There is significant predictive power up to four
quarters.
Another interesting data experiment to run would be to check how regression results change
across firm size; in particular, do particular types of firms have stronger correlations between
their long-term debt shares and fundamentals. In Table 16, we do exactly this, running
pooled regressions after first sorting firms into size quintiles on a monthly basis. A conclusion
that is borne out of this (effective) double sort is that smaller firms have a much larger
sensitivity between their respective long-term debt share and fundamental statistic. In
the top panel for example, the relationship between profitability and the long-term debt
share for small firms is much more significant than that for large firms, where it is in
fact insignificant. The same holds in the bottom panel with respect to the investment
relationship.
Through all the analysis in this section, I am not claiming that the long-term debt ratio
causes firm and aggregate conditions to change. Rather I display these facts in order to
prove its positive correlation with the business cycle, and in particular investment rates.
3.3. Economic Model
In order to better understand these empirical patterns, I introduce a dynamic, heteroge-
neous firm economy in which corporations maximize expected, discounted cash flows aris-
ing from endogenous investment. In order to finance their operations, they use funds from
production, short-term and long-term debt issuance, and equity issuance. The optimal, si-
multaneous choice of investment, short and long-term debt issuance uniquely separates this
framework from the literature. In the rest of this section I precisely lay out the structure
of the economy and discuss the solution technique to the model.
3.3.1. Cash Flow Risks, Investment, and Production
The economy is populated by a large continuum of firms that are subject to both aggre-
gate and idiosyncratic risks. The aggregate state of the economy is determined through
consumption growth at t, denoted by ∆ct. It follows a first-order autoregressive process:
∆ct = µc + ρc∆ct−1 + σcεct (3.1)
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While ∆ct governs the aggregate state of the cycle, the shocks that enter into firms’ cash
flows will be related to another variable, Xt, whose growth rate will be given by ∆xt:
log (Xt/Xt−1) ≡ ∆xt = E [∆ct] + λx (∆ct −E [∆ct]) (3.2)
From the above equation, ∆xt will have the same mean as ∆ct however the volatility is
larger for λx > 1. In terms of the model’s performance, I increase the volatility of the
aggregate portion of total firm productivity to increase the tie between default and the
business cycle. Empirically as well, the growth rate of total factor productivity is multiple
times more volatile than what is found in consumption growth data.
The firm is also exposed to idiosyncratic risks, which will create an endogenous cross-
sectional distribution in quantities and prices. The idiosyncratic productivity will be given
by a mean zero xi,t:
xi,t = ρxxi,t−1 + σxεxt (3.3)
Going forward, I will denote all firm specific variables with the subscript i.
The cash flow shocks will enter into the operating profits of the firm, piit. The profits are
decreasing returns to scale in capital, with a factor 0 < α < 1, and taxed at a rate τ . They
are given by:
piit = (1− τ)Aitkαit
s.t. Ait = exp (x¯+ xit + (1− α) log(Xt))
(3.4)
where kit measures the amount of capital the firm has on hand at the start of period t. The
Ait term accounts for both aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity. x¯ is a constant, which
scales the value function and does not change the core results of the model.6 As log(Xt) is
a unit root variable that grows over time (implied by the consumption growth process), the
model exhibits stochastic growth around a trend. When solving the model, we correct for
the (time-varying) trend. There is more to be said about this when I discuss the solution
technique to the model.
Firms make investment choices each period in response to economic conditions. Denote
iit as the amount of investment made at time period t. This will imply that next period
capital, ki,t+1 is known today and given by:
ki,t+1 = (1− δ)ki,t + iit (3.5)
6The scale, x¯, is selected by analytically solving a no-leverage economy and equating steady state capital
to one.
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Existing capital depreciates at a rate δ, which will factor into the steady state rate of
investment.7 Adjusting capital is not costless and these costs are given by:
Φk (kit, iit) =
φk
2
(
iit
kit
− iss
kss
)2
kit (3.6)
where φk is a constant parameter and
iss
kss
is the steady state investment-to-capital ratio
in the model. I impose investment adjustment costs in order to slow the speed at which
firms invest. In the literature investment adjustment costs are both empirically founded
(Ramey and Shapiro, 2001) and help explain various features in asset pricing models. Zhang
(2005), for example, suggests that a more costly downward adjustment of capital is crucial
to rationalize the larger return on high book-to-market stocks.
3.3.2. Discount Factor
A driving force behind much of the structural asset pricing literature is an adjustment to
the physical probability measure in valuing cash flows. The stochastic discount factor in
many models (see Campbell and Cochrane, 1999; Bansal and Yaron, 2004) values cash flows
in bad states of the world at a higher rate relative to those in good states. I also embody
this intuition in my model as the firm discounts its cash flows at a countercyclical rate,
using an Epstein and Zin (1989) discount factor. The use of an Epstein and Zin pricing
kernel is crucial to ensure that default events are properly priced into credit spreads, while
keeping risk free rates reasonably low.8
At time t, each firm discounts its possible cash flows at t + 1 using an aggregate discount
factor, Mt+1 = M (∆ct,∆ct+1). This pricing kernel must satisfy the following conditions:
Mt+1 = β
θ
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ (PCt+1 + 1
PCt
)θ−1
Et
[
Mt+1
(
Ct+1
Ct
)(
PCt+1 + 1
PCt
)]
= 1
(3.7)
where Ct+1Ct = e
∆ct+1 and PCt is the level of the price consumption ratio at time t. The time
discount rate is β, risk aversion is given by γ, and ψ governs the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. As is common in the literature, θ = 1−γ
1− 1
ψ
. The second equation results from
the first order condition of a household’s consumption-savings problem. Using this Euler
7As there is stochastic growth in this economy, the steady state investment to capital ratio will be given
by exp (∆xss)− (1−δ). If there was no growth in steady state (∆xss = 0) steady state investment to capital
is δ.
8In cases where the Epstein and Zin friction is not present (γ = 1
ψ
), I find that the credit spread shrinks
dramatically.
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condition, we can solve for Mt+1 via numerical techniques.
It is important to note that the discount factor is not part of a larger general equilibrium
problem. There are no households (or investors) that maximize over equity holdings in the
continuum of firms. Connecting an aggregate household to firms with heterogeneous capital
structure is more challenging and beyond the scope of this paper. I leave this for future
research.
3.3.3. Capital Structure
Every period, the firm can issue debt of two types – short (S) and long (L). Short term
debt requires repayment the following period while long-term debt only requires a fractional
payment and takes the form of an annuity. Both forms of debt also have a proportional
coupon, c, that provides a tax advantage for debt. Meanwhile, firms also pay a fraction
κL of outstanding long-term book debt each period. Suppose at time t, firms issue a new
amount of debt in book value terms, wSit and w
L
it. This will imply that the new book debt
outstanding at the start of t+ 1 are:
bSi,t+1 = w
S
i,t
bLi,t+1 = (1− κL)bLi,t + wLi,t
(3.8)
To enforce that type L is indeed longer term at issue, I will set κL < 1. Hence, the average
duration of long-term debt will be 1κL .
Modeling debt as an annuity helps us simplify the problem as I only need to keep track of
the current book value of debt as a state variable. Nonetheless, this restriction still allows
me to capture the basic intuition that long-term debt provides the opportunity to pay a
smaller per-period payment. As a modeling assumption, this form of debt is not new either.
It is the same as the sinking fund provision used in Leland and Toft (1996), Hackbarth et al.
(2006), among many others. The key difference is again, that I allow the firm to choose
between two types of debt at a dynamic rate.
The firm will face a collateral constraint on its short-term debt.9 I impose that short-term
debt to be paid off in the future, including the coupon, is no more than a fraction of capital,
9It is true that collateralized short-term paper are mostly applicable for the low duration liabilities of
financial firms (Kacperczyk and Schnabl, 2010), which is at odds with the non-financial data I calibrate the
model to. That being said, many non-financial commercial paper contracts are associated with a standby
line of credit, which helps reduce the paper’s risk properties for potential investors (Coyle, 2002). A direct
implication of the model, through the alternative mechanism of the constraint, will be a reduced risk profile
for short-term debt.
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net depreciation, next period:
(1 + c)bSi,t+1 ≤ s0(1− δ)ki,t+1 (3.9)
where s0 ≤ 1. Furthermore I will assume that equity holders and long-term debt holders
recognize that short-term debt holders are senior claimants upon default. The reason I do
so is that the combination of these assumptions will imply that short-term debt will be a
risk free claim. That is to say, upon default, the firm will always have enough capital on
hand to service repayment of short-term debt. Hence the price of one dollar’s worth of
short-term debt, pSt , is the risk free discounted value of (1 + c):
pSt = Et [Mt+1(1 + c)] (3.10)
While the use of a collateral constraint and seniority are simplifying assumptions, it helps
us model default risk solely in the long-term debt security. This makes the model much
more computationally tractable to be taken to the data. It also has roots theoretically.
Diamond (1993) suggests that the seniority and collateralization of short-term debt can
serve as compensation for monitoring costs of short-term creditors. This compensation will
make it incentive-compatible for short-term creditors to not run on the firm, allowing the
scope for future debt issuance as well.
One might ask whether the seniority and risk free nature of the model’s short-term debt
hold in the data. Based on the Financial Accounts data discussed in the empirical section,
a very large portion of short-term debt (on average, 95%) constitute of loans. To the extent
these loans are extended by banks they are almost always senior, as discussed in Welch
(1997). The relatively risk free nature of bank loans can also be corroborated by examining
recovery rates. In Figure 16, I provide recovery rates across debt types, as provided by
Moody’s recovery database for non-financial corporations. In the twenty years prior to the
financial crisis, the median recovery rate for bank loans was 100%.10 Contrastingly, in the
same time period, the median recovery rates for corporate bonds ranged from 67% to 2%,
depending on the seniority structure of the particular debt contract. The clear differences
of recovery rates suggest to us that the risk-free rate assumption for short-term bank debt
is not far from reality.
10The data for recovery rates are taken from “Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database” (Emery et al. (2007))
and cover 3500 non-financial loans and bonds from 1987 – 2007. Recovery rates vary across industry, debt
type, and seniority, among other categories.
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3.3.4. Default and Debt Valuation
The equity value of a firm accounts for the discounted stream of lifetime profits. Each
period, after realizing both idiosyncratic (xi) and aggregate (X) shocks, the corporation
can choose whether to (a) continue operations or (b) default and transfer residual assets to
bondholders. In the model, I define a default event occuring when the value from continuing
operation is too low relative to a threshold. In terms of an equation, this means that:
1{Default, it} =
1, if Vit ≤
(
V¯ Xt−1
)
0, otherwise
(3.11)
where Vit indicates the value from continuing operations and V¯ is a constant. Notice that
this constant multiplies the business cycle shock indicating that the overall threshold value
is time-varying and procyclical.
One way to interpret the default condition is that when V¯ > 0 equity holders or managers
have an outside option to consider. In Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013), for example, a
similar outside option exists where talented labor that manage a particular type of capital,
have the ability to walk away from the firm. Another, more relevant interpretation, would
be a Chapter 11 reorganization as discussed in Corbae and D’Erasmo (2016). Equityholders
“re-organize” such that bankruptcy proceedings determine the fraction of firm value that
short and long-term debt holders receive. Following this procedure, existing equity holders
retain firm value and resume operations as an unlevered firm.11
When the firm goes into bankruptcy the bondholder will receive any remaining undepreci-
ated capital and profits generated from the capital, net a repayment of the short-term debt
holder. That is to say the payment given default at time t+ 1 is:
Xpdi,t+1 = (1− ξ)
(
pii,t+1 + (1− δ)ki,t+1 − (1 + c)bSi,t+1
)
(3.12)
where ξ represents losses in default, which we can think to be related to legal and admin-
istrative fees paid out in bankruptcy.12 At this point it is clear why the short-term debt
holder will always be repaid in default. Because (1− δ)ki,t+1 ≥ (1 + c)bSi,t+1 due to the col-
lateral constraint, there will always be enough capital on hand to repay the senior claimant.
This will imply that the difference between the right two terms above is always greater than
zero.
11When simulating the model this is almost exactly the procedure that we conduct. The only difference
however is that firm capital is reset upon default.
12A similar form for payment given default is used in Hennessy and Whited (2007) and Kuehn and Schmid
(2014)
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Now I price the risky long-term debt. The equilibrium price, denoted by pLit, will equate
total lent funds to total expected proceeds next period. In period t, the firm chooses a new
amount of issuance, wLit, which brings him to a book value of b
L
i,t+1. The price on the new
dollar of debt will reflect the total default risk of obtaining a new level of book debt. In
order to obtain a level, bLi,t+1 we will have:
pLitb
L
i,t+1 = Et
[
Mt+1(1− 1{Default, i, t+ 1})×
(
(κL + c)b
L
i,t+1 + (1− κL)pLi,t+1bLi,t+1
)]
+Et
[
Mt+1
(
1{Default, i, t+ 1}
)×XPDi,t+1] (3.13)
The pricing equation can be understood in the following manner. The left hand side of the
first line represents the total funds lent. On the right hand side of the first line are the
payments that occur when the firm does not default. Again this includes both the effective
coupon payment and the market value of remaining debt. The right hand side of the second
line accounts for the payment upon default.
3.3.5. Equity Valuation
Shareholders seek to maximize the sum of discounted dividend payouts, taking into account
the ability to potentially default in the future. Conditional on not defaulting, the firm
will earn profits, choose investment, and issue short and long-term debt. The recursive
formulation of each firm’s problem is given by:
Vit = max
{ki,t+1,bSi,t+1,bLi,t+1}
{Dit − Φe (Dit) +Et [Mt+1Wi,t+1]}
Dit = piit + τ(δkit + cb
S
it + cb
L
it)
− iit − Φk(iit, kit)kit
+ pSitw
S
it + p
L
itw
L
it − (1 + c)bsit − (κL + c)bLit − ΦL(wLit)
Wi,t+1 = max
{
Vi,t+1, V¯ Xt
}
s.t. (3.5), (3.8), (3.9), (3.10), (3.13) hold
(3.14)
Note that in the top equation, current firm value is comprised of a dividend payment
(Dit), equity issuance costs in the case that firm dividends are negative (Φe(·)), and the
dynamic continuation value of the firm (Et [Mt+1Wi,t+1]). The additional constraints that
are referred to include the laws of motion for investment and long-term debt, the collateral
constraint, and the pricing equations for short and long-term debt.
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The dividend to the firm will consist of after-tax profits plus a tax shield for depreciation and
debt-related coupon payments. It will also include an outflow for equilibrium investment
and adjustment costs on capital. The terms on the final line of Dit represent debt proceeds
and repayment on both debt contracts, as well as issuance costs (ΦL) in the case that the
firm issues new long-term debt (wLit > 0). Notice that the firm pays a fractional portion
κL + c of long-term debt each period.
As the Bellman equation represents the value from continuing operations, the discounted
future value must account for the chance of potential default in period t + 1. As a result,
Wi,t+1 is a maximum over continuing to operate next period and choosing to take the outside
option.
3.3.6. Discussion of Capital Structure Tradeoffs
At its core this model discusses the tradeoffs among a number of securities that can be
used to finance endogenous investment. Beyond operating cash flows, the firm has the
opportunity each period to take upon new short-term and long-term debt, as well as equity
issuance. How does this model break the irrelevance theorem stated in Miller and Modigliani
(1959)? First, as firms take on more debt (both short and long) they receive a tax shield
that is proportional to the coupon payments on debt. Inherently this tax advantage creates
an incentive for leverage. Beyond the tax advantage, long-term debt embodies distress costs.
If the recovery parameter, ξ > 0, then there will be a loss in firm value upon default. This
will also create a deviation from capital structure irrelevance. Finally, the model features
issuance costs in both long-term debt and equity issuance.
I now discuss how the model emits a partial pecking order. Suppose the corporation would
like to raise additional funds for investment beyond those garnered from current production,
net of debt-related payments. The costs and benefits to issuing the three possible securites
are as follows:
1. Short term debt: the benefit consists of the discounted value of the tax advantage of
the future coupon payment. The costs, however, are on net zero. There is no de-
struction of firm value implied by the bond pricing, due to the seniority and collateral
constraint.
2. Long term debt: similar to short-term debt, the benefit consists of the discounted
value of the tax advantage of the future coupon payment. Conditional on being in a
default region, additional long-term debt increases the likelihood of bearing distress
costs.
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3. Equity issuance: there is no benefit to issuing additional equity while there are flota-
tion costs that are positive (Φe > 0).
Among these securities, it is clear that short-term debt always provides a positive benefit.
This implies that the firm takes upon as much short-term debt as it can and that the
collateral constraint binds, (1 + c)bSi,t+1 = s0(1 − δ)ki,t+1.13 Beyond short-term debt, it is
difficult to definitively say whether long-term debt or equity will be preferred. This will be
dependent on the tradeoff between floation costs and the time-varying net benefit of issuing
corporate debt. As this will be specific to the the quantitative behavior of the model, we
will leave this discussion till later.
3.3.7. Model Solution
Due to stochastic growth over time, we solve a scaled version of the model where all time
t variables are divided by the lagged level of the aggregate shock, Xt−1. In the discussion
that follows, gˆ indicates the detrended value of a generic variable g. For more details on
the exact system of equations that we iterate over, see Appendix 3.6.
The model emits four states, {∆ct, xit, kˆit, bˆLit} and two controls, {kˆi,t+1, bˆLi,t+1}. The value
and bond pricing functions will be of the form:
Vˆit
(
∆ct, xit, kˆit, bˆ
L
it
)
= max
{kˆ′i,t+1,bˆL
′
i,t+1}
{
Dˆit − Φe
(
Dˆit
)
+ e(∆xt)Et
[
Mt+1Wˆi,t+1
]}
Wˆi,t+1 = max
{
V¯ , Vˆi,t+1
} (3.15)
pLit = Et
[
Mt+1
(
1− 1{Vˆt+1≤V¯ }
) (
κL + c+ (1− κL)pLi,t+1
)]
+Et
[
Mt+1
(
1{Vˆt+1≤V¯ }
)(XˆPDi,t+1
bˆLi,t+1
)]
(3.16)
A simple and intuitive algorithm to solve this system would be to start with a guess for
prices and the value function. Using the guess for prices and an implied value for Wˆ , I can
compute a new value of Vˆ that resulted from the maximization step of 3.15. I could then
evaluate the right hand side of 3.16, using the previously computed Vˆ to determine the
default dummy variable and the original guess for prices, evaluated at the optimal policies.
As explained in great depth in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012), these sort of algorithms
suffer convergence issues in models with long-term debt. The reason is the following. In
13A binding collateral constraint aids the quantitative solution of the model. I am able to eliminate one
state (bSit) and control variable (b
S
i,t+1).
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order to move from one iteration of bond prices to another I need to assume a value function
and policy function. If the default decision switches, for a certain set of states, from the
previous iteration to the current one, the resulting abrupt shift will create a large jump in
the bond price. This jump then leads to a great shift in the next iteration of computing
value and policy functions. In this pattern, I never reach joint convergence of price and
value functions.
In order to remedy the convergence issues, Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) and Gordon
and Guerron-Quintana (2016) add IID zero mean noise into the effective dividend flow.
The purpose of this is two fold. First, because the IID noise enters monotonically into
the dividend payout one can compute the policy functions and default decision perfectly
as a function of the IID shock. Second, because the distribution of the IID noise is known
perfectly, when integrating across potential default decisions in the future, as in equations
3.15 and 3.16, we can smooth out potential jumps using numerical integration techniques.14
In the same vein I add a concave function of IID noise, g(mit), to my dividend payoff
such that mit is a truncated normal shock with a mean of zero and a very small variance.
Furthermore g is chosen such that E(g(mit)) = 0. This will imply that the value function
becomes:
Vˆit
(
∆ct, xit, kˆit, bˆ
L
it
)
= max
{kˆ′i,t+1,bˆL
′
i,t+1}
{
Dˆit − Φe
(
Dˆit
)
+ g(mit) + e
(∆xt)Et
[
Mt+1Wˆi,t+1
]}
Here the default decision will be a function of the noise and I compute the default rule
perfectly with respect to thresholds of m. When computing the expectation of next period’s
continuation value, I account for the uncertainty of the noise in the expectation. To compute
the expectation over m, I conduct a 15-interval numerical integration using properties of
the truncated normal distribution. For a detailed description of the numerical algorithm
see Appendix 3.7.
3.4. Results
In this section I document the quantitative results from the model, starting with an ex-
planation of the quarterly calibration, followed by discussions on simulated results, model
mechanisms, cross-sectional behavior, and other findings.
14The implementation of IID noise in both of these papers is slightly different than in mine. In both of
these papers the noise is added such that it enters into the utility flow of the representative household’s
Bellman equation. As a result optimal policies and default decisions are both affected by the noise. In my
setup the noise is simply added to the (risk-neutral) dividend flow, which implies that the noise only factors
into the optimal default decision. In this sense, my use of the IID noise purely helps smooth switches in
the default decision. In the case of these two references, it can also help prove existence of equilibrium as
policies are monotonic in the noise.
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3.4.1. Calibration
In Table 17, I display the parameters I calibrate the baseline version of the model to. The
first three rows of parameters relate to the ? stochastic discount factor. The values for
risk aversion (γ = 2) and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (ψ = 2) would suggest
the firm has a preference for a resolution of early uncertainty (γ > 1ψ ). As well known
in the Long Run Risks literature, such preferences would suggest that shocks to current
aggregate states will heavily influence future utility, which will then feed into the firm’s
discount factor. This creates a large “distortion” in state prices to help accurately capture
default and credit spread patterns.15
The next three lines of the table relate to the production parameters of the model. I use
a curvature parameter (α = .65) that is close in value to the estimates of Hennessy and
Whited (2007). The depreciation parameter is standard in the literature (δ = .025). The
capital adjusment parameter (φk = 1) is chosen to help curb investment rate volatility in
the cross section. An additional criterion I use to set this parameter is that default rates
are decreasing in φk. As firms are more exposed to adjustment costs they are more cautious
in adjusting their capital stock. These cautious adjustments make firms less susceptible to
a large drop in equity value, in the event that an adverse productivity shock hits.
The model is calibrated to feature one quarter short-term debt and five year long-term debt.
Setting κL = .05 suggest that it will take 20 quarters, on average, to pay off long-term debt.
The coupon rate (c = .01) is arbitrarily set and does not have a substantive effect on the
results. As the collateral constraint will bind, the average ratio of short-term debt to total
assets is s0(1 − δ). I set s0 = .08 to capture the mean ratio in Compustat data. The next
three parameters relate to issuance costs for both long-term debt and equity. The fixed cost
parameter for long-term debt, ΦL,a = .006 is set to target the frequency of long-term debt
issuances in the cross section. Similarly the floation cost parameter, Φe,a = .06 is used to
target the frequency of equity issuance. The parameter used for the proportional cost of
equity, Φe,b = .05, comes from Hennessy and Whited (2007).
The bottom set of numbers refer to productivity parameters. The productivity constant,
x¯ = −2.50, is chosen to scale the economy such that detrended capital is roughly equal to
one in a non-leverage economy. The autocorrelation and volatility of idiosyncratic factor
productivity are taken from Kuehn and Schmid (2014). All parameters for consumption
growth are set to match the mean, volatility, and autocorrelation of quarterly, real per-
capita consumption growth from NIPA tables. Finally, I set λx = 3.5 to scale up aggregate
15While β is not high enough to match the level of the risk free rate, all qualitative features of the model
hold in this environment.
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volatility in the firm TFP. More generally, it aids to induce a default that is more counter-
cyclical. The last parameter in the table, V¯ = 1.425 is set as an outside value to the firm.
It is set to help match default rates as seen in the data.16
3.4.2. Model Fit
I solve the model for the previously described set of values and simulate the model. The
simulation consists of a panel with 3000 firms over 500 quarters, including a burn-in period
of 500 quarters. In the model results I describe, I remove defaulted firms each period.
In Table 18, I provide cross-sectional statistics related to profitability, investment, debt,
and default. The data comes from Compustat, onwards from 1984, and the numbers in
parentheses represent time series bootstrapped standard errors. Et (·) and σt (·) refer to the
cross sectional mean and volatility, respectively.
The model performs reasonably well with respect to investment and book leverage. There is
a direct link in the model between book leverage and the long-term debt ratio. The portion
of book leverage that is due to short-term debt is a fixed ratio – s0(1− δ). Any additional
book leverage beyond this is through long-term debt. The model does particularly well with
respect to default (.970% in the model vs. 1.08% annually in the data). This results in a
credit spread of 1.84% annually which is close to the empirical target. The key statistic
that the model does poorly on is profitability. The likely reason why this occurs is the fact
that I do not have fixed costs in production as used in Gomes (2001). As the profitability
is too high this is probably causing the need for a positive outside option (V¯ > 0) to induce
default.
In Table 19 I display the aggregate statistics of the model. The first three rows provide the
moments of consumption growth (mean, volatility, autocorrelation) which are set exoge-
nously, in line with quarterly data. Aggregate investment growth and output growth move
positively with consumption growth and are also close to data. Leverage in the model is also
procyclical as firms issue more book debt in economic booms. Finally as desired, the model
is able to match the stylized fact that the long-term debt ratio is strongly pro-cyclical. In
the model, the aggregated long-term debt ratio has a correlation of .396 with consumption
growth and .664 with output growth. In the next subsection, we will thoroughly discuss
the mechanism that leads to this dynamic. As in the data, default rates vary negatively
with the aggregate state of the economy. When firms become unproductive and have lower
stocks of capital, this brings them closer to the default boundary. The smaller distance to
16When I set V¯ = 0 (“optimal default”), an average firm never defaults. In this region the tradeoffs
between short and long-term debt are not as clear. Absent of a collateral constraint which explicitly limits
issuance of short-term debt, the firm is indifferent between both debt choices. Both debt contracts are risk
free as well.
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default then generates large credit spreads.
3.4.3. Model Mechanism
The patterns that the model generates are best summarized by Figure 18. Here I display
a set of aggregated series related to output, investment, book leverage, and the long-term
debt ratio. The picture confirms the numerical evidence presented in the last sub-section.
In particular, additions to book leverage, via long-term debt, are strongly connected to
changes in investment. Moreover, firms take on more leverage to finance investment.17
This mechanism is particularly explained by Figure 19. Both panels represent the time
series average of simulated data, across aggregate states – hence there are five bars. In the
top figure, I describe what I call the funding deficit, which I define to be:∑
i
(
Dˆit − pSitwˆSit − pLitwˆLit
)
This deficit represents all dividends, net of short-term and long-term debt proceeds, or,
how much the firm seeks to raise out of debt markets. This number is negative so I take its
absolute value and index it to the median state. In terms of interpretation, it is clear that
firms need to raise less debt in the first state (about 45% less) relative to the median state.
In the fifth state, firms require much more, to the order of 70%. In particular the need for
additional debt in the last state is driven by a higher marginal productivity of capital.
In the second panel I describe where this funding is obtained. In particular the figure
displays the time-series average of:∑
i
(
pLitwˆ
L
it
)
/
∑
i
(
Dˆit − pSitwˆSit − pLitwˆLit
)
across states. This figure suggests that firms tend to fund more of their investment needs
in good times using long-term debt proceeds. The reasoning for this is two-fold. First, in
times when the marginal product of investment is high, firms are limited in funding through
short-term debt markets, due to the collateral constraint.
The second reason why this occurs relates to the dynamic pecking order between long-term
debt and equity. In order to obtain additional funding, firms can (i) issue additional long-
term debt or (ii) issue equity, and the choice between the two is a choice between bearing
expected distress costs and paying flotation costs, respectively. Certainly, issuing long-term
17In this figure, there might seem to be a timing discrepancy between aggregate output and investment
versus leverage and the long-term debt ratio. This discrepancy exists because the former group represents
a set of choice variable decided at time t while leverage related variables are chosen at time t− 1.
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debt might provide additional default risk. However, as the firm is further away from default
due to the state of the economy, the expected losses from distress are reduced. As a result,
the firm ends up issuing more long-term debt.
Nonetheless, this preference changes with respect to the business cycle. The bottom panel
also suggests that when aggregate conditions sour, the firm would rather buy back long-term
debt using a combination of short-term debt and equity issuance. While I don’t present the
result here, for firms who do seek to issue equity, their issuance increases dramatically in
low consumption growth states.
Moreover, the model endogenously generates a time-varying pecking order. Regardless
of the state of the world, the firm first issues short-term debt. Any additional external
financing will depend on consumption growth. In high consumption growth states, long-
term debt will be preferred to equity. In lower growth states, firms will, if need be, prefer
equity issuance.
3.4.4. Cross-Sectional Behavior and Rollover Risk
As the model features a set of heterogeneous firms, we can analyze characteristics across
corporations. In Table 20, I sort simulated firms into quintiles each period by their detrended
market value Vˆit. For each statistic I build a panel time series of average statistics across
quintiles. The chracteristics of the basic sort are given in the first line, where firms in
quintile 1 are 15% smaller, in terms of market capitalization, than the median firm on
average. Large firms are 20% larger.
Furthermore, I find that detrended capital varies monotonically with respect to market
value. Firms in quintile 5 are 27% larger than quintile 3, while those in quintile 1 are 22%
smaller. The most surprising result from this table is that while stable firms have more
capital, they also have more leverage and long-term debt. This is surprising in that we
would expect increased leverage to further decay firm value and increase credit spreads.
The equilibrium cross-section in this model implies that capital is the largest driver for
firm stability. In terms of key firm policy variables, profitability and investment increase
as a function of market value. Low market cap firms are 3% less profitable and invest 3%
less than high market cap firms. Economic stability is clearly reflected in credit spreads.
Firms in quintile 1 average a cost of capital that is fifteen times larger than those in the
top quintile.
In Figure 20, I plot firm behavior in the eight quarters that precede default, computed by
taking the average of series generated across corporate default episodes in simulation. The
bottom axis provides the number of quarters in relation to default. Firms that experience
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default undergo a series of shocks that degrades the level of total productivity (Aˆit) by
40%. This is displayed in the first panel. As a result of the shocks, and the lower marginal
productivity of capital, firms then dis-invest as shown in the second panel.
As productivity and capital both decrease firm value, making debt payments relatively more
costly, corporations would like to buy back some of the long term debt on its balance sheet.
However, this becomes difficult due to two reasons: (i) reduced capital and productivity
result in less profits, which provides a shortage of internal funds to buy back debt and (ii)
the collateral constraint, which is tied to the firm’s decreasing capital stock, greatly limits
the amount of short-term debt that can be used to liquidate long-term. As a result in panel
3, we see that the leverage ratio actually increases. It is clear that the combination of these
endogenous state variables changing leads to the value function behavior. Furthermore, it
is striking to see how much credit spreads react over the course of the default episode. Over
eight quarters the credit spreads rise from ∼ 0% to ∼ 220%, when the firm is on the precipice
of default. Moreover, this discussion confirms to us that the endogenous investment channel
matters greatly for the model. As firms lower their capital due to a lower marginal product
of capital, this has a substantial effect on firm value and the re-issuance costs of debt.
3.4.5. Further Considerations
While the model captures many salient features of investment behavior, corporate financing
decisions, and asset prices there are a few places where it does not do as well. In particular,
the model does not deliver the predictability results presented in the empirical section,
between the long-term debt ratio and investment growth. The reason why this does not
occur, in my estimation, is that investment growth rates in the model are not auto-correlated
enough to begin with. In the data, the first order autocorrelation of investment growth is
roughly .20 and slowly decreases to 0 over the course of three lags. In the model however, the
first order autocorrelation is -.24 and is volatile. Moreover the level of aggregate investment
is too strongly tied to the aggregate shock in the model, which has negative empirical
consequences for the model’s investment growth. One way to tackle these issues is to add
adjustment costs to the growth rate of investment (see Christiano et al., 2005). This will
directly induce an autocorrelation in investment growth. Additionally, the use of a “time-
to-build” assumption (see Boldrin et al., 2001) will also generate the desired characteristics
for investment growth.18
In reality firms have access to additional securities which allow them to potentially avoid
default – in particular, credit lines. In the financial crisis it is well documented that firms
18The literature on financial frictions (see ?Bernanke et al., 1999) suggests that financial intermediary
related constraints on investment can create autocorrelation in investment growth.
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drew down their credit lines in order to fund operations. For example, Campello et al.
(2011) suggests via survey data that small, financially constrained firms drew close to 60%
of their available lines of credit in 2009. In my model however, as firms effectively get priced
out of public debt markets (due to low capital, high leverage, and rising long-term credit
spreads), they are forced to default. One way to augment the model to address the “lack”
of debt market choices is to add a cash asset, that allows firms to save for the rainy day.
These savings would allow corporations to keep additional reserves on hand in the face of
future productivity drops.19 I leave this for future research.
3.5. Conclusion
Corporate debt maturity is a time-varying phenomenon that is linked to business cycles. In
this paper I study the extent of these linkages and show how they can arise in an economic
model. I empirically document that firms extend their debt maturity in peaks of the business
cycle, when aggregate output and investment are high, and corporate credit spreads are low.
These results also extend to the corporation level, where investment rates and profitability
are linked to firm-specific long-term debt ratios.
To understand why the ratio time varies and is linked to the business cycle requires a
theoretically motivated explanation. I provide one by developing a dynamic heterogeneous
firm economy where corporations trade off debt maturity choice in the face of investment
opportunities. Long term debt inherits relatively more distress costs than short-term debt
which creates an initial preference for lower duration liabilities. However, limits on short-
term debt make the potential distress costs worth it, in order to take advantage of the
pro-cyclical investment opportunities. The combination of investment and the collateral
structure lead to the pro-cyclical long-term debt ratio. Moreover the model sheds light on
the macro-economy as it implies that firms with higher amounts of long-term debt are more
systemically important to aggregate fluctuations.
19Mechanically, this would involve allowing bSi,t+1 to drift to negative regions. This would be equivalent
to implementing firm-level retained earnings, as in Livdan et al. (2009).
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3.6. Appendix: Detrended Model Equations
As there is stochastic growth in the model, we normalize each variable, vart, such that:
ˆvart =
vart
Xt−1
The complete list of equations that govern the model consist of:
Exogenous Processes (outside of model solution):
log(Ct/Ct−1) ≡ ∆ct = µc + ρc∆ct−1 + σcct
log(Xt/Xt−1) ≡ ∆xt = E(∆ct) + λx (∆ct −E(∆ct))
xit = ρxxi,t−1 + σxxt
Mt+1 = β
θ
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ (
PCt+1 + 1
PCt
)θ−1
1 = Et
[
Mt+1
(
Ct+1
Ct
)(
PCt+1 + 1
PCt
)]
The above lines refer to equations (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), and (3.7) from the text.
Investment and Leverage Constraints:
(1 + c)bˆSi,t+1 = s(1− δ)kˆi,t+1
e(∆xt)kˆi,t+1 = (1− δ)kˆit + iˆit
e(∆xt)bˆLi,t+1 = (1− κ)bˆLit + ωˆLit
e(∆xt)bˆSi,t+1 = ωˆ
S
it
The above lines refer to equations (3.5), (3.8), and (3.9) from the text. The constraint for short-term
debt binds due to the strict preference for short-term debt.
Firm Value:
Vˆit
(
∆ct, xit, kˆit, bˆ
L
it
)
= max
{kˆ′i,t+1,bˆL
′
i,t+1}
{
Dˆit − Φe
(
Dˆit
)
+ e(∆xt)Et
[
Mt+1Wˆi,t+1
]}
Wˆi,t+1 = max
{
V¯ , Vˆi,t+1
}
Dˆit = (1 − τ)e(x¯+xit+(1−α)∆xt)kˆαit + τ
(
δkˆit + cbˆ
S
it + cbˆ
L
it
)
− iˆit − Φk
(
iˆit, kˆit
)
kˆit
+ pSitωˆ
S
it + p
L
itωˆ
L
it − (1 + c)bˆSit − (κ+ c)bˆLit − ΦL
(
ωˆlit
)
The above lines refer to equation (3.14) from the text.
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Debt Pricing:
pSit = Et [Mt+1 (1 + c)]
pLitbˆ
L
i,t+1 = Et
[
Mt+1
(
1− 1{Vˆt+1≤V¯ }
)(
(κL + c)bˆ
L
i,t+1 + (1− κL)pLi,t+1bˆLi,t+1
)]
+ Et
[
Mt+1
(
1{Vˆt+1≤V¯ }
)(
XˆLi,t+1
)]
XˆLi,t+1 = (1− ξ)
(
pˆii,t+1 + (1− δ)kˆi,t+1 − (1 + c)bˆSi,t+1
)
The above lines refer to equations (3.10), (3.12), and (3.13) from the text.
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3.7. Appendix: Numerical Solution
In this section, I outline the numerical solution that I use. As the model contains long-term debt,
I use techniques from Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) to help convergence. The main difference
is that in my model I have an additional choice variable (capital) which does not allow for the use
of a monotonicity assumption. To get around this problem, I use a similar methodology as used in
Gordon and Guerron-Quintana (2016), while also handling the additional short-term debt.20
The two key parts of the model are given by:
Equity Value:
Vˆ
(
∆ct, xit, kˆit, bˆ
L
it,mit
)
= max
{kˆi,t+1,bˆLi,t+1}
{
Dˆit − Φe
(
Dˆit
)
+ g (mit) + e
(∆xt)Z
(
∆ct, xit, kˆi,t+1, bˆ
L
i,t+1
)}
Z
(
∆ct, xit, kˆi,t+1, bˆ
L
i,t+1
)
= Et
[
Mt+1 ×max
{
V¯ , Vˆi,t+1
}]
Pricing of Long Term Debt:
pL
(
∆ct, xit, kˆi,t+1, bˆ
L
i,t+1
)
= Et
[
Mt+1
(
1− 1{Vˆt+1≤V¯ }
) (
κL + c+ (1− κL)pLi,t+1
)]
+ Et
[
Mt+1
(
1{Vˆt+1≤V¯ }
)(XˆPDi,t+1
bˆLi,t+1
)]
where g(·) indicates a concave function of the noise, mit. The noise is I.I.D. with a truncated
N (0, σm), over support [−m¯, m¯]. The algorithm broadly operates as follows:
0. Set aggregate grids and solve for the stochastic discount factor, M (∆ct,∆ct+1), using iterative
techniques on the price to consumption ratio in equation 3.7. Start with guesses for the
expected continuation value, Z0 (·) and bond pricing, pL0 (·). Neither is a function of the
noise, m.
1. Input {Z0, pL0} into the right hand side of the equity value function and solve for one iteration
of firm value. As the optimal policy is not dependent onm, we will receive two policy functions:
{kˆ1′ (·) , bˆL1′ (·)}. The policy functions are specified over the entire state space.
2. For every state vector, Sit = {∆ct, xit, kˆit, bˆLit}, compute the default decision (D) over the
support of m. Because Vˆ is montonic in m, we check which of three possible cases hold:
20There is one major difference in the way I compute my model relative to the above references. While I
allow for the noise to impact the default decision, I do not allow it to affect policy functions, as it is only
additive and separable in the Bellman equation. Because of this, the policy functions will not receive the
smoothing benefits of the noise. The key reason I do not allow for the interaction between policies and
the IID noise is because I would not like to change the concavity on the dividend flow. If I did change the
concavity, this would alter the basic structure of the problem.
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(a)
{
Vˆ (Sit, m¯) ≤ V¯
}
In this case the firm will always default over the support. The optimal decision will
be given by:
D (Sit,mit) = 1 ∀mit
(b)
{
Vˆ (Sit,−m¯) ≤ V¯ and Vˆ (Sit, m¯) > V¯
}
In this case, we know that the firm switches its default decision over the support of
m. Because of the concave nature of g, we know there exists an m˜ in the support of m
such that:
Vˆ (Sit, m˜) = V¯
With m˜ defined in such a manner the default decision will be given by:
D(Sit,mit) =
1, if mit ≤ m˜0, otherwise
(c)
{
Vˆ (Sit,−m¯) > V¯
}
In this case the firm will never default over the support. The optimal decision will be
given by:
D (Sit,mit) = 0 ∀mit
Note that in order to compute values across different m, we use the optimal policies computed
in step 1 of the procedure. Another implication of this procedure is that, if applicable,
m˜ = m˜(Sit).
3. To this point we have computed optimal policies which matter in the case firms do not default,
as well as indicator variables for default. In some cases the default decision may vary over m,
so we have also computed default breakpoints. Using this information we can compute our
next iteration of expected continuation value and bond price, {Z1, pL1}.
(a) Computing Expected Continuation Value. The discounted, continuation value will be
given by:
Et
[
Mt+1 ×max
{
V¯ , Vˆi,t+1
}]
= Et
Mt+1 ×E [max{V¯ , Vˆi,t+1} ∣∣∆ct+1, xi,t+1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
reflects expectation solely over m

Using the law of iterated expectations as shown above, we can focus on first computing
the expectations of the continuation value over mi,t+1 and then taking an expectation
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over uncertainty regarding the fundamental states. For the purposes of my work, the
second expectation is taken using a standard discrete-state approach. Hence, I will focus
on explaining the bracketed expectation below.
E
[
max
{
V¯ , Vˆi,t+1
} ∣∣∆ct+1, xi,t+1] = E [D (Si,t+1,mi,t+1) V¯ + (1−D (Si,t+1,mi,t+1))Vˆi,t+1 (Si,t+1,mi,t+1)]
where Si,t+1 encorporates the relevant future productivity states. To compute the right
hand side expectation, for each given state (Si,t+1), there will be two cases:
I. There is no switch in default over m. In the case where the firm always defaults,
the expectation will be given by V¯ . In the case where the firm always continues to
operate, the expectation will be given by:∫ m¯
−m¯
Vˆ (Si,t+1,mi,t+1) dm =
14∑
j=1
[
Vˆ
(
Si,t+1,
mj +mj+1
2
)
× Pr (mj < mi,t+1 < mj+1)
]
where Pr denotes the probability. Notice above that we approximate the integral
using a numerical integral with 14 intervals. All mj refer to elements from an equally
spaced vector over the support of m, [m1,m2, . . . ,m14,m15].
II. There is a switch in default over m, which occurs at m˜. We now write the expec-
tation from above as:∫ m¯
−m¯
max
{
V¯ , Vˆ (Si,t+1,mi,t+1)
}
dm =
∫ m˜
−m¯
V¯ dm+
∫ m¯
m˜
Vˆi,t+1 (Si,t+1,mi,t+1) dm
= V¯ × Pr (mi,t+1 < m˜)
+
∫ m¯
m˜
Vˆi,t+1 (Si,t+1,mi,t+1) dm
Without loss of generality, suppose that m˜ falls between mk−1 and mk. Then the
last integral will be computed as:
∫ m¯
m˜
Vˆi,t+1 (Si,t+1,mi,t+1) dm = Vˆi,t+1
(
Si,t+1,
m˜+mk
2
)
× Pr (m˜ < mi,t+1 < mk)
+
14∑
j=k
[
Vˆ
(
Si,t+1,
mj +mj+1
2
)
× Pr (mj < mi,t+1 < mj+1)
]
After computing this at a given state, we are left with Z˜1 (Si,t+1). Using this object we
can proceed and compute our desired object using standard discrete methods:
Z1
(
∆ct, xit, kˆi,t+1, bˆ
L
i,t+1
)
= Et
[
Mt+1Z˜
1 (Si,t+1)
]
(b) Computing the Bond Price. Similar to the computation of the expected continuation
value the bond price will be a function of a default portion and a non-default portion.
pL
(
∆ct, xit, kˆi,t+1, bˆ
L
i,t+1
)
= Et
[
Mt+1 (1−Di,t+1)
(
κL + c+ (1− κL)pLi,t+1
)]
+ Et
[
Mt+1Di,t+1
(
XˆPDi,t+1
bˆLi,t+1
)]
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where Di,t+1 is the potential default decision at time t+ 1. It is important to realize that
the future bond price, pLi,t+1 is a function of a number of future policies:
pLi,t+1 = p
L
(
∆ct+1, xi,t+1, kˆi,t+2, bˆ
L
i,t+2
)
= pL
(
. . . , kˆ′
(
∆ct+1, xi,t+1, kˆi,t+1, bˆ
L
i,t+1
)
, bˆL
′
(· · · )
)
where bˆL
′
is a function of the same variables as kˆ′. In the course of the algorithm we use
the policy functions computed in step 1 to express the future price as a function of Si,t+1.
All of this being said we are left with a familiar problem:
pL (·) = Et [Mt+1 × ((1−D(Si,t+1,mi,t+1))f1(Si,t+1) +D(Si,t+1,mi,t+1)f2(Si,t+1))]
f1(Si,t+1) = κL + c+ (1− κL)pL (Si,t+1)
f2(Si,t+1) =
XˆPDi,t+1
bˆLi,t+1
= xb (Si,t+1)
Because the inner piece that multiples Mt+1 is also dependent on the realization of the
noise, we again use law of iterated expectations to focus on computing the inner expecta-
tion over m, given by:
p˜L1(Si,t+1) = E [((1−D(Si,t+1,mi,t+1))f1(Si,t+1) +D(Si,t+1,mi,t+1)f2(Si,t+1))]
The computation of this expectation will be conceptually identical to the technique used
in part (a). As a result I won’t go into further detail here. The final derived bond price
will be:
pL1
(
∆ct, xit, kˆi,t+1, bˆ
L
i,t+1
)
= Et
[
Mt+1p˜
L1(Si,t+1)
]
4. Having computed expected continuation value and bond prices we check convergence:
ε = max
{‖Z0 − Z1‖, ‖pL0 − pL1‖}
If ε is small enough we are done. Otherwise, choose a new starting guess based on the recent
outcomes:
ZNEW = ξzZ
0 + (1− ξz)Z1
pNEW = ξpp
L0 + (1− ξp)pL1
Let Z0 = ZNEW , pL0 = pNEW and go back to step 1. In practice, I set ξz = 0 and choose
ξp = .95.
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Table 12: Aggregate Predictive Regressions
k = 1Q 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1
k
∑k
i=1 ∆yt+i = β0 + β
′
XXt + βLTLTDR
c
t + errort+k:
βLT 0.165*** 0.151*** 0.124*** 0.102** 0.078 0.059 0.044 0.036
t(βLT ) 4.343 3.773 2.783 2.166 1.612 1.298 1.106 1.062
Adjusted R2 0.312 0.424 0.423 0.441 0.405 0.391 0.381 0.356
1
k
∑k
i=1 ∆it+i = β0 + β
′
XXt + βLTLTDR
c
t + errort+k:
βLT 0.939*** 0.921*** 0.797*** 0.637*** 0.511*** 0.363* 0.245 0.187
t(βLT ) 4.486 4.974 4.400 3.442 2.675 1.958 1.565 1.538
Adjusted R2 0.286 0.414 0.397 0.425 0.416 0.408 0.389 0.382
This table examines the relationship between average future, real per-capita output growth and
investment growth, and the HP-filtered cyclical component of the aggregate long-term debt share
(LTDRct). Each panel displays the results of regressing an economic aggregate on a vector of
controls, Xt, and the cyclic component. The first line of each panel measures the sensitivity, βLT ,
with respect to the LTDR measure; the second line measures the t-statistic when accounting for
Newey-West standard errors; the final row represents adjusted R2 measures. The column heading
provides the horizon of the average future dependent variable, in terms of k quarters. Controls are
at time t and include: real per-capita GDP growth, real per-capita consumption growth, CPI
inflation, log PD ratios, the difference between Moody’s BAA and AAA interest rates, the yield on
the 3M US Treasury bill, the difference between the 10Y US Treasury bond and 3M Treasury bill
yields, and the growth rate of aggregate debt. All economic growth variables are in log terms,
quarter over quarter, while financial prices are in level terms, from 1954 onwards. The number of
stars correspond to double-sided significance at the 90%*, 95%**, and 99%*** confidence levels.
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Table 13: Firm-Level Profitability and Long Term Debt
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3)
piit
kit
= β0 + β
′
XXit + βLTLTDRit + errorit:
σ(Πi/Ki) –3.65*** -3.66*** -3.12***
t-statistic -18.3 -18.3 -15.0
Bi/Ki -.031*** -.030*** -.034***
t-statistic -29.7 -29.5 -31.2
Ii,−1/Ki,−1 .068*** .062*** .045***
t-statistic 11.0 9.91 7.11
Qi,−1 .003** .003*** .003***
t-statistic 12.1 11.5 13.3
LTDRi / 100 .475*** .497*** .290***
t-statistic 7.13 7.50 4.22
No. of Firms 10,872 10,872 10,872
No. of Observations 217,967 217,967 217,967
Adjusted R2 .028 .032 .014
Firm Level Controls Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls No Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes
This table regresses firm profitability onto firm and macro level variables. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the firm level. Firm-level controls include historical one year volatility on
profitability, current book leverage, lagged investment rate, lagged ratio of market value to book
value of assets, and the long-term debt share. Macro controls include the quarterly growth rates of
industrial production and the consumer price index, the level of the 3M treasury bill, the difference
between the 10Y treasury bond and 3M bill, and the difference between Moody’s measures of BAA
and AAA corporate bond yields. All data is from 1984 onwards. The number of stars correspond
to double-sided significance at the 90%*, 95%**, and 99%*** confidence levels.
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Table 14: Firm-Level Investment and Long Term Debt
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3)
iit
kit
= β0 + β
′
XXit + βLTLTDRit + errorit:
σ(Πi/Ki) -.080* -.112*** .028
t-statistic -1.89 -2.62 .550
Bi/Ki -.007*** -.007*** -.013***
t-statistic -21.3 -23.2 -26.7
Ii,−1/Ki,−1 .393*** .384*** .267***
t-statistic 60.4 59.0 38.5
Qi,−1 .001*** .001*** .001***
t-statistic 17.9 16.8 19.7
LTDRi / 100 .334*** .362*** .161***
t-statistic 16.9 18.4 6.50
No. of Firms 10,598 10,598 10,598
No. of Observations 204,211 204,211 204,211
Adjusted R2 .312 .314 .254
Firm Level Controls Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls No Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes
This table regresses capital-adjusted firm investment onto firm and macro level variables. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Firm-level controls include historical one year
volatility on profitability, current book leverage, lagged investment rate, lagged ratio of market
value to book value of assets, and the long-term debt share. Macro controls include the quarterly
growth rates of industrial production and the consumer price index, the level of the 3M treasury
bill, the difference between the 10Y treasury bond and 3M bill, and the difference between Moody’s
measures of BAA and AAA corporate bond yields. All data is from 1984 onwards. The number of
stars correspond to double-sided significance at the 90%*, 95%**, and 99%*** confidence levels.
111
Table 15: Predicting Firm-Level Variables using Long-Term Debt
Explanatory Variable k = 1 2 3 4
1
k+1
∑k
j=0
pii,t+j
ki,t+j
= β0 + β
′
XXit + βLTLTDRit + errorit:
LTDRi / 100 .317*** .244*** .179*** .113***
t-statistic 11.8 9.79 7.57 4.87
No. of Firms 10,377 9.880 9,427 8,946
No. of Observations 207,166 196,785 186,852 177,613
Adjusted R2 .012 .005 .003 .001
Firm Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No
1
k+1
∑k
j=0
ii,t+j
ki,t+j
= β0 + β
′
XXit + βLTLTDRit + errorit:
LTDRi / 100 .298*** .242*** .191*** .164***
t-statistic 20.5 17.4 14.1 12.2
No. of Firms 9,943 9,143 8,620 8,066
No. of Observations 185,836 169,889 157,363 146,032
Adjusted R2 .337 .311 .295 .269
Firm Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No
This table regresses average, future profitability and investment onto firm and macro level
variables. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Firm-level controls include
historical one year volatility on profitability, current leverage, lagged investment rate, lagged ratio
of market value to book value of assets, and the long-term debt share. Macro controls include the
quarterly growth rates of industrial production and the consumer price index, the level of the 3M
treasury bill, the difference between the 10Y treasury bond and 3M bill, and the difference between
Moody’s measures of BAA and AAA corporate bond yields. All data is from 1984 onwards. The
number of stars correspond to double-sided significance at the 90%*, 95%**, and 99%***
confidence levels.
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Table 16: Firm-Level Variables and Long Term Debt, by Book Size
Explanatory Variable Small 2 3 4 Large
piit
kit
= β0 + β
′
XXit + βLTLTDRit + errorit:
LTDRi / 100 .587*** .247*** .419*** .112 .034
t-statistic 3.98 2.17 4.15 1.12 .270
Average Log Size 2.57 4.11 5.22 6.37 8.32
No. of Firms 4,158 4,469 3,960 3,013 1,756
No. of Observations 46,030 45,697 44,819 43,723 37,697
Adjusted R2 .105 .009 .064 .151 .265
Firm Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No
iit
kit
= β0 + β
′
XXit + βLTLTDRit + errorit:
LTDRi / 100 .342*** .397*** .382*** .322*** .101**
t-statistic 9.05 10.5 9.28 7.34 2.00
Average Log Size 2.57 4.11 5.22 6.37 8.32
No. of Firms 3,998 4,308 3,782 2,882 1,693
No. of Observations 43,026 42,897 42,138 41,133 35,016
Adjusted R2 .186 .298 .354 .399 .399
Firm Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No
This table regresses profitability and investment onto firm and macro level variables, running separate
pooled regressions for firms of different size quintile. Five size quintiles are computed period by period,
based on the book value of assets. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Firm-level
controls include historical one year volatility on profitability, current leverage, lagged investment rate,
lagged ratio of market value to book value of assets, and the long-term debt share. Macro controls include
the quarterly growth rates of industrial production and the consumer price index, the level of the 3M
treasury bill, the difference between the 10Y treasury bond and 3M bill, and the difference between
Moody’s measures of BAA and AAA corporate bond yields. All data is from 1984 onwards. The number of
stars correspond to double-sided significance at the 90%*, 95%**, and 99%*** confidence levels.
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Table 17: Calibration Parameters for Baseline Model
Parameter Value Note
β .98 Time Discount
γ 7.5 Risk Aversion
ψ 2 Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution
δ .025 Depreciation of Capital
α .65 Production Exponent on Capital
φk 1 Coefficient on Capital Adjustment Costs
κL .05 Governs Average Maturity of Debt
c .01 Coupon Rate
s0 .08 Selected to hit b
S/k ratio in the data
ΦL,a .006 Fixed Issuance Cost of Long Term Debt
Φe,a .06 Fixed Issuance Cost of Equity
Φe,b .05 Proportional Issuance Cost of Equity
x¯ -2.50 Productivity constant
ρz .85 Firm Productivity Autocorrelation
σz .15 Firm Productivity Conditional Volatility
µc, ρc, σc – Set to match mean, volatility, and autocorrelation of ∆ct
λx 3.50
V¯ 1.425 Chosen to hit default rate
This table provides the calibrated parameters for the baseline version of the model. The
calibration is at a quarterly basis. For a discussion of the specific parameters see the main text.
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Table 18: Model Versus Data: Firm-Level Statistics
Variable Description Model Data (2.5, 97.5%)
E
(
Et
(
piit
kit
))
Cross-Sec Mean of Profitability .066 .022 (.020, .024)
E
(
σt
(
piit
kit
))
Cross-Sec Stdev of Profitability .017 .050 (.047, .053)
E
(
Et
(
iit
kit
))
Mean of Investment Rate .029 .040 (.035, .045)
E
(
σt
(
iit
kit
))
Stdev of Investment Rate .045 .057 (.050, .064)
E
(
Et
(
bSit+b
L
it
kit
))
Mean of Book Leverage .193 .249 (.238, .263)
E
(
σt
(
bSit+b
L
it
kit
))
Stdev of Book Leverage .079 .183 (.180, .185)
E
(
Et
(
bLit
bSit+b
L
it
))
Mean of Long Debt Ratio .520 .694 (.669, .719)
E
(
σt
(
bLit
bSit+b
L
it
))
Stdev of Long Debt Ratio .225 .323 (.314, .331)
400×E
(
Et
(
κL+c
pLit
− κL+c
p∗Lit
))
Mean of Credit Spread 1.84 1.25 (.909, 1.65)
400×E
(
σt
(
κL+c
pLit
− κL+c
p∗Lit
))
Stdev of Credit Spread 12.30 –
400×E (Et (1Default,it)) Mean of Default Rate .968 1.08 (.422, 1.68)
This table provides firm-level statistics generated from a panel simulation of 3000 firms across 500
quarters. For variable xit, E (Et (xit)) refers to the time series mean of the cross-sectional mean.
Meanwhile, E (σt (xit)) refers to the time series mean of the cross-sectional standard deviation of
xit. All model computations remove defaulted firms. Quarterly data for profitability, investment
rates, book leverage, and the long-term debt ratio are taken from Compustat, 1984 – 2015. The
credit spread is defined as the difference between the Moody’s BAA and AAA corporate bond
yields. The annual default rate series is also Moody’s. The numbers in parentheses represent
bootstrapped time series errors at the 2.5% and 97.5% bounds.
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Table 19: Model Versus Data: Aggregate Statistics
Variable Description Model Data (2.5, 97.5%)
E (∆ct) Mean Cons. Growth .446 .493 (.397, .590)
σ (∆ct) Stdev Cons. Growth .454 .466 (.413, .510)
ρ (∆ct,∆ct−1) AR(1) Cons. Growth .499 .450 (.345, .536)
ρ (∆ct,∆yt) Corr(Cons. Growth, Output Growth) .741 .804 (.750, .863)
ρ (∆ct,∆it) Corr(Cons. Growth, Investment Growth) .444 .596 (.460, .743)
ρ
(
∆ct,
∑
i(b
S
it+b
L
it)∑
i kit
)
Corr(Cons. Growth, Leverage) .400 –
ρ
(
∆ct,
∑
i(b
L
it)∑
i(b
S
it+b
L
it)
)
Corr(Cons. Growth, Agg. LTDR ) .396 .262 (.151, .356)
ρ
(
∆yt,
∑
i(b
L
it)∑
i(b
S
it+b
L
it)
)
Corr(Output Growth, Agg. LTDR ) .664 .323 (.264, .388)
ρ (AggDefaultt,∆ct) Corr(Agg. Default Rate, Cons. Growth) -.365 -.223 (-.315, -.053)
ρ (MeanCreditSpreadt,∆ct) Corr(Agg. Credit Spread, Cons. Growth) -.325 -.505 (-.659, -.345)
This table provides aggregate statistics generated from the aggregation of a panel simulation of
3000 firms across 500 quarters. All model computations remove defaulted firms. Data for
consumption and output series are taken from NIPA accounts, from 1954 onwards. The data
counterpart of the long-term debt series comes from the HP filtered version of the Flow of Funds
measure. The credit spread is defined as the difference between the Moody’s BAA and AAA
corporate bond yields. The annual default rate series is also Moody’s. The numbers in parentheses
represent bootstrapped time series errors at the 2.5% and 97.5% bounds.
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Table 20: Sorting on Distance to Default
Mean of Variable Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
Detrended Value (Vˆit) 2.33 2.51 2.65 2.81 3.10
Index 86.51 94.60 100.0 106.0 119.4
Detrended Capital (kˆit) 1.07 1.24 1.35 1.45 1.67
Index 78.25 92.14 100.0 108.0 126.6
Profitability
(
piit
kit
)
.052 .058 .065 .071 .082
Investment Rate
(
iit
kit
)
.012 .026 .031 .036 .042
Book Leverage
(
bSit+b
L
it
kit
)
.156 .186 .205 .213 .204
Book Long Term Debt Ratio
(
bLit
bSit+bi
L
it
)
.417 .521 .553 .557 .530
Long Term Credit Spread (%, Annual) 6.56 .901 .686 .583 .468
This table provides cross-sectional model statistics generated from a panel simulation of 3000 firms
across 500 quarters. Each period I sort non-defaulted firms by their detrended value (Vˆit) into five
quintiles. After generating five time series for each variable I compute the average which is
reported above. Under deterended value and capital I also include values that are indexed to the
middle quintile.
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Figure 14: Cyclical Component of the Long Term Debt Share
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This figure displays the time series of the cyclical component of the long-term debt share, using a
Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter. Grey bars indicate NBER-defined recession dates. Data related
to the long-term debt share comes from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds. The frequency is
quarterly from 1952Q2 through 2014Q2.
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Figure 15: Cross Correlation of Economic Aggregates and LTDR Cycles
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This figure displays cross correlation functions between cyclical components of the long-term debt share and
economic aggregates. Figures in the left column correlate aggregate output growth and the cyclical component of
the long-term debt share while those in the right column test investment growth. From top to bottom, we examine
filtered values of the long-term debt share using: (1) Hodrick and Prescott (LTDRHP ), (2) Baxter and King
band-pass (LTDRBP ) and (3) Christiano and Fitzgerald band-pass (LTDRCF ) filters. The x-axis provides the
number of forward lags for each economic aggregate while the y-axis provides the cross correlation. All data is
quarterly from 1952Q2 through 2014Q2. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are computed at each lag and given
by the gray bands.
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Figure 16: Recovery Rates Across Debt Types
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This figure displays the mean and median recovery rates across different loan and bond seniority
types. All data is from “Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database” and spans approximately 3500
loans and bonds over 720 US non-financial corporate default events. All data refers to the twenty
years preceding the financing crisis (1987 – 2007). From left to right, bars represent statistics
related to: bank loans, senior secured corporate bonds, senior unsecured, senior subordinated,
subordinated, junior subordinated, and all corporate bonds.
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Figure 17: Model-Implied Bond Prices
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This figure displays the equilibrium value for pLit(Aˆit, kˆi,t+1, bˆ
L
i,t+1) across states, where Aˆit
indicates the joint aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity states. The top panel focuses on the
low joint TFP state (low aggregate and low idiosyncratic). The second panel focuses on the
medium aggregate and idiosyncratic, while the bottom panel relates to high productivity states. In
each panel the different lines (from bottom to top) represent different choices for capital next
period (kˆi,t+1). The bottom axis represents the choice of next period long-term debt (bˆ
L
i,t+1).
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Figure 18: Aggregate Behavior of the Model
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This figure displays the aggregate behavior of the model in a sample simulation of 100 quarters. In
all three graphs the solid black line represents output growth. From top to bottom, the dashed line
represents investment, book leverage, and the long-term debt ratio. All values are standardized
and provided as z-scores.
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Figure 19: Funding Investment through Long Term Debt
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Figure (a) displays the time series average of the simulated aggregate funding deficits across five
aggregate states. The left most bar relates to the lowest consumption growth state while the right
most to highest. All of the state values are indexed to the middle state. To build the funding
deficit we simulate the model to compute the gap between total dividend and the amount raised
through short and long-term debt (Dˆit − pSitwˆSit − pLitwˆLit). To receive the aggregate number, we sum
across non-defaulted firms. Figure (b) displays the time series average of the percentage of the
funding deficit that comes from the long-term debt proceeds (pLitwˆ
L
it). For cases where this
percentage is negative, this suggests that long-term debt was puchased back.
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Figure 20: Firm Behavior Preceding Default
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This figure displays the average behavior of the firm eight quarters in advance of default. The
panels represent, from left to right, total productivity (Aˆit), de-trended capital (kˆit), leverage(
bˆSit+bˆ
L
it
kˆit
)
, the credit spread
(
κL+c
pLit
− κL+c
pL∗it
)
, and detrended firm-value (Vˆit). The bottom axis
provides the number of quarters in relation to default which occurs at time 0. Productivity,
capital, leverage, and firm value are all indexed to the initial value, 8 quarters in advance of
default, while the credit spread is expressed in annual percentage terms.
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